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The Effects Of Accessibility On Judgment And Decision-Making
Abstract
When making decisions, individuals may only use a subset of all available information. The experience of
thinking about and attending to this accessible information can, atop of the actual content, exert an impact on
what information (and the weighting thereof) is employed in judgments. In this dissertation, I examine how
experiences associated with memory-based accessibility (i.e., ease-of-recall) and stimulus-based accessibility
(i.e., amount of attention allocated, salience) influence decision-making. Accessibility serves as the connecting
construct for two essays of this dissertation for a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and how salience
affects valuation.
In essay one, I meta-analyze an instantiation of how accessibility experiences (i.e., feelings associated with
trying to retrieve information from memory) affect decisions: the ease-of-retrieval effect. The ease-of-retrieval
effect contends people employ cognitive feelings of ease from recall as an input to judgment. I explore this
idea through a common manipulation of ease-of-retrieval in which individuals generate either few or many
examples of a given topic such as times they behaved assertively (Schwarz et al. 1991). This manipulation is
argued to affect subjective ease and thereby other downstream dependent measures. Specifically, I test
whether subjective ease fully mediates the impact of the manipulation. I also test several theoretical
moderators of the use of cognitive feelings of ease as information (e.g., misattribution) and how much of the
effect may be attributable to publication bias. Across over twenty-years of studies using conceptually-similar
manipulations, I find evidence for several theoretical moderators, and find that publication bias only explains a
small portion of the effect. Further, I find that subjective ease only partially explains the ease-of-retrieval effect,
which means other explanations of the effect may also exist, yet they are understudied in the literature.
In essay two, I turn to stimulus-based forms of accessibility: namely, salience, or the amount of attention
devoted to a stimulus. While prior theories of decision-making contend greater salience increases information
accessibility, they do not specify how salience influences the weighting and valuation of said information.
Instead, these theories mostly distinguish between low versus high accessibility due to salience as affecting
information used in judgments, and that information valuation occurs separately based on task goals. I
demonstrate through three rating-based conjoint experiments across multiple product categories (e.g., cars)
that even when all information is highly accessible, differences in salience may have an impact on the valuation
and weighting of that information. I show these effects can arise from both perceptual (e.g., position effects)
and cognitive (i.e., elaboration in working memory) sources. However, I also demonstrate the persistence of
salience-biases differs between these two sources: biases due to cognitive salience decline over repeated
decisions, whereas biases from perceptual salience do not.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Marketing
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2633
First Advisor
John W. Hutchinson
Keywords
accessibility, judgment, salience, valuation
Subject Categories
Advertising and Promotion Management | Marketing | Psychology
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2633
 THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING  
 
Evan Weingarten 
 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Marketing 
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
and 
Psychology 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2017 
Supervisor of Dissertation      
_____________________ 
J. Wesley Hutchinson 
Stephen J. Heyman Professor, Professor of Marketing 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
______________________  
Catherine Schrand, Celia Z. Moh Professor, Professor of Accounting 
______________________ 
Sara Jaffee, Associate Professor of Psychology 
Dissertation Committee: 
Barbara E. Kahn, Professor of Marketing 
John G. Lynch, Professor of Marketing, University of Colorado Boulder 
Barbara A. Mellers, Professor of Marketing 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING  
COPYRIGHT 
2017 
Evan Weingarten 
 
This work is licensed under the  
Creative Commons Attribution- 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 
License 
 
To view a copy of this license, visit 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/
  iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I’ve received support from several individuals during my time in the doctoral 
program, all of whom deserve some recognition below.  
 I thank my advisor, Wes Hutchinson, for his patience with me for the past handful 
of years, and for teaching me about how to think deeply and carefully. Wes allowed me 
to dive deeper on the ideas that were most interesting to me, even if others deemed them 
too old school, obscure, or difficult. Wes’ insight and recommendations remind me daily 
that I still have much to learn, which only makes the field that much more exciting. 
 I thank Jonah Berger for teaching me how to be succinct, how to remain positive, 
and how to sell my ideas. Before I met Jonah, I was aboard the 20,000-page train to 
express a five-word idea. I thank Dolores Albarracin for her tutelage, support, and 
wisdom in so many areas of research. I thank Patti Williams for her positivity and 
willingness to let me explore off-the-wall ideas that may not have worked out, and for 
bringing a ray of sunshine to discussions. I thank Barbara Kahn for teaching me how to 
care more about the practical sides of marketing. I thank Barb Mellers for being a guide 
for ideas that I learned more about from her than from years of trying to learn the 
literature. I thank Gal Zauberman and Kristin Diehl for their insight into what’s 
important, their patience with me, and their willingness to fight for me.  
 I’d like to also thank my dissertation committee for their feedback and comments: 
Wes Hutchinson, Barbara Kahn, Barbara Mellers, and John Lynch, Jr., the last of whom 
expressed a kindness to me in his advice and words even though he barely knew me.  
 I also thank numerous members of the Wharton doctoral program for fostering a 
community and helping cohere our students as a unit. To Eric Schwartz, who was a silly, 
  iv 
kind mentor and friend. To Jonathan Berman and Cindy Chan, who served as wonderful 
parents to the program in an invaluable way. To Arun Gopalakrishnan and Jeff Cai, who 
encouraged a vigorous social life and were always open to provide feedback on anything 
under the sun. To Joy Lu and Kathy Li, who were close friends during tough times in the 
program. And lastly, to Alix Barasch, who has been an extremely supportive colleague, 
mentor, and most critically, friend. If people have anyone even half as helpful as you 
were and are during their doctoral program, they are unfathomably fortunate beyond 
words. The success the program really hinged on these people and the culture of 
openness, friendliness, and mentorship they maintained.  
  
  v 
ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING  
Evan Weingarten 
J. Wesley Hutchinson 
 
 When making decisions, individuals may only use a subset of all available 
information. The experience of thinking about and attending to this accessible 
information can, atop of the actual content, exert an impact on what information (and the 
weighting thereof) is employed in judgments. In this dissertation, I examine how 
experiences associated with memory-based accessibility (i.e., ease-of-recall) and 
stimulus-based accessibility (i.e., amount of attention allocated, salience) influence 
decision-making. Accessibility serves as the connecting construct for two essays of this 
dissertation for a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and how salience affects 
valuation. 
In essay one, I meta-analyze an instantiation of how accessibility experiences 
(i.e., feelings associated with trying to retrieve information from memory) affect 
decisions: the ease-of-retrieval effect. The ease-of-retrieval effect contends people 
employ cognitive feelings of ease from recall as an input to judgment. I explore this idea 
through a common manipulation of ease-of-retrieval in which individuals generate either 
few or many examples of a given topic such as times they behaved assertively (Schwarz 
et al. 1991). This manipulation is argued to affect subjective ease and thereby other 
downstream dependent measures. Specifically, I test whether subjective ease fully 
mediates the impact of the manipulation. I also test several theoretical moderators of the 
use of cognitive feelings of ease as information (e.g., misattribution) and how much of 
the effect may be attributable to publication bias. Across over twenty-years of studies 
  vi 
using conceptually-similar manipulations, I find evidence for several theoretical 
moderators, and find that publication bias only explains a small portion of the effect. 
Further, I find that subjective ease only partially explains the ease-of-retrieval effect, 
which means other explanations of the effect may also exist, yet they are understudied in 
the literature. 
In essay two, I turn to stimulus-based forms of accessibility: namely, salience, or 
the amount of attention devoted to a stimulus. While prior theories of decision-making 
contend greater salience increases information accessibility, they do not specify how 
salience influences the weighting and valuation of said information. Instead, these 
theories mostly distinguish between low versus high accessibility due to salience as 
affecting information used in judgments, and that information valuation occurs separately 
based on task goals. I demonstrate through three rating-based conjoint experiments across 
multiple product categories (e.g., cars) that even when all information is highly 
accessible, differences in salience may have an impact on the valuation and weighting of 
that information. I show these effects can arise from both perceptual (e.g., position 
effects) and cognitive (i.e., elaboration in working memory) sources. However, I also 
demonstrate the persistence of salience-biases differs between these two sources: biases 
due to cognitive salience decline over repeated decisions, whereas biases from perceptual 
salience do not.  
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Introduction 
 
  
 Although it might sound optimal for consumers to weight all possible information 
both in memory and the environment by importance when making decisions, consumers 
often only use a subset of available information (i.e., what is accessible or top-of-mind). 
Consumers may instead employ several oft-studied heuristics and strategies (Bettman et 
al. 1998; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Johnson and Payne 1985; Payne et al. 1993; Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974). These strategies allow for possible contamination based on what 
information is made accessible (i.e., more salient), especially when that information is 
irrelevant (e.g., Carpenter et al. 1994).  
Although there are decades of research about how accessible information may 
influence judgment, there is still much work to do on how we model and conceptualize 
accessibility. For example, classic theories of consumer behavior segment the judgment 
process into steps involving information becoming more accessible, and that information 
being evaluated and potentially acted upon (Barry 1987; Feldman and Lynch 1988). 
However, these theories often treat these steps as a binary model: information is either 
accessible or not, and only accessible information is evaluated independent of the search 
process. Yet, it is also possible that accessibility exerts an impact on the evaluation 
process itself above and beyond the content of information made accessible.  
I examine how the experience of recalling (memory-based accessibility) and 
searching for information (stimulus-based accessibility) affects downstream judgments 
above and beyond the relevance of the content that is generated or located. This 
dissertation also concentrates on how salience plays a role both memory-based 
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accessibility experiences and stimulus-based product judgments. I integrate older 
literature on affect-as-information (Schwarz and Clore 1983; Pham 1998) and 
accessibility-diagnosticity (Feldman and Lynch 1988) to establish two frameworks for 
salience: the salience-inference framework for affect-as-information (where feelings are 
made salient), and the salience-valuation framework for consumer behavior (where some 
relevant information is made salient).  
Essay one examines how cognitive feelings function as informational inputs to 
judgment in a meta-analysis of a classic use of feelings of ease in judgments: the ease-of-
retrieval effect (Schwarz et al. 1991). According to the ease-of-retrieval effect, 
individuals’ accessibility experiences (i.e., feelings of ease associated with recall) may 
serve as informational inputs to judgment separate from the content of recall. This essay 
answers the question about the extent to which cognitive feelings of ease fully (or only 
partially) explain the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, this essay develops a salience-
inference framework for how salience moderators (e.g., attention, range, polarization) 
affect the experience of ease that accompanies the recall process, while inference 
moderators (e.g., misattribution, representativeness) affect the relationship between ease 
and a downstream judgment. I test this framework both by meta-analyzing the overall 
impact of a classic ease-of-retrieval manipulation, and by testing how these moderators 
influence the indirect effect and direct effects by which ease (and potentially several 
unmeasured constructs) judgment. I find evidence for both a medium-sized impact of 
inductions for ease-of-retrieval and for several canonical salience and inference 
moderators (e.g., processing depth). I also demonstrate that publication bias cannot 
completely account for the ease-of-retrieval effect, and that only half of the ease-of-
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retrieval effect may be due to ease. Therefore, there may be other explanations of the 
ease-of-retrieval effect, especially for cases in which another construct or theory connects 
ease to the dependent measure of interest. 
Essay two switches from recall-based accessibility to stimulus-based accessibility 
to demonstrate how salience may bias product valuations. It expands upon the 
accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Feldman and Lynch 1988) by proposing that even 
when all information is accessible and relevant, salience can influence valuation of 
information (e.g., product attributes). Further, this essay contends that these salience 
effects can originate from both perceptual and cognitive sources, and that the temporal 
dynamics of these effects over repeated decisions can elucidate the psychological 
explanations of these salience effects. Three studies and an internal meta-analysis using 
several different product categories (cars, cell phone plans, Disney vacation packages) in 
rating-based conjoint paradigms both tease apart cognitive and perceptual salience effects 
on valuation and show divergent temporal patterns for each source. Specifically, 
cognitive salience effects induced at the beginning of the study dissipate over repeated 
decisions (consistent with self-correcting process explanations), whereas perceptual 
salience effects directionally increased over repeated decisions (possibly due to enduring 
features of the product display).  
This dissertation advances several developments about accessibility and salience’s 
impact on judgment and decision-making both by reflecting on classic effects and by 
updating classic models of decision-making. While many years have passed since these 
models began circulating, there are still important theoretical developments and insights 
that inform consumer behavior. 
  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 1 
 
 
Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis 
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Abstract 
 
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of 
information for judgment. Specifically, in one classic manipulation in social psychology, 
participants list either a few or many examples of a given type, and then make a 
judgment. Instead of using the number of arguments or evidence strength, participants are 
hypothesized to use the subjective ease of generating examples as the primary input to 
judgment. This result is commonly called the ease-of-retrieval effect. The “few” task is 
easier than the “many” task, and this feeling of ease is assumed to mediate the effect. We 
use meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies, and 582 effect sizes to explore 
the robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether the effect is mediated by 
subjective ease. On average, the standard manipulation of ease-of-retrieval exhibits a 
medium-sized effect. About half of this effect is mediated by subjective ease, which both 
supports the standard explanation and suggests that other mediators are commonly 
present but seldom identified. Further, we find evidence of publication bias that can 
reduce the standard effect by approximately one-third. We also find that (1) moderator 
manipulations that differ from the standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed 
effects that are not as strongly mediated by ease, (2) several manipulations of theory-
based moderators (e.g., polarized attitudes, misattribution) yield strong theory-consistent 
effects, (3) method-based moderators have little or no effects on the results, and (4) the 
mediation results are robust regarding assumptions about error structure.   
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Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis 
 
 A man’s wife asks him, "Do remember the day we first met?" He immediately 
answers, "Of course.”  She then asks, "What was I wearing?”  He replies, "Tight fitting 
jeans, a black sweater, black Nike running shoes, and a weirdly huge leather jacket."  She 
smiles.  He smiles.  
 It is not surprising that the wife believes that her husband's excellent memory is 
evidence of his love. What is surprising is the conjecture that his quick, easy memory 
strengthens the husband's own belief about the depth of his love for his wife. That is, in 
addition to the facts that are recalled, the conjecture claims that the experience of 
remembering, the feeling of ease, is itself treated as information that can influence our 
judgments.  This conjecture is called the ease-of-retrieval effect, and there is a large 
literature devoted to it.  This paper is a meta-analysis of that large literature and also aims 
to answer the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect?" 
Introduction 
 Decades of decision-making research have challenged “rational” theories of 
proper adherence to complete and consistent weighting of all available information 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Simon, 1978). Critically, individuals 
do not always base their decisions on the weight of evidence pro and con, but often use 
other cues and heuristics (Albarracin, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005; Bettman et al., 1998; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One famous example is the availability heuristic. 
According to the availability heuristic, individuals make judgments based on how easy it 
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feels to bring examples to mind rather than based on the strength of those examples 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 Affect-as-information theory explains many types of behavior by postulating that 
feelings are mixed with facts in human decision processes.  For example, affect-as-
information theory argues that the availability heuristic results from the use of feelings of 
ease as an input to judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007). More generally, 
individuals may use many different types of feelings as decision inputs (Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2011; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007). 
These feelings include both affective feelings (i.e., experiences of moods or emotions, 
such as happiness; Pham, 2004) and cognitive feelings (i.e., experiences of mental 
activities, metacognition, such as feelings of ease; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; 
Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).   
Cognitive feelings are typically divided into two major forms: processing fluency 
and accessibility experiences (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Processing fluency is the 
subjective ease with which information is encoded, and accessibility experiences are the 
feelings of the ease with which information is retrieved from memory (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This paper focuses on the hypothesis that 
accessibility experiences are part of a meta-cognitive process that affects judgment 
(Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This meta-cognitive role is very similar to the 
role of feelings of familiarity in the recognition literature (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985).  
 One seminal demonstration of the effects of accessibility experiences is Schwarz 
et al. (1991), in which individuals first generated examples of being assertive and then 
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rated their assertiveness on a multi-item scale.  The critical manipulation was whether 
few (6) or many (12) examples were requested (i.e., a few-versus-many manipulation).   
The critical result was that self-rated assertiveness was lower in the "many" condition 
than in the “few” condition.  Schwarz et al. contended that although those in the “many” 
condition had more evidence to support high assertiveness than those in the “few” 
condition, they rated themselves lower because they inferred low assertiveness from their 
experienced difficulty in the example-generation task. This type of metacognitive 
inference has become the standard explanation the effects of the few-versus-many 
manipulation and, therefore, such effects are commonly called the ease-of-retrieval 
effects.  Importantly, the ease-of-retrieval effect is the opposite of what is predicted by 
content numerosity (i.e., people using number of examples, which they have more of in 
the “many” condition; Pelham, Smurata, & Myaskovsky, 1994) and polarization (i.e., 
attitudes becoming more extreme as more examples are generated; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979).  
 Metacognitive inferences based on subjective ease have also been proposed as 
explanations for the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation on other types of 
judgment. For example, this manipulation has also been used in studies of health (by 
influencing perceived vulnerability; Raghubir & Menon, 1998), consumer preference (by 
tilting preference for compromise options; Novemsky et al., 2007), and policy and 
political figure attitudes (by affecting support for them; Haddock, 2002; Wänke, Bless, & 
Biller, 1996). Moreover, this manipulation has been used in experiments examining a 
wide variety of tasks, such as product choice (Zhao et al., 2012), cooperation (Müller et 
al., 2010), and prediction (Pham, Lee, & Stephen, 2012). One indicator of the influence 
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of both the paradigm and the ease-of-retrieval explanation is that the original Schwarz et 
al. (1991) paper has 540 citations on Web of Science and 1121 on Google Scholar (as of 
December 2016). 
 Although subjective ease is the dominant explanation, other accounts of the ease-
of-retrieval effect have been proposed.  First, individuals in the “many” condition might 
spontaneously think of more conflicting examples than individuals in the "few" 
condition, which would yield directionally-similar effects as ease (Tormala et al., 2007; 
but see Wänke et al., 1996; Wänke, 2013). Second, Kühnen (2010) proposed that placing 
the ease question before the dependent measure in studies creates a demand effects that 
explains the results.  Finally, ease might increase confidence, and confidence affects 
judgment, making ease a distal, rather than a proximal, mediator (Wänke & Bless, 2000; 
Tormala et al., 2002).  
  The existence of these alternative explanations and causal paths increases the 
desirability of determining the extent to which subjective ease by itself mediates the ease-
of-retrieval effect. If ease does not fully explain the effect (e.g., a mediation analysis 
reveals a residual direct effect that is comparable to the indirect effect based on subjective 
ease), then the alternative explanations are potentially necessary for a full account of the 
phenomenon. 
This paper reports a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and is designed 
(a) to test the robustness of the effect, (b) to examine the extent to which subjective ease 
of retrieval mediates the effect, (c) to find evidence for or against several theoretical 
accounts of the effect, and (d) to determine if methodological factors might account for 
variation in effect sizes. We find five main results from our analyses. First, we find a 
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medium effect size estimate for paradigms intending to conceptually replicate the original 
ease-of-retrieval effect, which we call the standard paradigm. Second, we find that 
accounting for publication bias could potentially reduce the standard paradigm’s effect 
size by approximately a third. Third, we find support for several theory-based moderators 
of the effect. Fourth, we find little support for several potential artifacts that have been 
proposed in the literature or for methodological moderators other than publication status. 
Fifth, we find that subjective ease is a robust partial mediator, but that the direct effect is 
equally robust, suggesting that other mediators are present.  
Theory-Based and Methodological Moderators of the Ease-of-Retrieval 
Effect 
One important goal of this meta-analysis is to examine a wide range of theory-
based moderators that have been proposed in the affect-as-information literature. These 
moderators provide potential explanations of heterogeneity in effect sizes that might be 
observed.  We divide these moderators into those that potentially inform theories of 
judgment (e.g., misattribution and involvement) and those that are mainly exploratory or 
methodological (e.g., the country in which data were collected).  
It is useful to subdivide theory-based moderators according to how they influence 
the use of subjective ease. First, there are moderators that affect the experience of ease. 
We call these moderators salience-based because they influence the experience or even 
interpretation of ease. Second, there are moderators that influence the relationship 
between the manipulation and the dependent measure by changing either the weighting of 
ease as an informational input or by the processing of other non-feeling inputs. We call 
these moderators inference-based because they affect the downstream impact of ease.  
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The impact of these two classes of moderators can be seen in Figure 1.  By making 
subjective ease more salient, salience moderators might change the effect of the 
manipulation (S1 in Figure 1), or they might change the effect of subjective ease on the 
dependent measure by changing the accessibility of this input (S2).  Inference-based 
moderators might also change the effect of ease on the dependent measure (I2), not by 
changing the accessibility of ease, but by changing the implications people draw from 
this cognitive feeling.  Additionally, inference-based moderators might trigger some other 
non-ease mechanism (I1). 
We drew upon a series of reviews within the ease-of-retrieval and affect-as-
information literatures to identify a set of salience and inference moderators. These 
reviews included Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham (2011), Petty et al. (2007), Schwarz 
(1998, 2004), Schwarz and Clore (1988, 2007), and Wänke (2013). Our meta-analysis 
builds on these reviews by systematically coding the ease-of-retrieval studies in our 
database in terms of these moderators and then quantitatively testing the extent to which 
those moderators are associated with differences in effect size. 
While some moderators apply to the whole study (e.g., type of dependent 
measure, publication status), other moderators exist only with some conditions of a study 
(e.g., misattribution used or not; polarized attitude or not). Therefore, for each paper, we 
split up the experiment by moderator level into a few-versus-many effect size for each 
level of the moderator.  
Salience Moderators 
 Salience moderators are those that affect the retrievability of content or the 
experience of ease. These salience moderators should therefore exert an influence 
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through an impact of the manipulation on experienced ease (S1) or the impact of ease on 
the dependent measure (S2).  
 Range. Feelings of subjective ease are likely to become more salient when the 
retrieval task is either much easier or much more difficult than usual.  As the difference 
between the number of items required for the “few” and “many” conditions increases, it 
is increasingly likely that one or both will be far from the usual level of retrieval ease.  
We operationalize this moderator as range (i.e., "many" target number - "few" target 
number). This metric should be positively related to the size of the effect, as it should 
affect ease and the downstream impact of the manipulation. 
 Attention.  The salience of cognitive feelings should be enhanced when attention 
is explicitly directed toward those feelings.  Many ease-of-retrieval experiments include 
an explicit measure of feelings of ease.  When the feelings of ease are explicitly measured 
before (rather than after) the target judgment, attention is drawn to cognitive feelings, 
which makes them more salient during the target judgment (Danziger et al., 2005; 
Kühnen, 2010). This should lead to larger effect sizes.  
 Polarized attitude. Individuals with polarized or crystallized attitudes are less 
likely to experience difficulty in generating examples, which should decrease the impact 
of the few-versus-many manipulation and thereby decrease effect sizes (e.g., Dijksterhuis 
et al., 1999; Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999). However, it is also possible that those 
with polarized attitudes make fewer meta-cognitive inference based on ease (I2) or rely 
on other information or inferences (I1). 
Inference Moderators 
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 These moderators include those manipulations within experiments or differences 
across experiments that affect the perceived meaning of feelings of ease (I2) or introduce 
considerations of other possible cues to judgment that run contrary to the predictions of 
ease as an input (I1). 
Processing motivation (depth). The first set of moderators concerns processing 
motivation, meaning the extent to which an individual is willing to deeply consider the 
scenario or judgment in question (Chaiken et al., 1989; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 
2011; Petty et al., 2007; Schwarz, 2004).  We distinguish two types of processing 
motivation: depth and involvement. 
Depth of processing factors found in the ease-of-retrieval literature include 
accuracy motivation (i.e., no ease effect for high accuracy motivation; Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 1999), availability of cognitive processing resources (i.e., ease effects 
stronger for those under cognitive constraint; Greifeneder & Bless, 2007), and whether 
people are in positive or negative moods (Ruder & Bless, 2003), the latter of which 
should lead to greater systematic processing (lower effect sizes; also see Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). Consistent with this logic, Ruder and Bless (2003) find a reversed ease-of-
retrieval effect for participants induced to feel sad.  
Processing motivation (involvement). The most prominent type of motivation 
factor in the ease-of-retrieval literature is whether people engage in low involvement or 
heuristic (i.e., individuals process few pieces of information with less effort) versus high 
involvement systematic (i.e., individuals analytically evaluate much more information 
carefully; Chaiken et al., 1989) processing. The ease-of-retrieval effect was originally 
specified in terms of the heuristic-systematic model and hypothesized to reflect a 
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heuristic (low elaboration) strategy for individuals for whom the target judgment has low 
personal relevance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Two initial articles 
found that individuals with higher personal relevance (which presumably increased 
systematic processing) in a topic reversed the predictions of ease-of-retrieval, while 
individuals with lower personal relevance (which presumably increased heuristic 
processing) produced results consistent with ease-of-retrieval (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; 
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). However, Tormala et al. (2002) provides another account of 
how involvement should affect the use of feelings of ease. In this view, individuals who 
elaborate more should pay attention to their higher-order thoughts and thus incorporate 
ease into their judgments (Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009; 
Petty et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 2002). Thus, these authors hypothesize that their 
manipulation of processing motivation should have effects opposite to those of the 
previously mentioned authors (i.e., the ease-of-retrieval effect should be enhanced).  
Although the manipulations of involvement are not identical across studies, they are 
conceptually focused on personal relevance and the difference in predictions arises from 
assumptions about how personal relevance affects the likelihood of systematic 
processing.  Thus, the meta-analytic results for this moderator are potentially informative 
about the relationship between cognitive feelings and systematic processing. 
 Representativeness (retrieval target). Individuals should be more likely to apply 
feelings to target judgments when their feelings are believed to be more representative of 
the target of the retrieval task (e.g., your own assertiveness; Schwarz et al., 1991; 
Greifeneder et al., 2011). For example, individuals are more likely to display an ease-of-
retrieval effect when making judgments about themselves as opposed to others (e.g., 
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Caruso, 2008) because their feelings are more representative of themselves than of others.  
Similarly, the applicability of ease differs depending on whether individuals judge in-
group as compared to out-group members because their feelings are more representative 
of the in-group than the out-group (Rothman & Hardin, 1997; Woltin et al., 2014).  
Representativeness (misattribution). Feelings should be less likely to be used as 
an input to judgment when the informational value of the feelings has been obviated by 
other information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Several studies employ misattribution 
paradigms in which participants are given another cause to which subjective ease can be 
attributed (e.g., difficulty due to simultaneous music; e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). These 
elements are hypothesized to render subjective ease non-diagnostic for the judgment 
(reduce effect sizes) because some other source was the reason for ease, so the 
metacognitive inference about the meaning of personal ease is discounted (Schwarz et al., 
1991; Unkelbach, 2006). In Schwarz et al. (1991), this source was music; in Ruder and 
Bless (2003), this source was an oddly-shaped writing space. Neither of these sources had 
meaning for the target judgment. 
 Relevance of feelings (judgment task). Multiple articles within the feelings-as-
information stream of research suggest that people are more likely to use feelings as 
inputs when those feelings are perceived to be relevant to the target judgment task 
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). This is 
exemplified by Schwarz and Clore’s (2007) perceived relevance of feelings of ease for a 
judgment. This concept is different from perceived informational value because, unlike 
that construct, relevance focuses on the bearing feelings have on the judgment task rather 
than the target of retrieval. 
  13 
 Relevance of feelings (disposition). Relevance may be influenced by such 
factors as individual differences (disposition) such as reliance on feelings or expertise 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Multiple papers within the ease-of-retrieval paradigm suggest 
experts are less likely to employ feelings (Ofir, 2000), and those who are more likely to 
trust their feelings (e.g., higher or lower experiential style; higher faith in intuition; e.g., 
Danziger et al., 2005; Keller & Bless, 2009) are more likely to show the ease-of-retrieval 
effect (i.e., stronger effect sizes). 
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
 We additionally investigate potential moderators of the ease-of-retrieval effect 
that are mainly methodological and have few, if any theoretical implications. Thus, these 
moderators are more exploratory in nature. 
 Year. The ease-of-retrieval effect studies in question range from 1991 to present-
day. We examine whether there is variation in effect sizes depending on publication year, 
which may be concurrent with changes in the methodology and the hunt for more 
moderators (Mooneyham, Franklin, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2012; Schooler, 2011).  
 Country. The ease-of-retrieval effect has been studied across continents in 
America (e.g., Tormala et al., 2002), Australia (e.g., Laham, 2013), Germany (Schwarz et 
al., 1991), and other countries.  
 Publication Status. As in many other meta-analyses, the publication status of 
studies may be related to their effect size. Studies with nonsignificant p-values or small 
effect sizes may have been rejected by journal editors and relegated to the "filedrawer" or 
could be hidden within parts of unpublished dissertations (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).  
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Number of dependent measures. The number of measures used to measure 
subjective ease and the dependent variable of interest also varies widely from study to 
study. Some studies include only one measure of ease (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), 
while others include two (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008) or three (e.g., Avnet, 2005). 
These measures are typically averaged to form a single ease-of-retrieval index. Similarly, 
studies measuring trait ratings or attitudes have substantial variation in their number of 
measures used to form a composite dependent variable. We incorporate this variability 
into our analyses as a measure of precision and potential measurement error for the 
hypothesized mediator (i.e., subjective ease) and the dependent measure of interest. 
When effect sizes were composed of an average of two dependent measures with 
differing number of items (e.g., a one-item scale and a six-item scale), we averaged the 
number of items for this variable (yielding 3.5 for the previous example). 
Type of dependent measure. We classify the different dependent measures in 
this literature into two broad categories: attitude-based measures and non-attitude 
measures. These broad categories are meant to capture potential differences in dependent 
measure types (such as reliability, response bias, or response scale familiarity). Attitude-
based measures cover multiple different types of responses (e.g., self-rated traits, policy 
evaluations; Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991), whereas non-attitude include 
such measures as subjective likelihood and frequency (e.g., Sanna et al., 2002) or 
observable behaviors (e.g., Stephen & Pham, 2008).   
A Taxonomy of Ease-of-Retrieval Data: Standard and Moderated, Proximal and 
Distal 
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To determine the extent to which ease mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, it is 
necessary to identify the experimental conditions meant by the authors to conceptually 
replicate the original Schwarz et al. (1991) ease-of-retrieval effect. We refer to these 
conditions as using the "standard" paradigm. The remaining experimental conditions, in 
which authors hypothesize that the ease-of-retrieval effect will be attenuated or reversed, 
are said to use a "moderated" paradigm. 
Based on this taxonomy, we construct three datasets: standard, moderated, and 
combined (i.e., both paradigms). The combined dataset provides the greatest variation in 
moderators because many moderators are held constant in each paradigm (i.e., moderator 
present or moderator absent). Therefore, the combined dataset is most useful for 
assessing the overall effectiveness of the moderators proposed in the literature to alter the 
size (and direction) of the ease-of-retrieval effect.  Also, through mediation analyses, this 
dataset is most useful in identifying the sources of moderation.  More specifically, 
mediation analyses provided estimates of effect sizes due to the proposed meta-cognitive 
mechanisms involving subjective ease and effect sizes due to other causal factors (i.e., 
indirect and direct effects, respectively; see subsequent discussion). The standard 
paradigm data provides (1) the best estimate of the size of ease-of-retrieval effect and (2) 
the best test of subjective ease as the best explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect as 
originally conceived. Analyses of the moderated data set are included for completeness. 
One further division in the data pertains to the relationship between the recall task 
and the dependent measure used within each study. In some studies, subjects are asked to 
recall examples of assertiveness then complete a dependent measure for self-rated 
assertiveness (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), or recall reasons in favor or against public 
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transportation before evaluating public transportation (Wänke et al., 1996). In these 
cases, there are no intermediary mechanisms between what is recalled, ease, and the 
outcome (often an attitude or likelihood judgment), which are strong examples of the 
affect-as-information ideas on which this meta-analysis is based. These effect sizes are 
proximal effect sizes. However, there are also several cases in which the few-versus-
many manipulation pertains to one subject matter (e.g., reasons New York is positive or 
negative; Alter & Balcetis, 2011), while at least one dependent measure concerns 
something not recalled (e.g., how far away New York feels). In these cases, beyond what 
is recalled in the few-versus-many manipulation, there is usually an intermediary 
mechanism (i.e., a connection between attitudes towards New York and how far away it 
feels) between ease and the dependent measure. We call these distal effect sizes because 
there is an additional step between ease and the dependent measure.  
We therefore split each of the datasets (combined, standard, moderated) into two 
pieces to analyze separately: proximal and distal. We perform the above analyses on both 
datasets for completeness. However, the proximal effect sizes are of greater interest 
because they are more direct tests of cognitive feelings of ease being used as information.  
Methodology 
Literature Search 
The widespread use of the "few-versus-many" manipulation in disparate 
experimental literatures made keyword search ineffective because no simple set of 
keywords could capture the entire literature efficiently.  Sets of keywords such as “ease-
of-retrieval” and “retrieval fluency” did not capture all of the papers that forward 
searches of the major articles in the literature did, whereas the latter yielded all papers 
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found by the former. Therefore, we examined forward citations of the original empirical 
paper that reported the ease-of-retrieval effect, Schwarz et al. (1991), and two major 
reviews, Schwarz (1998) and Schwarz (2004), using the ISI Web of Knowledge. We also 
looked at forward citations of published articles citing Schwarz et al. (1991) that 
employed the few-versus-many manipulation within the following ten-year period (1992-
2001)1. Additionally, we searched Proquest Dissertations and Theses database for papers 
that had the names of the Schwarz et al. (1991; “Ease of Retrieval as Information: 
Another Look at the Availability Heuristic”), Schwarz (1998; (“Accessible content and 
accessibility experiences: The interplay of declarative and experiential information in 
judgment”), and Schwarz (2004; “Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and 
Decision Making”) in their text as citations. Finally, we cross-referenced 
PsychFileDrawer.org and the Reproducibility Project Open Science Framework for any 
replications of papers in our search. We completed this search by April 2014. 
 We then contacted authors2 who had available contact information to inquire 
about unpublished studies, effect sizes not reported in their paper, and to ask them to 
verify our classification of their experimental conditions into standard and moderated 
paradigms. As part of this process we sent spreadsheets to individual authors that 
contained the effect sizes we had obtained from their publications. The spreadsheet also 
indicated which measures were missing and how we had interpreted their studies in terms 
                                                 
1 These articles included Aarts & Dijksterhuis (1999); Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & Lynn (1998); 
Broemer (2001); Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock (1999); Grayson & Schwarz (1999); Haddock, 
Rothman, & Schwarz (1996); Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz (1999); Merckelbach, Wiers, 
Horselenberg, & Wessel (2001); Ofir (2000); Raghubir & Menon (1998); Rothman & Hardin (1997); 
Rothman & Schwarz (1998); Vaughn (1999); Wänke, Bless, & Biller (1996); Wänke, Bohner, & 
Jurkowitsch (1997); Winkielman & Schwarz (2001); Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli (1998) 
2 We contacted first authors except when an author with multiple publications was also on the publication 
and was contacted, or when the first author’s contact information could not be found. 
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of the standard and moderated paradigms. An example of one of these sheets for Pablo 
Briñol is provided in Appendix Figure A1. Example e-mail text is provided in Appendix 
A.  
Further, to solicit researchers for other possible file-drawer studies, we sent 
messages requesting unpublished data through the following listservs: ACR-L, SCP, 
SJDM, and SPSP.  
Inclusion Criteria 
 We included articles using the following two criteria: 
1) Presence of few-versus-many manipulation: Studies had to include a between-
subjects manipulation that required writing or imagining a smaller number of examples 
versus a larger number of examples. We only used between-subjects manipulations given 
the overwhelming majority of studies were between-subjects, and because it is unclear 
how to interpret the within-subject version of this task since that effect may not entirely 
be due to ease. We excluded conditions in which readers reviewed what writers had 
produced (e.g., Wänke et al., 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2008) because these conditions do 
not require the task of interest (i.e., example generation). 
When multiple numbers of arguments were present (e.g., four, eight, and 12 
arguments; e.g., Belli et al., 1998; e.g., one, three, and seven arguments; e.g., Sinha & 
Naykankuppam, 2013, Study 1), we only used the minimum and maximum number of 
arguments conditions that were of the same topic for computing effect sizes. Only three 
papers in our final database ultimately used more than two levels for number of 
arguments.3  
                                                 
3 Excluding the studies that tried multiple levels of few and many conditions does not have an enormous 
impact on our effect size results (Standard: r = .253; Moderated: r = -.178; Overall: r = .121). 
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2) Statistics: Studies needed to have enough information from which to calculate a 
contrast between the “few” condition and corresponding “many” condition. When 
information to compute effect sizes was unavailable, we contacted authors as mentioned 
earlier. 
Meta-Analytic Methodology 
 We used means and standard deviations, F ratios, t-tests, d values, r values, and 
log-odds ratios to compute effect sizes based on standard formulae (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008). 
Most experiments manipulated some other factor in addition to few-versus-many. 
Sometimes all levels were the same paradigm type (e.g., a standard paradigm might 
manipulate whether assertiveness or unassertiveness was the dependent measure with the 
expectation that these were conceptual replications). Sometimes the manipulation 
changed the paradigm type (e.g., control versus alternative attribution for subjective 
ease). In all cases, each level of the factor was used to obtain effect sizes. Three effect 
sizes were sought: (1) the effect of few-versus-many (X) on the dependent variable of 
interest (Y), (2) the effect of X on subjective ease (M), and (3) the effect of subjective 
ease (M) on the dependent variable of interest (Y). 
We calculated effect sizes in terms of Pearson’s r because of its ease of 
interpretation across different measures (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We conducted 
analyses of the simple correlations using Fisher’s z for distributional reasons, but we 
report all results in in terms of r for interpretability (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal 
& DiMatteo, 2001). We weight the effect sizes by their inverse variance (i.e., n-3 for 
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Fisher’s z) using random effects formulae4 from the meta-analysis literature (Borenstein 
et al., 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
We averaged the rXY values across effect sizes for all dependent measures with 
sufficient statistical information to prevent biases based on trying to pick a “best” or 
“most relevant” dependent measure for each study. However, for the mediation triplets, 
we used only one dependent measure based on which measure had sufficient statistical 
information available for rMY. When multiple measures had information for rMY, we used 
the median value (or minimum of two values when an even number of values were 
present); additional analyses with non-included values yielded similar results. Taking the 
average of the rMY values for the averaged rXY values could potentially violate rules of 
mediation, so we strayed from complicating these analyses.  
Publication Bias 
 We assessed publication bias by examining the simple ease-of-retrieval effect, rXY, 
in two ways: trim-and-fill analysis of funnel plots (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b; 
Light & Pillemar, 1984) and PET-PEESE (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2014).  
First, the funnel plot is a graphical display of precision (here standard error) by 
effect size (Light & Pillemar, 1984). In a standard funnel plot, effect sizes should 
converge towards a tighter estimate of an overall effect size as the studies become more 
precise, producing a funnel shape (Sutton, 2009). However, if there is publication bias, 
                                                 
4 We also note the weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect sizes are different (Standard: r = .144; 
Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r = .083) from our main random-effects results. However, this deviation is 
primarily due to several heavily-weighted, small, unpublished effect sizes from the standard paradigm 
(Yeager & Krosnick, 2014). Removing these points reveals a weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect size 
that’s not drastically different from the random effects results (Standard: r = .241; Moderated: r = -.173; 
Overall: r = .118). 
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there will be an asymmetry in the funnel for smaller, less precise studies with near-zero 
effect sizes that may not have had significant findings to publish (Egger et al., 1997). The 
trim-and-fill algorithm (Viechtbauer, 2010) "corrects" this asymmetry by first trimming 
the asymmetric portion of the funnel plot, then re-estimating the mean effect size and its 
confidence interval for the remaining studies. Finally, the trim-and-fill algorithm re-fills 
in the funnel with both the trimmed studies (that created the funnel asymmetry) and their 
corresponding "missing" observations reflected across the mean of the funnel (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000).  
Second, PET-PEESE is a method by which an effect size is extracted from the 
intercept of an Egger regression that is intended to represent the publication-bias adjusted 
effect size with a study with zero standard error (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2014). PET (Precision Effect Test) employs standard error as the predictor 
in this regression, and errs on the side of underestimating the true effect size. PEESE 
(Precision Effect Estimate with Standard Error) uses variance instead. Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2014) advise that when PET yields an intercept significantly different 
from zero, individuals should rely on the intercept from PEESE as the underlying effect 
size. Otherwise, PET’s estimate of the effect size is more accurate (but, also see Gervais, 
2015).  
Moderator Coding 
Salience moderators. We code the three salience moderators discussed earlier as 
follows. First, we code the difference between the number of arguments in the “many” 
and “few” conditions as range.  Second, we code whether the measure of subjective ease 
on subjective ease occurred before or after the dependent measure of interest (1 = before, 
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-1 = after) as attention. Finally, we code polarized attitude as present (+1; -1 otherwise), 
if such attitudes were explicitly noted in the paper (e.g., high interest in politics; 
crystallized attitude; e.g., Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999) or if participants were 
described as having expertise (which was assuming to imply a polarized attitude).  
Inference moderators. We code the six inference moderators discussed earlier as 
follows.  First, we code processing motivation (depth) based on whether processing depth 
or motivation was influenced by a non-involvement manipulation (+1 = increased, -1 = 
decreased, 0 = no manipulation).   Examples of manipulations that would increase 
processing motivation or capacity would be inducing sadness (e.g., Ruder & Bless, 
2003), boosting accuracy motivation (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), or increasing 
uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a). Examples of manipulations that decrease 
processing motivation or capacity would be those that eat up cognitive resources (e.g., 
Greifeneder & Bless, 2007) or decrease uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a). 
These manipulations should decrease effect sizes if depth is boosted. Second, we code 
processing motivation (involvement) based on whether involvement is stated to be 
manipulated as more (+1; e.g., higher need for cognition individuals; e.g., Tormala et al., 
2002) or less (-1) personally involving than when involvement is not explicitly 
manipulated (0).  Third, we code representativeness (retrieval target) based on whether 
the target of recall is the self (+1) or not (-1).5 Fourth, we code representativeness 
(misattribution) paradigms based on whether an attribution to another source (e.g., music, 
an unusual writing space; e.g., Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991) was present 
                                                 
5 We alternatively also coded a variable about whether the recall was episodic or semantic. The same 
results held for this coding scheme, which was highly correlated with self/not-self. 
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(+1) or not (-1).  Fifth, we code relevance of feelings (judgment task) based on whether 
individuals are making judgments about themselves (+1) or not (-1).6  Sixth, we code 
relevance of feelings (disposition) based on whether individuals are personally more 
likely to see their feelings as relevant to judgment (+1; e.g., experiential processors, high-
powered individuals; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Weick & Guinote, 2008) or less likely (-
1; e.g., individuals with less faith in intuition; e.g., Keller & Bless, 2009; 0 for no 
manipulation).  
Exploratory methodological moderators. We coded the following study 
characteristics as moderators as part of our exploratory analyses: (a) the year, (b) the 
country in which the study was published (in the US = +1, non-US = -1), (c) whether the 
study was published or unpublished (+1 = unpublished, -1 = published); (d) the number 
of items in the subjective ease measure; (e) the number of items in the dependent variable 
of interest;7 and (f) attitude dependent measure (e.g., +1 = attitude measure, -1 = all other 
measures).8  
Taxonomy. Based on a careful reading of the authors' hypotheses, experimental 
conditions were classified as either a standard or a moderated paradigm. As part of our 
outreach to authors, we requested authors review our categorization of standard and 
moderated paradigm assignments for their experiments.  We provided authors with the 
following definition of standard and moderated paradigms: "Importantly, we are 
                                                 
6 We recognize this has some conceptual overlap with representativeness and may be better categorized as 
such; the results for both this moderator and retrieval target are consistent, and we return to these in the 
general discussion. 
7 We cap the maximum number of measures at 9 given 89% of the distribution falls between 1-8 measures, 
and all other measures use far lengthier scales that skew the distribution. 
8 One question may revolve around whether attitude certainty measures are coded separately from attitude 
measures. These measures comprise a small portion (<5%) of the database and do not significantly differ 
from any other category of dependent measure (attitude or non-attitude). 
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separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as 
conceptual replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the 
standard paradigm -- and conditions in which the authors change the standard paradigm 
in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing attenuation or reversal." 
We also separated effect sizes based on whether they were proximal or distal 
effect sizes. Examples of proximal and distal effect sizes can be found in Table 1. These 
examples and divisions were based on conferring with the editor. In some cases, a paper 
could contribute both proximal and distal effect sizes (e.g., Alter & Balcetis, 2011; 
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).  
Coding reliability.  All moderators were originally coded by the first author, and 
then coded a second time by at least one of two independent raters to confirm reliability. 
The first author is an advanced graduate student in Psychology with completed graduate 
coursework training. The two independent coders were undergraduate research assistants 
with extensive coursework in psychology and research experience. All coded variables 
included in the final analysis had satisfactory or better (i.e.,  > .6) agreement. 
Mediation Analysis Plan 
 As noted earlier, a subset of our data includes a measure of ease-of-retrieval in 
addition to a dependent measure of interest, and therefore it permits statistical tests of 
mediation. Mediation analysis provides a computational method for decomposing the 
total effect (c) into indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects, given the assumption that a 
variable, M, causally mediates the relationship between an independent variable, X, and a 
dependent variable, Y (Baron and Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; 
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Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010; see Figure 2).9 These estimates quantify the qualitative 
relationships depicted in Figure 1. 
The traditional explanation in the standard paradigm is that subjective ease 
mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect (Schwarz, 2004). In terms of the mediation model 
depicted in Figure 2, a and b should be large if the traditional explanation holds. More 
specifically, the traditional explanation suggests that subjective ease should fully mediate 
the effect, which implies that the indirect effect, a x b should be larger than the direct 
effect, c'.  At a minimum, the traditional explanation predicts that the indirect effect 
should be significantly positive.  If the direct effect is found to be substantial (i.e., as 
large as the indirect effect and significantly different than zero), then traditional 
explanation is inadequate insofar as a substantial direct effect suggests that one or more 
mediators, other than subjective ease, are involved. In the moderated paradigm, the 
mediation should be disrupted (i.e., indirect effect is reduced) or some other mediator 
should exert a stronger influence than feelings of ease (i.e., direct effect is increased).   
 For every triplet of effect sizes (rXM, rMY, and rXY) obtained from the literature and 
directly from the authors, standardized regression coefficients were computed based on 
the traditional mediation equations with subjective ease as the mediator of the effect of 
the few-versus-many manipulation on the dependent measure of interest (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These equations are: 
                                                 
9 However, one piece of conceptual confusion is whether subjective ease is a “manipulation check” or an 
explanation; we argue it is the latter. Although many studies report measures of subjective ease as a 
manipulation check, we believe "manipulation check" is a misnomer because subjective ease is a 
psychological construct. Further, Fiedler et al. (2011) present simulation evidence that manipulation checks 
should not significantly mediate the dependent measure of interest. Following this, if subjective ease is 
found to often pass the mediation test, then our claim that subjective ease is a mediator, not a manipulation 
check, is supported. For the subset of experiments for which results are reported for measures of subjective 
ease, statistical tests of mediation are possible, and we compute and meta-analyze such tests when possible. 
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 a = rXM
 (1) 
 b = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)
 (2) 
 c' = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)
 (3) 
 
We did not obtain rMY or estimate mediation models for studies using spotlight 
analyses due to the difficulty of obtaining a meaningful correlation at one standard 
deviation above and below another factor.10  
 
Results 
Literature Search 
A total of 152 papers, published and unpublished, were found that employed the 
few-versus-many manipulation. As of the time of this article, no replications with 
publicly available results were available on PsychFileDrawer or the Open Science 
Framework/Reproducibility Project.11 There were 121 published papers, 23 dissertations 
and theses12, and eight unpublished papers (two studies were left out from a published 
paper, and 17 studies came from seven unpublished manuscripts). These 152 papers 
contained 284 studies. One study was excluded for using a within-subject design (Corby 
                                                 
10 We thank John Lynch, Jr., for his advice on this topic. 
11 However, a study from Stephen and Pham (2008) was under processing (yet not conducted as of initial 
submission) in the OpenScience framework database. 
12 We e-mailed 92 authors who had available contact information and were the common links across 
multiple papers, of whom 64 (69.57%) responded. 
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& Homa, 2011, study 2). Other studies and conditions were excluded due to insufficient 
statistical information (e.g., Corby & Homa, 2011; Florack & Zoabi, 2003; Frederick & 
Mochon, 2012; Hermann et al., 2002; Hirt et al., 2004; Kivetz & Zhang, 2006; Lee, 2005; 
Ofir, 2000; Sackett, 2006; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Tormala et al., 2002, study 3; Walton 
& Cohen, 2007; Wehr, 2010, Study 1; Yahalom & Schul, 2013), as specified above. 
These exclusions left 142 papers and 263 studies. A comprehensive table with effect sizes 
and descriptions of studies can be found in Appendix B. The data file can be found in the 
Supplemental Materials. 
Of the 142 papers, there were 263 studies that yielded 582 effect sizes (i.e., 
observations in the database): these 582 effect sizes were composed of 454 proximal and 
128 distal.13 Of these 454 proximal observations, 298 were categorized as standard 
paradigm observations, and 156 as moderated paradigm observations. The distal 
observations were composed of 92 standard paradigm and 36 moderated paradigm 
observations. For our mediation tests, we had 209 triplets of rXM, rMY, and rXY from 
proximal and 44 from distal. 
A descriptive set of statistics for the 582 effect sizes split into proximal and distal 
can be found in Table 2. 
Total Effect Analyses (c = rXY) 
 Overall effect size. All reported analyses of effect sizes and regression models 
used a two-level meta-analytic model with random intercepts for papers (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002; see Singer, 1998 for a similar model). We use a restricted maximum 
                                                 
13 We also analyze our results excluding the two papers from the proximal analyses: Yeager & Krosnick’s 
replications, which have several hundred participants per cell, and Bares’ (2007) dissertation from which 
multiple observations were gathered. Removal of these papers does not affect our overall effect sizes 
drastically (Standard: r = .258; Moderated: r = -.181; Overall: r = .125). 
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likelihood estimation method (Littell et al., 2006). The dependent variable was the Fisher 
z transform of rXY, and all predictors were standardized. We report the mean effect sizes 
and 95% confidence intervals in Table 3. 
We first examine the proximal effect sizes. As shown in Table 3, the mean effect 
size for the standard paradigm was positive, rXY = .253, 95% CI [.224, .281], t(110) = 
17.05, p < .001), and the mean effect size for the moderated paradigm was negative, rXY = 
-.178 (95% CI [-.215, -.140], t(52) = -9.27, p < .001). Both the standard and moderated 
paradigms rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneity based on Cochran’s Q (standard: 
Q(297) = 720.795, p < .001; I2 = 58.80%, 95% CI [53.19%, 63.73%]; moderated: Q(155) 
= 202.26, p = .006; I2 = 23.37%, 95% CI [5.85%, 37.62%]). An 𝐼2 value corresponds to 
the proportion of total variation attributable to true heterogeneity and not sampling error; 
we caution, however, that it does not represent absolute heterogeneity (Borenstein et al., 
2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). We also observe a grand 
mean effect size of the combined (i.e., standard and moderated together) dataset14 of rXY = 
.121 (95% CI [.094, .149]; t(113) = 8.79, p < .001; Q(453) = 1395.33, p < .001; I2 = 
67.53%, 95% CI [64.23, 70.53]). We present the distribution of the individual proximal 
effect sizes in each paradigm in Figure 3.  For the standard paradigm, 91% of 
observations are greater than zero.  For the moderated paradigm, 83% of observations are 
less than or equal to zero. 
We next turn to the distal effect sizes, which are depicted in Figure 4 for the 
standard (panel A) and moderated (panel B) paradigms. 96% of the standard paradigm 
                                                 
14 Alternative strategies yield similar proximal results for nesting within studies (Standard: r = .254; 
Moderated: r = -.183; Overall: r = .102) and within clusters of authors (Standard: r = .232, Moderated: r = -
.174; Overall: r = .117), where clusters were defined as sets of frequent co-authors.  
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observations are greater than zero, whereas 67% of the moderated observations are at or 
below zero. The standard paradigm again had a positive mean effect size (rXY = .264, 95% 
CI [.220, .307]; t(41) = 11.83, p < .001; Q(91) = 117.452, p = .032; I2 = 22.52%, 95% CI 
[-1.19%, 40.68%]), whereas the moderated paradigm had a negative mean effect size (rXY 
= -.082, 95% CI [-.158, -.005]; t(19) = -2.23, p = .038; Q(35) = 53.075, p = .026; I2 = 
34.06%, 95% CI [0.75%, 56.18%]). The combined dataset again had a slightly positive 
effect size (rXY = .165, 95% CI [.120, .208]; t(44) = 8.98, p < .001; Q(127) = 281.822, p < 
.001; I2 = 54.94%, 95% CI [44.99%, 63.08%]). 
Publication bias. We investigated publication bias using both trim-and-fill and 
PET-PEESE methods (Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Both 
methods suggest that publication bias may reduce the ease-of-retrieval effect by up to 
one-third in magnitude in the standard paradigm (and reduce the moderated paradigm by 
about a fifth). However, the null hypothesis that the true effect size is 0 is still rejected 
after adjusting for publication bias. 
Funnel plots based on trim-and-fill analyses15 for effect sizes from standard 
paradigm, moderated paradigm, and combined datasets for proximal effect sizes are 
provided in Figures 5-7. In Panel A, the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the 
sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel B, the funnel depicts 
the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel C, the funnel 
depicts alpha contours assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true (white indicates 
                                                 
15 One difficulty with funnel plots is that missing studies may occur due to multiple reasons, inclusive of 
non-significant results or small study effects. We employ contour-enhanced funnel plots, which illustrate 
the regions in which studies are statistically significant. These contours help indicate whether studies are 
missing from areas of the chart in which the effect sizes would emerge from non-significant studies 
(Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008). 
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non-significant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01). The 
standard paradigm had 88 potentially-missing observations imputed by trim-and-fill for 
an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .159, 
95% CI [.137, .181], z = 13.78, p < .001; Q(385) = 983.37, p < .001). Many of the 
imputed, potentially missing effect sizes (white circles in Figure 5B), however, occur in 
regions of statistical non-significance (p > .10, white), while fewer imputed effect sizes 
are in regions of marginal (.05 < p < .10, light grey) or traditional (.01 < p < .05, darker 
grey; p < .01, outside the funnel) statistical significance. So, the asymmetry in the funnel 
is more likely to be due to publication bias than from other elements such as variance in 
study quality for smaller-sample studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008). In the 
moderated paradigm, no studies were filled in (r = -.177, 95% CI [-.206, -.147], z = -
11.34, p < .001; Q(155) = 202.26, p = .006). In the combined dataset, only 33 potentially-
missing studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its 
confidence interval (r = .080, 95% CI [.054, .105], z = 6.01, p < .001, Q(486) = 1625.62, 
p < .001). 
The accompanying trim-and-fill funnel plots for the distal model effect sizes can 
be found in Figures 8-10 for standard (Figure 8), moderated (Figure 9), and combined 
datasets (Figure 10). The standard paradigm had 31 potentially-missing observations 
imputed by trim-and-fill for an adjusted effect size estimate that also did not have 0 in its 
confidence interval (r = .188, 95% CI [.154, .222], z = 10.62, p < .001; Q(122) = 222.27, 
p < .001). In the moderated paradigm, 8 studies were filled in (r = -.013, 95% CI [-.078, 
.052], z = -0.387, p = .699; Q(43) = 84.61, p < .001). In this case, the moderated 
paradigm became nonsignificantly different from zero. However, given the effect sizes in 
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the moderated paradigm are garnered from studies intended to attenuate or reverse the 
effect, this result is not troublesome. In the combined dataset, only 18 potentially-missing 
studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its 
confidence interval (r = .132, 95% CI [.092, .172], z = 6.39, p < .001, Q(145) = 373.67, p 
< .001). 
Our PET-PEESE results on proximal effect sizes similarly suggest a downward 
correction of the effect size to account for publication bias. For the standard paradigm, 
the results of PET suggest a new effect size of r = .104 (95% CI [.034, .172], t(110) = 
2.95, p = .004), while PEESE points to a more modest correction to r = .193 (95% CI 
[.153, .232], t(110) = 9.51, p < .001). Given that we reject the null hypothesis for PET 
(that the intercept is equal to 0), the value from PEESE is generally recommended (Carter 
& McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). This adjusted value is almost a 
fourth reduction in the effect size and is less extreme than the trim-and-fill estimate, so 
only a third of the effect may be explained by publication bias. Our moderated paradigm 
results yield similar conclusions from PET (r = -.162, 95% CI [-.276, -.043], t(52) = -
2.72, p = .009) and PEESE (r = -.179, 95% CI[-.237, -.120], t(52) = -5.99, p < .001). We 
again opt for the PEESE estimate based on the PET-PEESE rule to select PEESE if PET 
is significantly different from 0 (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2014). On the combined dataset, we see a PET estimate of r = .111 (95% CI [.034, .188], 
t(113) = 2.84, p = .005) and a PEESE estimate of r = .121 (95% CI [.078, .164], t(113) = 
5.57, p < .001). Therefore, we see a non-zero effect with PET-PEESE (opting for 
PEESE), but the effect sizes warrant an adjustment towards zero from where they were 
originally. 
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Analyses on the distal effect sizes yield divergent results. The estimates for the 
standard paradigm for PET (r = .020, 95% CI [-.076, .115], t(41) = 0.41, p = .683) are 
nonsignificant; the same was true for the moderated paradigm (r = .053, 95% CI [-.254, 
365], t(19) = 0.35, p = .727). The combined dataset also had a nonsignificant value for 
PET (r = .070, 95% CI [-.047, .185], t(44) = 1.20, p = .237). Although the PEESE values 
for the standard (r = .140, 95% CI [.082, .198], t(41) = 4.79, p < .001), moderated (r = -
.011, 95% CI [-.173, .151], t(19) = -0.14, p = .89), and combined (r = .109, 95% CI [.041, 
.176], t(44) = 3.23, p = .002) datasets were significant, we must default to the PET 
values. Therefore, for the studies using distal models of ease-of-retrieval that may employ 
the manipulation more opportunistically, which makes up a minority of the overall data, 
it is plausible that the true effect size is nonsignificantly different from zero for studies 
seeking to replicate the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
Although there is evidence of publication bias for proximal effect sizes as well, it 
is also important to note two aspects of the adjusted effect size. First, in the standard and 
moderated paradigm analyses, both trim-and-fill and PEESE find the lower bound of the 
95% confidence interval is far from 0 relative to the mean (Borenstein et al., 2009), so 
publication bias is unlikely to be the primary explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
Also, for the standard paradigm, many studies were potentially-missing from regions of 
non-significance in the contour trim-and-fill, suggesting that a filedrawer effect is likely.  
Finally, we note that trim-and-fill techniques have been challenged in the 
literature (Johnson & Eagly, 2014; Terrin et al., 2003), so we acknowledge that the 
results should be accepted with some caution. On the other hand, our results are not as 
susceptible to these criticisms as they might be because we greatly reduce one source of 
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bias in the trim-and-fill estimation method (i.e., heterogeneity) by separating the analysis 
by paradigm in addition to presenting the combined results. 
Moderator Analyses  
 Table 4 presents analyses for the total effect sizes (rXY) based on the combined 
dataset (N = 454) and the standard paradigm data only for the proximal paradigm (N = 
298) using both a bivariate regression model for each moderator and a multiple 
regression model that includes all moderators. We find no concerns with collinearity 
diagnostics for these predictors.  Each predictors’ variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
below 10 for both the combined dataset (maximum VIF = 1.56) and the standard 
paradigm data (maximum VIF = 1.44), and the maximum condition index was below 30 
(Cohen et al., 2003; 2.26 for the combined dataset and 2.12 for the standard paradigm 
data). The same holds true for Table 5, which depicts the same analyses for the combined 
dataset (N = 128, maximum VIF = 2.33, maximum condition index = 3.16) and standard 
paradigm data (N = 92, maximum VIF = 2.14, maximum condition index = 2.99) for the 
distal paradigm.   
Regarding the salience moderators, we find a strong negative effect of having a 
polarized attitude associated with lower effect sizes. This result is consistent with extant 
theory suggesting ease to be less prominent of an input to judgment for those individuals 
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). Also, we find little impact of increased range or 
attention (via placement of the subjective ease question, contrary to Kühnen, 2010), even 
in the standard paradigm.  
Regarding the inference moderators, there were strong effects of manipulations of 
processing motivation (both depth and involvement), misattribution, and disposition. 
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Manipulations of processing motivation that increased processing depth were negatively 
related to effect sizes (significantly for proximal and directionally for distal), which is 
consistent with systematic processing reducing reliance on ease. For involvement-based 
manipulations of processing motivation, we find observe a small increase in effect size 
when involvement is high (and decrease with lower involvement). That is, consistent with 
Tormala et al. (2002), individuals who have greater involvement with an issue may rely 
on higher order thoughts and feelings as a heuristic to judgment. With respect to 
representativeness, we find that misattribution paradigms, which alert participants to task 
difficulty being non-informative for judgment, clearly reduce (and reverse) effect sizes. 
Finally, with respect to relevance based on disposition, we find that people who are 
predisposed to use feelings for judgment have larger effect sizes for proximal effect sizes. 
However, we also find two results that are inconsistent with our predictions for 
the inference moderators. First, we observe a reversal of our expected result for the target 
of retrieval. Retrieving information about the self reduces rather than increases effect 
sizes in the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes (and directionally for distal). 
Further, we do not find evidence supporting the claim that making judgments about 
yourself leads to larger effect sizes. In fact, we find a reversal in the standard paradigm 
for proximal effect sizes.  
 Regarding the exploratory methodological moderators, we only observe a strong 
effect for publication status. Unpublished studies have lower effect sizes than published 
studies. This result holds both for the combined dataset and for the standard paradigm 
data for proximal and distal effect sizes. However, aside from publication status effects, 
we do not see consistent results across bivariate and multiple regression models on 
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whether other facets of the dependent measures (e.g., number of measures, type of 
measure) have an impact on effect sizes.  
Mediation Analyses: Indirect and Direct Effects  
 Of the  values of rXY in the total database,  also had associated values of rXM and 
rMY.  For each of these triplets, standardized regression coefficients from the mediation 
models, as defined in Equations 1 - 3, were used to compute estimates of the indirect 
effect (a x b) and the direct effect (c').  These estimates were analyzed without 
transformation.16 
The usual explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect predicts that the indirect 
effect (a x b) should be large, which we find.  For the proximal effect sizes combined 
dataset, the indirect effect was .096 (95% CI [.060, .132], t(56) = 5.34, p < .001; Q(208) 
= 182.149, p = .902; I2 = 0% ). Thus, the standard explanation is supported. The direct 
effect (c') was .019 (95% CI [-.105, .053], t(56) = 1.14, p = .259,; Q(208) = 450.362, p < 
.001; I2 = 53.81% [45.96%, 60.53%]), which suggests that other mediators may not be 
involved on average. However, the combined data includes moderated paradigm data, so 
this interpretation may be less straightforward. However, for the distal effect sizes 
combined dataset, we observe an indirect effect of .034 (95% CI [-.020, .087], t(17) = 
1.32, p = .203; Q(43) = 57.185, p = .072; I2 = 24.81% [-9.83%, 48.52%]), and a direct 
effect of .112 (95% CI [.034, .191], t(17) = 3.02, p = .008; Q(43) = 116.093, p < .001; I2 
= 18.98% [-18.57%, 44.64%]). As compared to the indirect effect, the direct effect was 
much larger for the distal effect sizes, which is consistent with the distal model’s 
                                                 
16 Unlike bivariate correlations, standardized regression coefficients from multiple correlations (i.e., b and 
c') are not bounded by -1 and +1, so skewness is less of a concern.   
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operationalization as requiring another non-ease explanation between ease and dependent 
measure.  
The standard paradigm data show partial mediation of the effect through 
subjective ease. For the standard paradigm data for proximal effect sizes, the average 
indirect (a x b) effect was .114 (95% CI [.074, .154]; t(56) = 5.68, p < .001; Q(142) = 
166.916, p = .075; 𝐼2 = 14.93% [-5.87%, 31.64%]). However, the average direct effect 
(c') was similar in size, .105 (95% CI [.064, .145]; t(56) = 5.19, p < . 001.; Q(142) = 
278.555, p < .001; 𝐼2 = 49.02% [38.06%, 58.04%]).  This indicates that subjective ease 
does not fully mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect. Moreover, because the direct effect (c') 
is positive, it cannot be due to numerosity or evidence strength, which would otherwise 
yield a negative effect. Thus, the results of the analysis of mediation model estimates is 
mixed.  The standard explanation is supported, but the large direct effect is unexplained 
by the constructs typically discussed in this literature. 
However, distal standard paradigm effect sizes do not show mediation by ease 
through the indirect effect. The indirect effect was .046 (95% CI [-.029, .121], t(15) = 
1.32, p =.208; Q(30) = 54.722, p = .004; I2 = 45.18% [16.25%, 64.11%]) and the direct 
effect was .208 (95% CI [.144, .272], t(15) = 6.96, p < .001; Q(30) = 56.751, p = .002; I2 
= 47.14% [19.52%, 65.28%]). The relative larger size of the direct effect, and the relative 
lack of mediation by ease is consistent again with the conceptualization of distal effect 
sizes as requiring an additional step between ease and the dependent measure of interest. 
We also find a reversal in the moderated paradigm on the remaining direct effect. 
For proximal effect sizes’ moderated paradigm data, the average effect size of the direct 
effect (c') is -.205 (95% CI [-.273, -.137]; t(25) = -6.18, p < .001, Q(65) = 84.174, p = 
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.055, 𝐼2 = 22.78% [-5.63%, 43.55%]), which is a reversal of the ease effect, and is 
consistent with numerosity or evidence strength. However, the indirect (a x b) effect for 
these proximal effect sizes was significantly greater than zero, .042 (95% CI [.010, .073]; 
t(25) = 2.75, p = .011, Q(65) = 14.216, ns; I2 = 0%), which suggests that some ease-
related effect is present, but is too small to overcome the negative direct effect created by 
the moderator manipulation. On the other hand, for the distal effect sizes, the indirect 
effect was .002 (95% CI [-.034, .037], t(8) = 0.11, p = .92; Q(12) = 1.632, ns; I2 = 0%) 
and the direct effect was -.121 (95% CI [-.232, -.010], t(8) = -2.51, p = .036; Q(12) = 
15.005, p = .241), which again demonstrates the small relationship between ease as an 
indirect effect and the total effect for distal effect sizes.  
Mediation Analyses: Moderators of the Indirect and Direct Effects 
 Tables 6 and 7 present moderator results for indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects 
for triplets pooled over the standard and moderated paradigms for proximal and distal, 
respectively (see Appendix C for standard paradigm moderator results). As a reference 
point, Tables 6 and 7 also present estimates of the total effect (c).  
For salience moderators, we observe three results. Range has little effect, 
polarized attitudes moderate all effects, and attention has little or no effect. 
For inference moderators, all moderators except involvement affect the direct 
effect for proximal effect sizes, suggesting they invoke non-ease processes. 
Representativeness based on retrieval target affected the direct effect as well for 
proximal, but it affected the indirect effect for distal effect sizes. Thus, the overall pattern 
of estimated coefficients is consistent with explanations that require new mediators that 
are typically not measured, or even identified, in the ease-of-retrieval literature. 
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For the exploratory methodological moderators, publication status had a 
directional effect (filedrawer studies were directionally lower in proximal).  
General Discussion 
 People do not always employ objective evidence to make decisions (Albarracin et 
al., 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
Many research traditions have investigated alternatives to the effortful evaluation of 
objective evidence, including use of quick heuristics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; 
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), reducing negative emotions (Bettman, Luce, & 
Payne, 1998) and thinking less (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). A large 
research stream posits that people confer how they feel about something as an input to 
judgment: the affect-as-information framework (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In this 
tradition, affective feelings, cognitive feelings, and bodily experiences such as facial 
feedback (Stepper & Strack, 1993) inform the decision-making process (Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2007; Schwarz, & Clore, 2007).  
This meta-analysis examined a frequent instantiation of the impact of cognitive 
feelings (more specifically, accessibility experiences), the ease-of-retrieval effect, to 
speak more broadly to the operations of how feelings are used in judgment. In the ease-
of-retrieval effect, individuals generate varying numbers of examples of content then are 
argued to employ feelings of ease instead of alternative inputs to judgment (Schwarz et 
al., 1991). 
 We analyzed 582 effect sizes from 263 studies in 142 papers. These effect sizes 
were either using proximal (N = 454) or distal (N = 128) models of ease-of-retrieval. 298 
proximal and 92 distal effect sizes were from experimental conditions using the standard 
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paradigm, in which authors were attempting to conceptually replicate the original effect 
reported by Schwarz et al. (1991). On the other hand, 156 proximal and 36 distal effect 
sizes were from experimental conditions using moderated paradigms in which authors 
were attempting to reduce or reverse the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, we were 
able to conduct a mediation analysis for 209 proximal and 44 distal effect sizes, 
decomposing each total effect into an indirect (a x b) and a direct (c') effect.  
 The results of our analyses have several implications for affect-as-information and 
metacognition in addition to the ease-of-retrieval. We focus on the implications from the 
proximal paradigm due to their more direct recruitment of cognitive feelings as a 
mediating mechanism.  
First, on average, the standard paradigm exhibits a robust, medium-sized effect 
(rXY = .) of the few-versus-many manipulation on a wide variety of judgment tasks.  
Publication bias was found to be present.  We estimate that it reduces the average effect 
size by about one third in the standard paradigm, leaving about two thirds of the effect to 
be explained by other factors. Therefore, we find robust evidence of inductions of a 
cognitive feeling, ease, influencing judgment.  
Second, about half of the ease-of-retrieval effect in standard paradigms is 
mediated by subjective ease when the traditional OLS mediation model is used to 
separate the total effect estimate into an indirect and a direct effect (a x b = . and c' = ., 
see Table 3).  This supports the standard explanation of the effect and presents striking 
evidence of the use of affect-as-information.  However, it also suggests that other 
mediators are commonly present, but seldom identified.  The standard explanation 
survived analyses that incorporated heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated 
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error.  However, the size of the indirect was further reduced in these analyses, while the 
direct effect was less affected.  This mediation analysis serves as a call to action for 
researchers to find new theories and experimental paradigms that will explicate the 
robust, and unexplained, direct effect uncovered in this meta-analysis.  
Third, for moderated paradigms for proximal effect sizes, the indirect effect is 
much smaller than for the standard paradigm (but still significantly positive), and the 
direct effect is negative and larger in magnitude.  These results strongly suggest that other 
mediators are at work in the moderated paradigm.  
Fourth, several moderators were found to contribute to variations in effect size 
(see Table 4).  Importantly, five moderators were designed to represent the types of 
moderators of affect-as-information posited elsewhere in the literature (Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2011), which appeared as manipulations in the moderated paradigms.  
Thus, they inform us both about the operation of affect-as-information and possible 
explanations of the observed differences between the standard and moderated paradigms. 
All five moderators were found to account for significant amounts of the variation in 
effect sizes in the total database.  
For salience moderators (i.e., those affecting the experience of ease), we found 
two important results: one positive and one null. Polarized attitudes reduced the ease-of-
retrieval effect. For these participants who had competing inputs to ease (e.g., a polarized 
attitude for politics; e.g., Haddock, 2002), effect sizes were negative. However, contrary 
to what Kühnen (2010) argues, we found only a small, non-significant effect of the 
subjective ease question appearing before the dependent measure (versus after or no 
question) in any dataset.  
  41 
For inference moderators (i.e., those affecting the relationship between ease and 
the dependent measure), we found several important results.  Manipulations of processing 
motivation that increased processing depth (but were not related to involvement) reduced 
effect sizes, which is suggestive that increased cognitive resources made systematic 
processing strategies more likely (Chaiken et al., 1989).  However, manipulations of 
processing motivation that increased involvement were positively related to the ease-of-
retrieval effect, which is consistent with the Tormala et al. (2002) framework. 
Participants who have heightened personal relevance may be more cognizant of their 
higher order feelings. Further, representativeness (misattribution) reduced the ease-of-
retrieval effect, consistent with the hypothesized reduced informativeness of cognitive 
feelings (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011).  Finally, people predisposed toward using 
cognitive feelings exhibited larger ease-of-retrieval effects.   
Fifth, when the indirect and direct effect sizes were analyzed separately, many 
moderators were found to affect one, but not the other (see Tables 6 and 7).  For salience 
moderators, the polarized attitude moderator influenced the indirect and direct effect 
sizes. The inference moderators mostly affected direct effect sizes much more than 
indirect effect sizes for proximal effect sizes.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the moderator manipulations used in the literature achieved their results mainly by 
introducing new mediators that had effects opposite to those of subjective ease.  
Sixth, two moderators that were based on degree of self-reference (i.e., 
representativeness [retrieval target] and relevance [judgment task]) were not consistent 
with our initial predictions and were reversed for the standard paradigm for proximal 
effect sizes. This result may mean that these moderators are less related to 
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representativeness and relevance, but instead function similarly to depth of processing 
motivation. That is, self-referential retrieval and judgment may encourage more 
systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).  
 Finally, we find few methodological factors that have a large influence on effect 
sizes. That the ease-of-retrieval effect is robust across these manipulations supports the 
usefulness of the manipulation in the span of inductions of cognitive feelings to be used 
as information, and it diminishes concerns about other possible methodological artifacts. 
Methodological Implications for Few-Versus-Many Studies 
Our meta-analysis also has implications for ease-of-retrieval studies in the future, 
inclusive of the way the few-versus-many manipulation is conducted.  
First, while our work suggests no aggregate differences between whether the ease 
question is placed before or after the dependent measure, there may be reason to place the 
question after the dependent measure to avoid demand characteristics explanations 
(Kühnen, 2010). In some situations, however, there may be theory-driven reasons for 
including the ease question before the dependent measure (e.g., salience; Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2011; see also Danziger et al., 2005). Therefore, the exact placement of 
this question should consider both concerns. However, we also recommend studies that 
manipulate the placement of the ease question to test whether the placement influences 
the results in a specific paper (see Feldman & Lynch, 1988). 
Second, we recommend increased sample sizes to increase power. In a simple 
two-cell design, given our effect size, an experimenter would need to run approximately 
58.5 participants per cell for proximal and 53.5 for distal to achieve a power of .8. In the 
standard paradigm for the proximal model in this meta-analysis, we find that, when 
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excluding the largest designs (N > 300), an average of 25.34 participants are run per cell, 
which would only be powered at .45 for each two-cell comparison. In the distal 
paradigm, this number would be 30.42 per cell to be powered at .56. We recognize that 
we reduced power by splitting designs by moderators and that, in many cases, the full 
ANOVA had more statistical power than disaggregated two-cell comparisons due to 
pooled estimates of the error term (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000).  However, as 
illustrated by our meta-analyses, splitting data into standard and moderated paradigms 
enables informative tests of mediation. 
Broader Implications of this Meta-Analysis 
 This meta-analysis arrives at an important time within the fields of social 
psychology, consumer behavior, and judgment and decision-making. Many well-known 
effects are being re-visited because of failures to replicate (e.g., behavioral priming; 
Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Shanks et al., 2013), and many researchers are 
engaging in debates over the existence of published effects (e.g., choice overload; 
Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman, 2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010; 
unconscious thought theory; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). Due to these challenges, many 
authors of previously published effects are reluctant to provide information, data, or even 
communicate about their prior work. The robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect found 
in this meta-analysis presents a case in which published effects are not overly 
controversial.   Many authors who were contacted for data were not only willing to 
respond, but often provided missing data and unpublished studies with non-significant 
results or with offers to contact other colleagues for their file-drawer contents. Thus, this 
meta-analysis underscores the value of sharing data and experimental details. 
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 More substantively, we report that a commonly-employed manipulation leads to 
an ease-of-retrieval effect of moderate size. This result is important due to the strong 
connection of this effect to other phenomena in psychology such as the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and various fluency effects (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). This manipulation is one cornerstone of a broader set of ideas of the 
impact of cognitive feelings as information in judgment and decision-making 
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
 This meta-analysis also extends the boundaries of other meta-analytic endeavors 
by examining the proposed mediator of an effect in addition to the effect itself.  This 
approach allows the total effect to be decomposed into an indirect effect and a direct 
effect.  Thus, the adequacy of the proposed mediator can be tested, in addition to its 
existence. Moreover, moderators can be related to the direct and indirect effects, 
shedding light on the mechanisms of moderation.  Finally, when substantial direct effects 
are revealed by the meta-analysis (as was the case here), this serves to motivate future 
research to uncover the associated mediators.  
 Finally, we believe this meta-analysis also serves as a call for pre-registered, 
large-scale replications of the broad category of effects using highly-powered studies. 
Studies in the database relied on smaller samples (or had smaller cell sizes in a larger 
factorial design) compared to what others may argue (n > 30; Simmons et al., 2011). It is 
prudent to advocate pre-registered, pretested (in terms of number of “few” and “many” 
arguments), high-powered replications to demonstrate ease-of-retrieval across a variety of 
policy, consumer, health, and other domains. These pre-registered replications ensure that 
there is no cherry-picking of dependent-measures.  
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Potential Limitations 
 Data availability due to the passage of time was a major factor in being able to 
attain missing information, especially from early research. Notably, we had far fewer 
triplets of correlations because less than half of the studies that included a subjective ease 
question reported rMY. We thus faced two layers of publication bias: those studies that 
were not published due to failing to find significant results, and those studies with 
significant results but incomplete reporting (especially, no correlation between ease and 
the dependent measure). When reaching out to authors we encountered multiple instances 
of inability to recover these missing correlations because the raw data were no longer 
available. 
Another source of missing data arises when the goal of using the few-versus-
many manipulation is simply to provide an alternative procedure for manipulating 
another construct (e.g., connectedness with a future self; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011). 
Thus, there may be other filedrawers filled with ease-of-retrieval studies in which the 
investigation was not interested in ease-of-retrieval per se (i.e., many other types of distal 
studies). 
 Further, we recognize that some studies that rely on the ease-of-retrieval effect do 
not use the few-versus-many manipulation (e.g., Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007; 
Raghubir & Menon, 2001). In this meta-analysis, we chose to concentrate solely on the 
few-versus-many manipulation to ensure that we had comparable effect sizes.  
Future Directions 
Our meta-analysis revealed that subjective ease is, at most, a partial mediator of 
the ease-of-retrieval effect. Thus, one important future direction is to explore alternative 
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explanations, such as unrequested cognitions (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al., 
1996). The addition of questions to measure these and other explanations is 
straightforward. 
 Second, future research should examine the ecological validity of subjective ease, 
as generated by the few-versus-many manipulation (see Hertwig et al., 2013). While 
work in the field has established how naïve beliefs about ease may factor into everyday 
judgments (Schwarz, 2004), researchers have only occasionally asked whether the 
attributions drawn by individuals are beneficial or detrimental (Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2012). For example, Pham et al. (2012) demonstrate that peoples’ predictions may be 
improved through relying on their feelings based on the few-versus-manipulation. Future 
research should examine how and when relying on feelings of ease may be adaptive or 
maladaptive.  
Conclusions 
 How people rely on their feelings has been a strong area of research for several 
decades (Greifender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007; Zajonc & 
Markus, 1982). Substantive research topics have spanned both affective (e.g., sadness; 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2001) and cognitive (e.g., ease; Whittlesea, 1993) forms of feelings as 
they apply to a large variety of outcomes. One often-studied cognitive feeling has been 
the subjective ease of recall for judgment-related examples. 
This meta-analysis addressed the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-
retrieval effect?" Our results suggest the answer is "Yes, but ..."  We found that the effect 
in the standard paradigm is robust, although about one-third of the effect may be due to 
publication bias. These results also speak to the role of feelings as decision inputs within 
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the affect-as-information theoretical framework. As for our focal question, we found that 
subjective ease is a robust mediator, but that an unexplained direct effect is equally robust 
in both standard and moderated paradigms. For moderated paradigms, authors have 
identified and manipulated specific theory-based variables. However, the large residual 
direct effect for standard paradigms serves as a call to action for future research to answer 
the question, "What else mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect?"  
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Table 1.  
Example cases of proximal and distal effect sizes. 
         
Division and Paper Reason 
  
Proximal 
 
Schwarz et al. 1991 People recall assertive/unassertive instances; they make judgments 
of assertiveness. 
Haddock 2002 People recall reasons to like/dislike Tony Blair, then they make 
judgments about Tony Blair. 
Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999 
 
People recall instances of biking, then they make judgments about 
how frequently they bike. 
Novemsky et al. 2007 
 
People imagine having to generate reasons for choosing a given 
product, then they make a choice of product. 
Tsai and Thomas 2011 People imagine reasons to donate or not, then they decide 
whether/how much to donate. 
Pocheptsova et al. 2010 People think of occasions for going to a restaurant; willingness-to-
pay for dinner in that restaurant is the DV.  
Biswas et al. 2012 
 
Participants come up with reasons why a car may have starting 
problems; participants judge likelihood that a 5-year old used 
Volkswagen car might fail to start anytime within the next 6 
months.  
Keller and Bless 2009 Participants think of few or many things in their life impacted by 
having a right leg amputated; perceived negative affect duration 
was the DV. 
  
Distal 
 
Pham et al. 2012 
 
People recall times they were correct in trusting their feelings, then 
make predictions about some outcome.  
Schlegel et al. 2011 
 
People come up with descriptors of themselves, then judge 
meaning in life. 
Bartels and Urminsky 2011 People consider how hard it would be to generate reasons their 
identity would remain stable, then their discount factor is assessed.  
Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2005 People come up with exemplars of minorities they like, then they 
complete measures of implicit stereotyping (RT as dependent 
measure).  
Alter and Balcetis 2011 People consider positive or negative elements of NYC, then they 
rate the felt distance to NYC.  
Muller et al. 2011 Participants come up with few or many unfair things about a 
negotiation game; the main DV is cooperation in the negotiation 
game.  
Sussman and Alter 2012 Participants think of items they had bought from a product 
category; willingness-to- pay for items from that category (based 
on subsequent questions) was the DV. 
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Table 2.  
Descriptive Statistics of Ease-of-Retrieval Effect Sizes. 
 
 
  
          
Variable Proximal (N = 454) Distal (N = 128) 
   
Year   
M (SD) 2006 (5.25) 2009 (3.33) 
Median 2007 2010 
Country    
United States (%) 254 (55.9) 97 (75.8)  
Non-US (%) 200 (44.1) 31 (24.2)  
Publication Type    
Journal Article (%) 350 (77.1)  101 (78.9)  
Unpublished (%)  104 (22.9) 27 (21.1)  
Paradigm    
      Standard (%)  298 (65.6) 92 (71.9)  
      Moderated (%)  156 (34.4) 36 (28.1)  
Misattribution    
      Present (%) 22 (4.8) 2 (1.6)  
      Absent (%) 432 (95.2) 126 (98.4)  
Target of Retrieval    
      Self (%) 160 (35.2) 74 (57.8)  
      Not Self(%) 294 (64.8) 54 (42.2)  
Target of Judgment    
      Self (%) 256 (56.4) 103 (80.5)  
      Not Self (%) 198 (43.6) 25 (19.5)  
Polarized Attitude    
      Yes (%) 22 (4.8) 0 (0)  
      No (%) 432 (95.2) 128 (100)  
Arguments    
M, Few (SD) [Median] 2.50 (1.11) [2] 2.44 (0.99) [2]  
M, Many (SD) [Median] 8.60 (2.95) [8] 9.47 (3.08) [10]  
Measure of Subjective Ease    
Before DV (%) 106 (23.3) 32 (25)  
After DV (%) 290 (63.9) 42 (32.8)  
None (%) 58 (12.8)  54 (42.2)  
DV Type    
Attitude (%) 369 (81.3) 70 (54.7)  
Non-Attitude (%)  85 (18.7) 58 (45.3)  
Median, Number of Ease Items 1 1  
Median, Number of Measures 2 2  
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Table 3.  
Overall Effect Sizes [95% CIs] for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect. 
Effect Size               Combined 
Standard/Moderated 
Standard 
Paradigm 
Moderated 
Paradigm 
 Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Proximal 
c (all data) 
 
.121 [.094, .149] .253 [.224, .281] -.178 [-.215, -.140] 
c (mediation triplets) 
 
.109 [.073, .145] 
.223 [.184, .262] -.166 [-.230, -.100] 
 Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal 
c’ (mediation triplets)  
.019 [-.105, .053] 
.105 [.064, .145] -.205 [-.273, -.137] 
a x b (mediation triplets)  
.096 [.060, .132] 
.114 [.074, .154] .042 [.010, .073] 
Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Distal 
c (all data) 
 
.165 [.120, .208] .264 [.220, .307] -.082 [-.158, -.005] 
c (mediation triplets) 
 
.154 [.085, .221] 
.308 [.219, .393] -.125 [-.231, -.015] 
 Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal 
c’ (mediation triplets)  
.112 [.034, .191] 
.208 [.144, .272] -.121 [-.232, -.010] 
a x b (mediation triplets)  
.034 [-.020, .087] 
.046 [-.029, .121] .002 [-.034, .037] 
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Table 4. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient2 
  Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
 
454 .009 (.013) 
 
.015 
 
298 -.005 (.012) 
 
.012 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 106 .114 (.023) 
 
-.002 
 
73 .245 (.019) 
 
-.005 
 
 
After DV (-1) 348 .124 (.015) 
   
225 .255 (.016) 
   
Polarized Attitude Yes (+1) 22 -.140 (.056) *** -.064 *** --- --- 
 
--- 
 
 
No (-1) 432 .134 (.014) 
   
--- --- 
   
Inference Moderators 
Processing 
Motivation 
High (+1) 12 -.184 (.076) *** -.034 ** --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(depth) No manip (0) 417 .128 (.014) 
   
--- --- 
   
 
Low (-1) 25 .150 (.057) 
   
--- --- 
   
Processing 
Motivation 
High (+1) 26 .178 (.057) ^ .030 ** --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(involvement) No manipu (0) 404 .124 (.015) 
   
--- --- 
   
 
Low (-1) 24 .008 (.061) 
   
--- --- 
   
Representativenes
s 
Self (+1) 160 .108 (.022) 
 
-019 
 
114 .196 (.021) *** -.030 * 
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 294 .130 (.018) 
   
184 .286 (.017) 
   
Representativenes
s 
Present (+1) 22 -.246 (.065)  *** -.092 *** --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 432 .136 (.014) 
   
--- --- 
   
Relevance Self (+1) 256 .123 (.018) 
 
-.001 
 
180 .221 (.018) *** -.028* 
 
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 198 .121 (.021) 
   
118 .298 (.021) 
   
Relevance High (+1) 15 .226 (.076) *** .045 *** --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(disposition) No manip (0) 426 .128 (.014) 
   
--- --- 
   
  Low (-1) 13 -.194 (.083)       --- ---   
 
  
 
  89 
 
Table 4 (continued). 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient
2 
  Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient
2 
  
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year 
 
454 -.006 (.013) 
 
-.011 
 
298 -.008 (.010) 
 
-.009 
 
Country USA (+1) 254 .117 (.018) 
 
.0004 
 
170 .232 (.019) ^ -.007 
 
 
Non-USA (-1) 200 .127 (.021) 
   
128 .280 (.022) 
   
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 104 .044 (.027) ** -.035 * 65 .137 (.030) **
* 
-.053 **
*  
Published (-1) 350 .137 (.015) 
   
233 .277 (.015) 
   
Number of measures (M) 454 .011 (.014) 
 
.014 
 
298 .025 (.014) ^ .015 
 
Number of measures (Y) 454 .0002 (.014) 
 
-.001 
 
298 .016 (.012) 
 
.014 
 
Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 369 .112 (.015) 
 
-.019 
 
239 .241 (.017) ^ -.025 ^ 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-1) 85 .155 (.030) 
   
59 .292 (.030) 
   
            
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 
and the maximum condition index was below 30. 
  
  90 
Table 5. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal paradigm. 
    Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data Standard Paradigm Data Only 
Moderator Level Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient2 
  Number 
of Effect 
Sizes 
Mean Effect Size 
(S.E.)1 
  Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
 
128 -.009 (.019) 
 
-.005 
 
92 -.008 (.020) 
 
-.008 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 32 .170 (.043) 
 
.021 
 
22 .320 (.043) 
 
.017 
 
 
After DV (-1) 96 .165 (.022) 
   
70 .243 (.027) 
   
Inference Moderators 
Processing 
Motivation 
High (+1) 6 -.036 (.107) 
 
-.018 
 
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
(depth) No Manip (0) 118 .177 (.021) 
   
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
 Low (-1) 4 .115 (.097)         
Processing 
Motivation 
High (+1) 1 .331 (.207) 
 
.026 
 
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
(involvement) No Manip (0) 126 .167 (.019) 
   
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
 Low (-1) 1 -.064 (.201)    --- ---  ---  
Representativenes
s 
Self (+1) 74 .152 (.023) 
 
-.018 
 
50 .226 (.03) ^ -.023 
 
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 54 .195 (.033) 
   
42 .307 (.033) 
   
Representativenes
s 
Present (+1) 2 -.250 (.227) ^ -.063 * --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 126 .170 (.020) 
   
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
Relevance Self (+1) 103 .158 (.021) 
 
-.028 
 
76 .270 (.025) 
 
.0004 
 
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 25 .198 (.044) 
   
16 .239 (.051) 
   
Relevance High (+1) 2 -.015 (.187) 
 
-.040 ^ --- --- 
 
--- 
 
(disposition) No Manip (0) 124 .165 (.019) 
   
--- --- 
 
--- 
 
 Low (-1) 2 .409 (.208)    --- ---  ---  
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
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Year 
 
128 -.020 (.022) 
 
-.051 
 
92 -.035 (.024) 
   
Country USA (+1) 97 .174 (.025).  .025  73 .273 (.026) ^ .  
 Non-USA (-1) 31 .155 (.045)    19 .239 (.047)    
Publication Status3 Filedrawer (+1) 27 .097 (.045)  -.038  17 .213 (.054) *** -.048 ^ 
 Published (-1) 101 .176 (.019)    75 .275 (.025)    
Number of 
measures (M) 
 128 .009 (.02)  .002  92 .033 (.020)  .033  
Number of 
measures (Y) 
 128 -.018 (.021)  -.019  92 .020 (.021)  .019  
Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 70 .180 (.028)  -.004  51 .275 (.029)  0  
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-1) 58 .155 (.027)    41 .250 (.031)    
            
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10 
and the maximum condition index was below 30. 
3Model for bivariate analyses in combined dataset was unable to be run for this covariate; we removed the random intercept for this bivariate analysis.  
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Table 6. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect (combined 
dataset) 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') 
Total Effect 
(c) 
  
      
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Regression 
Coefficient3 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
 
209 .013 (.010) 
 
.024 
 
-.021 (.014) 
 
-.030 ^ .003 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 47 .078 (.021) 
 
-.011 
 
.021 (.026) 
 
.004 
 
-.007 
 
 
After DV (-1) 162 .102 (.018) 
   
.019 (.018) 
     
Polarized Attitude Yes (+1) 5 -.037 (.057) * -.020 * -.187 (.096) * -.030 * -.042 **  
No (-1) 204 .101 (.019) 
   
.025 (.017) 
     
Inference Moderators 
Processing Motivation High (+1) 6 .043 (.070)  -.003  -.281 (.109) ** -.049 ** -.051 ** 
(depth) No manip. (0) 193 .098 (.018)    .024 (.018)       
Low (-1) 10 .086 (.058) 
   
.189 (.086) 
 
 
  
Processing Motivation High (+1) 6 .092 (.065)  .003  .118 (.094)  .016  .019  
(involvement) No manip. (0) 195 .098 (.019)    .016 (.017)       
Low (-1) 8 .063 (.065) 
   
.004 (.094) 
 
 
  
Representativeness Self (+1) 88 .081 (.022) 
 
-.011  .060 (.025) * .039 * .011  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 121 .105 (.019) 
   
-.010 (.022) 
 
 
   
Representativeness Present (+1) 7 .066 (.063)  -.006  -.364 (.110) *** -.080 *** -.093 *** 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 202 .097 (.018) 
   
.030 (.018) 
 
 
   
Relevance Self (+1) 127 .087 (.020)  .006  .045 (.021) * .004  -.002  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 82 .109 (024) 
   
-.023 (.027) 
 
 
  
Relevance High (+1) 8 .051 (.082)  .005  .209 (.091) ** .046 ** .055 ** 
(disposition) No manip. (0) 193 .1004 (.019)    .024 (.018)      
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Low (-1) 8 .009 (.082) 
   
-.209 (.090) 
     
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year 
 
209 .009 (.009) 
 
-.004 
 
-.015 (.014) 
 
.006 
 
-.008 
 
Country USA (+1) 114 .098 (.023)  -.004  .018 (.023)  -.0001  -.006 
  
Non-USA (-1) 95 .095 (.025) 
   
.023 (.026) 
    
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 65 .072 (.035)  -.005  -.022 (.028) 
 
-.036*  -.041 ^  
Published (-1) 144 .102 (.019) 
   
.035 (.019) 
     
Number of measures (M) 209 .014 (.017) 
 
.015 
 
-.011 (.017) 
 
-.019 
 
-.001 
 
Number of measures (Y) 209 -.014 (.014) 
 
-.017 
 
.012 (.017) 
 
.024 
 
.007 
 
Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 
176 .087 (.019)  -.012  
.016 (.019)  -.008  -.026 
 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
33 .126 (.032) 
   
.033 (.039) 
    
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below  
10 and the maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect from is provided as a benchmark.  
 
  
  94 
Table 7. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') 
Total Effect 
(c) 
  
      
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Regression 
Coefficient3 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
 
44 .019 (.016) 
 
.024 
 
-.023 (.035) 
 
-.116 
 
-.032 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 23 .060 (.026) 
 
.112 
 
.092 (.055) 
 
.035 
 
.078 
 
 
After DV (-1) 21 .005 (.017) 
   
.131 (.053) 
     
Inference Moderators 
Processing Motivation High (+1) 1 -.019 (.171) 
 
-.010  -.287 (.234)  -.055 ^ -.067 * 
(depth) 
No Manip (0) 42 .022 (.016) 
   
.119 (.038) 
 
 
   
 Low (-1) 1 .074 (.171)    .221 (.234)      
Representativeness Self (+1) 14 .016 (.026) 
 
-.119  .136 (.059)  .190 ^ .098  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 30 .033 (.026) 
   
.090 (.053) 
 
 
   
Representativeness Present (+1) 2 .058 (.180) 
 
.005  -.305 (.248) ^ -.152 * -.139 * 
(misattribution) Absent (-1) 42 .022 (.015) 
   
.121 (.038) 
 
 
   
Relevance Self (+1) 41 .022 (.016)  -.072  .117 (.039)  -.036  -.068  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 3 .036 (.089) 
   
.054 (.138) 
 
 
  
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year 
 
44 -.012 (.026) 
 
-.014 
 
.020 (.046) 
 
-.119 
 
-.163 ^ 
Country USA (+1) 38 .032 (.013)  -.016  .101 (.043)  .070  .069   
Non-USA (-1) 6 .-.026 (.027) 
   
.149 (.077) 
    
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 6 .025 (.071)  -.122  .019 (.109) 
 
.013  -.060   
Published (-1) 38 .023 (.016) 
   
.125 (.039) 
     
Number of measures (M) 44 .004 (.025) 
 
-.083 
 
-.004 (.04) 
 
-.025 
 
-.043 
 
Number of measures (Y) 44 -.002 (.023) 
 
-.037 
 
-.011 (.042) 
 
.017 
 
-.057 
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Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 
28 .048 (.024)  .075  
.078 (.045)  -.116  -.093 
 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
16 .006 (.019) 
   
.167 (.052) 
    
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below  
10 and the maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark 
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Figure 1. Theoretical organization of moderators of ease-of-retrieval effect.  
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S1 S2
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Figure 2. The mediation model of the ease-of-retrieval effect. 
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
 
B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of proximal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated 
paradigms (B). 
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of distal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms 
(B). 
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A. Standard Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)   
 
B. Standard Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill) 
 
C. Standard Paradigm (with Contours)                 
  
 
Figure 5. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the 
funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-
and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates 
nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) 
assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A: Moderated Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)     
 
B: Moderated Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)     
  
 
C. Moderated Paradigm (with Contours) 
 
Figure 6. Funnel plots for the moderated paradigm proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the 
funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-
and-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates 
nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) 
assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A. Combined Dataset (before Trim-and-Fill)      
 
B. Combined Dataset (after Trim-and-Fill)  
 
 
C. Combined Dataset (with Contours) 
 
Figure 7. Funnel plots for the combined dataset proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel 
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill 
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant, 
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null 
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A. Standard Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)   
 
B. Standard Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill) 
 
C. Standard Paradigm (with Contours)                 
  
 
Figure 8. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel 
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill 
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant, 
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null 
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A: Moderated Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)     
 
B: Moderated Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)     
 
C. Moderated Paradigm (with Contours) 
 
Figure 9. Funnel plots for the moderated paradigm distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel 
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill 
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant, 
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null 
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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A. Combined Dataset (before Trim-and-Fill)      
 
B. Combined Dataset (after Trim-and-Fill)  
 
 
C. Combined Dataset (with Contours) 
 
Figure 10. Funnel plots for the combined dataset distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel 
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill 
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-
fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant, 
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null 
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true. 
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Figure 11. Mediation model that includes measurement error (errM) and correlated error 
due to an unmeasured confounding variable (Z). 
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Appendix A 
Example e-mail for reaching out to authors 
Dear []: 
 
[Co-author] and I are conducting a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect.  You have been a contributor to this 
literature, so we hope you can help us.  Attached is a spreadsheet with the data we have been able to abstract from your 
publications.   
 
The data we seek are correlations (as reported or computed from other reported measures) between the few-many 
manipulation (X), the manipulation check on subjective difficulty (M), and the dependent measure of interest (Y).   For 
your attached study, this would be []. In addition to examining the basic effect, we are examining the mediation of the 
effect by subjective difficulty, which is why we need three correlations for each observation.   
 
Importantly, we are separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual 
replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in which 
the authors change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing attenuation or 
reversal.  Thus, we often get two or more observations from a single experiment. 
 
Currently, we have data from 142 articles and dissertations, 258 experiments, and 539 observations.  It is no surprise 
that the basic effect in the standard paradigm conditions is very robust, and this effect is reliably reduced or reversed in 
the non-standard conditions.  However, there is a significant level of heterogeneity in the effect sizes, and we hope to 
identify the factors that do and do not contribute to this variation.  Also, we hope to explore the role of subjective 
difficulty as a mediator of the effect.  Regarding the latter, we have r(XY) for 85% of the observations and r(XM) for 
94% of the observations, but for r(MY) only 21% of observations. 
 
What do we need from you?  First, please review how we have separated the conditions of your experiments into 
standard and non-standard paradigms and confirm that they are consistent with your interpretation of your 
manipulations.  Second, we need the missing correlations.  We are happy to do whatever we can to make this easier for 
you.  Below are some options. 
 
OPTION 1:  Send us the original data.  We will only use it for the purpose of computing the correlations we need. 
 
OPTION 2:  Hire a student research assistant to do this work under your direction.  We reimburse you for this expense 
(up to some reasonable amount).  Also, we would be happy to work with this student via phone/Skype. 
 
OPTION 3:  Do it yourself.  Just fill in the yellow cells in the attached spreadsheet.  Alternatively, we have designed a 
website that assists in this process.  It is preloaded with the data we already have, and it has effect size "calculators" to 
make the task easier.  Of course, the RA in Option 2 might also want to use the website. 
 
OPTION 4:  Some combination of the above, or some other process that occurs to you. 
 
Of course, if you have unpublished experiments in your "file drawer" (new or old), we would love to have the 
correlations from those experiments. 
 
Please let us know if you can help.  Thanks in advance. 
 
Regards 
[Authors] 
 
Note: While we used the phrase “very robust” to describe the effect when reaching out to authors, we caution against 
using this language as a template for future meta-analyses so as not to bias authors. It is possible that this language 
could encourage more individuals to send data, but it is also possible it may affect whether individuals with successful 
or unsuccessful filedrawer studies are willing to respond.  
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Figure A1. Example sheet sent to authors to request missing data and to verify our 
interpretation of their studies. 
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Appendix B 
Table of Effect Sizes 
 
Table B1. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database before excluding studies.  
Paper Exp Sourc
e1 
Topic Retrieved Difficul
ty 
Questio
n2 
Fe
w  
Man
y  
DV Misattributio
n3 
XY Std XY 
Mod 
           
Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis 
(1999) 
1 J Biking instances A 3 8 Frequency 
of usage 
estimate 
N r = .23, N = 
78  
 
- 
Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis 
(1999) 
2 J Biking instances B 3 8 Frequency 
of usage 
stimate 
N r = .30, N = 
51  
 
r = -.09, 
N = 49  
 
Aladjem (2010) 1 D Reasons to drive a BMW B 1 10 Attitude-
assertion 
effect 
(enjoyment 
of listing 
task); 
attitude 
N r = .32, N = 
69.5 
r = -.30, 
N = 
69.5 
Aladjem (2010) 2 D Reasons why Dutch team 
would win Soccer World 
B 1,2 7, 10 Attitude-
assertion 
effect 
(enjoyment 
of listing 
task); 
attitude 
N r = .30, N = 
77.5 
r = -.44, 
N = 
77.5 
Aladjem (2010) 3 D Pro/Con reasons in favor of 
presidential ticket 
A 1 10 Attitude-
assertion 
effect 
(enjoyment 
of listing 
task); 
attitude 
N r = .32, N = 
65 
r = -.31, 
N = 74 
Alter & Balcetis 
(2010) 
3 J Reasons NY (C1) vibrant 
and exciting/ (C2) dirty and 
dangerous 
N 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
NYC 
N C1: r = .34, N 
= 30, C2: r = 
.25, N = 30 
- 
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Angle (2012) pilo
t 
D Behaviors engaged in that 
demonstrate university spirit 
N 4 12 Choice of 
University-
related 
lottery 
N r = .29, N = 
61 
- 
Armitage (2007) 1 J Instances of taking stairs 
instead of elevator 
A 3 8 Frequency 
estimate of 
stairs; 
attitude 
towards 
stairs, 
behavioral 
intention 
towards 
stairs 
N r = .23, N = 
83  
- 
Armitage (2007) 2 J Instances of volunteering to 
help others 
A 3 8 Frequency 
estimate of 
volunteering
; attitude, 
behavioral 
intentions, 
behavioral 
control, 
subjective 
norm 
N r = .27, N = 
77  
- 
Ask et al. (2012) 1 J (C1) Truth/ (C2) lie clues B 2 6 Credibility 
judgment 
N C1: r = .33 N 
= 42, C2: r = 
.31 N = 42 
- 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
1 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
A 2 10 # of Feeling 
Related 
Reasons 
used to 
justify 
evaluation 
of book; 
trust in 
feelings 
N r = .26, N = 
59  
- 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
3 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
A 2 10 reliance on 
feelings to 
make choice 
N r = .18, N = 
97  
- 
Bares (2007) 1 D Shy/mean/friendly/nice/boo
ks liked 
A 1, 
3 
5,8 How much 
do you like 
being 
N r = .30, N = 
10; r = .02, N 
= 10; r = -.11, 
r = -.15, 
N = 10; 
r = -.05, 
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friendly 
(shy/friendly
); How 
much do 
people like 
you 
(mean/nice); 
How much 
do you like 
reading 
(book); 
frequency 
N = 11; r = 
.62, N = 10; r 
= .05, N = 10; 
r = -.25, N = 
10 
N = 9, r 
= .15, N 
= 11, r 
= 0, N 
= 10; r 
= -.30, 
N = 10; 
r = .06, 
N = 10; 
r = .15, 
N = 10; 
r = -.40, 
N = 9; r 
= .33, N 
= 9; r = 
.09, N = 
10; r = -
.11, N = 
10; r = 
.04, N = 
10; r = 
.14, N = 
10; r = -
.03, N = 
10  
Bares (2007) F D Shy/mean/friendly/nice/boo
ks liked 
A 3 8 How much 
do you like 
being 
friendly 
(shy/friendly
); How 
much do 
people like 
you 
(mean/nice); 
How much 
do you like 
reading 
(book) 
N r = -.05, N = 
44; r = .10, N 
= 44; r = -.01, 
N = 39; r = 
.18, N = 39 
- 
Bartels & 
Urminsky 
(2011) 
3 J Reasons identity would 
remain stable 
B 2 12 Connectedn
ess to future 
self 
N r = .23, N = 
97 
- 
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Belli et al. 
(1998) 
1 J Specific events experienced 
when 5-7 and 8-10 years old 
A 4 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .18, N = 
152  
- 
Belli et al. 
(1998) 
2 J Specific events experienced 
when 5-7 and 8-10 years old 
N 4 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .21, N = 
107  
- 
Bianchi et al. 
(2009) 
3 J Positive aspects of the 
group the Germans 
N 3 12 Ingroup 
projection 
ratings; 
social 
projection 
rating 
N r = .35, N = 
66  
- 
Biswas, Keller, 
& Burman 
(2012) 
1 J Reasons car might have 
starting problems 
A 4 12 Probability 
of 5-year old 
used 
Volkswagen 
failing 
N r = .39, N = 
41  
- 
Biswas, Keller, 
& Burman 
(2012) 
2 J Reasons car might have 
starting problems (C1) high 
need for closure, (C2) low 
need for closure 
A 4 12 Probability 
of 5-year old 
used 
Volkswagen 
failing 
N C1: r = .43, N 
= 39 
C2: r = 
.08, N = 
39 
Biswas, Keller, 
& Burman 
(2012) 
3 J Performance-related 
problems of music CD (C1) 
neutral exp (C2) negative 
exp 
A 4 12 Probability 
of typical 
music CD 
from same 
company 
having 
performance
-related 
problems 
within 6 
months of 
purchase  
N C1: r = .32 N 
= 45 
C2: r = 
-.28 N 
= 49 
Biswas, Keller, 
& Burman 
(2012) 
4 J Reasons car might have 
starting problems (C1) cue 
absent (C2) cue present 
N 4 12 Probability 
of 5-year old 
used 
Volkswagen 
failing; 
number of 
possible 
reasons for a 
C2 C1: r = .28 N 
= 50 
C2: r = 
-.27 N 
= 50 
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car to have 
starting 
problems 
Bohner et al. 
(2002) 
1 J Reasons of personal 
behaviors that would 
increase/decrease risk of 
rape; (C1) no pres + low 
RMA +decr (C2) time pres 
+ low RMA + decr (C3) no 
pres + low RMA + incr (C4) 
time pres + low RMA + incr 
(C5) time pres + high RMA 
+ incr (C6) no pres + high 
RMA +decr , (C7) time pres 
+ high RMA + decr, (C8) 
no pres + high RMA + incr 
B 2 6 Vulnerabilit
y to sexual 
assault 
N C1: r = .25 N 
= 49, C2: r = 
.16 N = 32, 
C3: r = .17 N 
= 34 C4: r = 
.19 N = 42, 
C5: r = .07 N 
= 40 
C6: r = 
-.10 N 
= 37, 
C7: r = 
.08 N = 
42, C8: 
r = -.30 
N = 37 
Brinol, Petty, & 
Tormala (2006) 
1 J Reasons in favor of 
comprehensive exams; (C1) 
ease is good, (C2) ease is 
bad 
N 2 10 Attitude 
favorability 
towards 
senior 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N C1: r = .35 N 
= 30, C2: r = 
.38 N = 30  
- 
Broemer (2001) 1 J (C1) Desired/ (C2) 
undesired end states in 
relationship 
B 5 10 Interpersona
l closeness 
N C1: r = .29 N 
= 52, C2: r = 
.21 N = 52 
- 
Bulbul (2007) 4b D Reasons why or why not to 
purchase 
A 2 10 Assortment 
size (small 
or large) 
preference 
N r = .28, N = 
42  
- 
Carter & 
Dunning (2008) 
1 U (C1, C3, C5) Positive/ (C2, 
C4) negative attributes 
about (C1, C2, C3) George 
Bush/ (C3, C5) Obama; 
(C1, C2, C5) Democrat or 
(C3, C4) Republican 
A 2 8 Evaluation 
of President; 
judged 
success of 
presidency 
N C5: r = .03, N 
= 42, C4: r = 
.31 N = 7 
C3: r = 
-.32 N 
= 7, C2: 
r = -.01 
N = 29, 
C1: r = 
.21 N = 
28 
Carter & 
Dunning (2009) 
2 U Arguments in favor 
of/against constitutional 
amendment banning gay 
marriage (C1) against + 
against, (C2) against + 
A 2 7 Attitude 
Certainty 
N C1: r = .11 N 
= 19 
C2: r - 
.32 N = 
10, C3 
= r = -
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originally for, (C3) for + 
originally against 
.06 N = 
39 
Carter & 
Dunning (2011) 
3 U Factors that would help 
Obama in 2012 for (C1) 
democrat or (C2) republican 
A 2 8 Subjective 
Likelihood; 
percentage 
of popular 
vote for 
Obama 
N C1: r = .02, N 
= 135 
C2: r = 
-.12 N 
= 45 
Carter & 
Dunning (2009) 
4 U (C1) charitable or (C2) 
Neutral / introverted 
behaviors 
A 2 12 Trait rating, 
relative trait 
rating 
N C1: r = .07 N 
= 26 
C2: r = 
-.41 N 
= 23 
Carter & 
Dunning (2009) 
5 U (C1) charitable or (C2) 
Neutral/introverted 
behaviors 
A 2 10 Self-rated 
Trait rating, 
relative trait 
rating 
N C1: r = .06 N 
= 110 
C2: r = 
.09 N = 
101 
Carter & Sanna 
(2008) 
2 J (C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect 
self-presentation strategies 
B 3 12 Judgment of 
childhood 
memory 
N C1: r = .48 N 
= 16, C2: r = 
.59 N = 16 
- 
Caruso (2008) 1a J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .43, N = 
30  
r = -.09, 
N = 30  
Caruso (2008) 1b J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .13, N = 
57  
r = -.24, 
N = 57  
Caruso (2008) 2 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = .24, N = 
48  
r = -.13, 
N = 47  
Caruso (2008) 3 J Unsafe feeling A 2 6 Safety N r = .19, N = 
38  
r = -.39, 
N = 38 
Caruso et al. 
(2011) 
1 U examples in which did not 
have enough money 
B 2 6 Satisfaction 
with 
personal 
finances 
N r = .05, N = 
99  
-  
Chang (2010) 1 J Consequences of disease A 2 5 Perceived 
severity 
N r = .28 N = 
47 
- 
Chang (2010) 2 J Number of ways to prevent 
hemorrhoids 
A 3 7 Perceived 
efficacy 
N r = .21 N = 
95 
- 
Chang (2010) 3 J Consequences of disease 
(C1) solutions (C2) 
consequences 
A 2 5 Public 
Service 
Announcem
ent  
effectivenes
s 
N C1: r = .32 N 
= 48 
C2: r = 
.08 N = 
49 
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Chang (2010) 4 J Consequences of disease: 
(C1) tinea pedis or (C2) 
peridontal 
N 2 5 Severity of 
disease 
N - C1: r = 
.09 N = 
99.5, 
C2: r = 
-.24 N 
= 99.5 
Cheng (2005) 3 D Good things about being an 
Asian American 
N 3 12 attitude 
towards 
being Asian 
American 
N r = -.17, N = 
108  
- 
Corby & Homa 
(2011)* 
1 J Recent/childhood examples 
of assertive, creative, 
optimism 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
traits 
N - - 
Corby & Homa 
(2011)* 
2 J Assertive, friendly, 
optimism, creative 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
traits 
N - - 
Cutright, 
Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons 
(2013) 
Pilo
t 
J Things in life over which 
have complete control 
N 2 10 Perceptions 
of control 
N r = .37, N = 
29.6 
- 
Cutright, 
Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons 
(2013) 
1 J Things in life over which 
have complete control 
N 2 10 Perceptions 
of control 
N r = .38, N = 
59 
 
Danziger, 
Moran, & 
Rafaely (2006) 
1 J Reasons in favor of 
proposal of changing 
number of school years in 
Israel; (C1, C2) high 
experiential or (C3, C4) low 
experiential 
 (C1, 
C3) B,  
(C2, 
C4) A 
2 8 Evaluation 
of proposal 
to change 
number of 
school years 
in Israel 
from 12 to 
11 
N C1: r = .16 N 
= 66, C2: r = 
.18 N = 79, 
C3: r = .25 N 
= 84 
C4: r = 
-.21, N 
= 75 
DeMarree et al. 
(2012) 
2 J Times tried very hard to 
achieve something 
A 4 10 Persistence 
on anagrams 
N r = .26, N = 
64  
- 
Demotta (2012) 3 D Reasons organization was 
competent 
A 2 8 Competence 
of 
organization 
N r = .28, N = 
128 
- 
Deval (2010) 1 D Reasons for choosing 
vacation package: (C1) on-
line + high inv (C2) 
memory + low (C3) on-line 
+ low (C4) memory + high 
N 2 8 Attitude 
towards 
vacation 
package; 
confidence 
(C1, C3) 
N C1: r = .34 N 
= 44, C2: r = 
.36 N = 41 
C3: r = 
-.08 N 
= 44, 
C4: r = 
-.22 N 
= 43 
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Deval (2010) 2 D Reasons for choosing TV 
(C1) on-line + high need for 
closure (C2) memory + low 
(C3) on-line + low (C4) 
memory + high 
N 1 10 Attitude 
towards 3D 
HDTV; 
confidence 
(C1, C3)  
N C1: r = .35 N 
= 46, C2: r = 
.32 N = 44 
C3: r = 
.14 N = 
42, C4: 
r = .05 
N = 43 
Dijksterhuis, 
Macrae, & 
Haddock (1999) 
1 J Traits on which men and 
women reliably differ; (C1) 
low, (C2) medium, (C3) 
high 
A 3 8 Judges’ 
ratings of 
Stereotypica
lity in target 
portrayals 
N C1: r = .72, N 
= 31 
C2: r = 
.46, N = 
31, C3: 
r = -.50, 
N = 31 
Echterhoff & 
Hirst (2006) 
1 J Memory of experiences on 
NYE 
A 4 12 Judged 
memory 
quality; 
vividness 
N r = .32, N = 
93 
- 
Echterhoff & 
Hirst (2006) 
2 J (C1) no shock, (C2) 
attenuated shock, (C3) high 
shock Memories of 
September 11th 
A 4 12 Judged 
memory 
quality 
N C1: r = .28 N 
= 73, C2: r = 
.41 N = 73 
C3: r = 
-.07 N 
= 69 
Eibach, Libby, 
& Gilovich 
(2003) 
4 J Things about you changed 
since high school 
B 3 12 Judgment of 
self-change 
N r = .33, N = 
80  
- 
Etcheverry, Le, 
& Hoffman 
(2013) 
3 J Reasons friend is satisfied B 3 8 Level of 
approval; 
perceived 
relationship 
satisfaction 
N r = .32, N = 
44  
- 
Florack & Zoabi 
(2003)* 
1 J Reasons for/against 
investment 
N 1 3 Willingness 
to invest 
N - - 
Florack & Zoabi 
(2003)* 
2 J Reasons for/against 
investment 
A 1 3 Willingness 
to invest 
N - - 
Fox (2006) 1 J Ways in which course could 
be improved 
N 2 10 Course 
Ratings 
N r = .28, N = 
58  
- 
Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, & 
Banse (2005) 
4 J (C1) Introverted/ (C2) 
extroverted exemplars 
N 3 10 Outgroup 
extroversion 
N C1: r = .50 N 
= 16, C2: r = 
.49 N = 16 
- 
Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, & 
Banse (2005) 
5 J Students high in (C1) 
introversion/ (C2) 
extroversion 
A 3 10 Ingroup 
Extroversion
; outgroup 
extraversion 
N C1: r = .21 N 
= 35, C2: r = 
.29 N = 35 
- 
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Gomillion 
(2012) 
1 U Ways in which partner 
facilitates academic goals 
A 4 12 Perceived 
partner 
instrumental
ity; 
academic 
ability test 
N r = -.11 N = 
53, r = .03 N 
= 54  
 
- 
Grayson & 
Schwarz (1999) 
1 J Behaviors that could 
increase/decrease risk of 
assault 
B 4 12 Likelihood 
of being 
assaulted 
N r = .48 N = 
29; r = .21 N 
= 29 
r = -.14 
N = 30, 
r = -.22 
N = 25 
Grayson & 
Schwarz (1999) 
2 J Behaviors that could 
increase risk of assault 
B 3 7 Perceived 
risk  
N r = .29 N = 
30 
r = -.44 
N = 29 
Greifeneder & 
Bless (2007) 
1 J Reasons in favor of 
introduction of new 
quarterly surgery fee 
B 2 5 Evaluation 
of surgery 
fee 
N r = .24 N = 
43.5 
r = -.19 
N = 
43.5 
Greifeneder & 
Bless (2007) 
2 J Assertiveness B 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .21 N = 
40 
r = -.39 
N = 40 
Greifeneder & 
Bless (2007) 
3 J Reasons in favor of 
introduction of new 
quarterly surgery fee 
B 2 5 Evaluation 
of surgery 
fee 
C2 C1: r = .28 N 
= 21.5 
C2: r = 
-.43 N 
= 21.5 
Greifeneder & 
Bless (2008) 
1 J Number of kitchen tools B 4 12 Evaluation 
of kitchen 
tools 
N r = .27, N = 
33  
r = -.28, 
N = 33  
Greifeneder & 
Bless (2008) 
2 J Reasons in favor of 
expansion of Mannheim 
airport 
B 2 6 Attitude 
towards 
airport 
extension 
N r = .20, N = 
44  
r = -.11, 
N = 44  
Greifeneder & 
Keller (2012) 
1 J Reasons in favor of airport 
extension: (C1) promotion 
(C2) middle (C3) 
prevention 
B 2 6 Evaluation 
of airport 
extension 
N C1: r = .24 N 
= 39.5, C2: r 
= .11 N = 
39.5 
C3: r = 
-.09 N 
= 39.5 
Greifeneder & 
Keller (2012) 
2 J Reasons in favor of airport 
extension (C1) promotion 
(C2) middle (C3) 
prevention 
B 2 6 Evaluation 
of airport 
extension 
N C1: r = .33 N 
= 19.67, C2: r 
= .18 N = 
19.67 
C3: r = 
-.09 N 
= 19.67 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011a) 
1 J Unfair aspects of the 
university admission 
process 
B 2 4 Procedural 
justice; 
attitude 
towards the 
ZVS 
N r = .46 N = 
23 
- 
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Greifeneder et 
al. (2011a) 
2 J Unfair aspects about 
orientation exam for (C1) 
certain or (C2) uncertain 
A 2 4 Procedural 
justice; 
organization
al 
attractivenes
s 
N C1: r = .23 N 
= 47.5 
C2: r = 
-.23 N 
= 47.5 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011a) 
3 J Unfair aspects about 
orientation exam (C1) 
certainty (C2) control (C3) 
uncertainty 
A 2 4 Procedural 
justice; 
organization
al 
attractivenes
s 
N C1: r = .39 N 
= 32.67, C2: r 
= .16 N = 
32.67 
C3: r = 
-.04 N 
= 32.67 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011b) 
1 J Aspects of trust game 
seeming unfair as senders 
(C1) low uncertainty (C2) 
high uncertainty 
A 2 4 Fairness 
perception  
N C1: r = .34 N 
= 30 
C2: r = 
-.11 N 
= 30 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011b) 
2 J Aspects of trust game 
seeming unfair as senders 
(C1) low uncertainty (C2) 
high uncertainty 
A 1 3 Trusting 
behavior 
N C1: r = .34 N 
= 27.5 
C2: r = 
-.13 N 
= 27.5 
Haddock (2002) 1 J Reasons to (C1, C3) like/ 
(C2, C4) dislike Tony Blair 
with (C1, C2) low or (C3, 
C4) high interest in politics 
A 2 5 Evaluation 
of Tony 
Blair 
N C1: r = .16 N 
= 23, C2: r = 
.38 N = 23 
C3: r = 
-.11 N 
= 27.5, 
C4: r = 
-.06 N 
= 27.5 
Haddock, 
Rothman, & 
Schwarz (1996) 
1 J Reasons (C1) for or (C2) 
against doctor-assisted 
suicide 
A 3 7 Attitude 
strength 
N C1: r = .14 N 
= 30,  
C2: r = .41, N 
= 27 
- 
Haddock et al. 
(1999) 
1 J Reasons (C1, C3) for or 
(C2, C4) against doctor-
assisted suicide with 
moderate (C1, C2) or 
extreme (C3, C4) attitude 
A 3 7 Attitude 
certainty 
N C1: r = .36 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.29 N = 20 
C1: r = 
.04 N = 
20, C2: 
r = -.12 
N = 20 
Haddock et al. 
(1999) 
2 J Reasons (C1, C3) for or 
(C2, C4) against doctor-
assisted suicide with (C1, 
C2) high diag or (C3, C4) 
low diag 
A 3 7 Attitude 
certainty 
C3/C4 C1: r = .40 N 
= 19.5, C2: r 
= .13 N = 
19.5 
C3: r = 
-.35 N 
= 19.5, 
C4: r = 
-.20 N 
= 19.5 
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Hansen & 
Wänke (2008) 
2 J Arguments against 
implementation of federal 
DNA databases; (C1) 
discrepant or (C2) 
congruent 
A 2 6 Attitude 
towards 
DNA 
databases 
N C1: r = .34, N 
= 31.5 
C2: r = 
-.18, N 
= 31.5 
Hansen & 
Wänke (2008) 
3 J  (C1, C3) Pro/ (C2, C4) Con 
for voting on Internet 
A 2 8 Attitude 
towards 
Internet 
voting 
N C1: r = .32 N 
= 37.5, C2: r 
= .18 N = 
37.5  
C3: r = 
-.29 N 
= 37.5, 
C4: r = 
-.07 N 
= 37.5 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & 
Arkin (2002)* 
1 J Events in your life that led 
you to feel confident about 
ability to perform 
A 2 8 Self-esteem N - - 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & 
Arkin (2002)* 
2 J Events in your life that led 
you to feel confident about 
ability to perform 
A 2 12 Self-esteem N - - 
Hermann, 
Leonardelli, & 
Arkin (2002)* 
3 J Events in your life that led 
you to feel confident about 
ability to perform 
A 8 20 Self-esteem N - - 
Hirt, Kardes, & 
Markman 
(2004)* 
1 J NFC Teams, Sitcomes A 2 8 Winning 
probability 
N - - 
IJzerman & 
Semin (2010) 
2 J Similarities A 3 10 similarities  N - r = -.19, 
N = 84 
Janssen, Muller, 
& Greifeneder 
(2011) 
1 J Number of fair aspects of 
contact with company: (C1) 
experienced + certain (C2) 
inexperienced + uncertain 
(C3) inexperienced + 
certain (C4) experienced + 
uncertain 
B 1 4 Procedural 
justice 
N C1: r = .15 N 
= 130.75 
C2: r = 
-.07 N 
= 
130.75, 
C3: r = 
-.08 N 
= 
130.75, 
C4: r = 
-.14 N 
= 
130.75 
Kadous, 
Krische, & 
Sedor (2006) 
1 J Reasons for failure A 2 12 Forecasts N r = .20, N = 
39 
- 
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Kadous, 
Krsiche, & 
Sedor (2006) 
2 J Reasons financial 
performance might not be as 
positive 
A 2 10 Forecasts N r = 0, N = 42 - 
           
Keller & Bless 
(2009) 
1 J (C1) High faith in intuition, 
unrelated; (C2) high faith in 
intuition, related; (C3) low 
faith in intuition, unrelated; 
(C4) low faith in intuition, 
related 
B 2, 
3 
7, 9 Affect 
duration 
N C1: r = .32 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.44 N = 26 
C3: r = 
-.02 N 
= 27, 
C4: r = 
.05 N = 
24 
Kivetz & Zheng 
(2006)* 
2 J Examples in which yielded 
to vice instead of virtual 
/overcame a vice for a 
virtue 
N 2 10 Choice of 
vice option 
over virtue 
option 
N - - 
Kivetz & Zheng 
(2006)* 
pilo
t 
J Examples in which yielded 
to vice instead of virtual 
/overcame a vice for a 
virtue 
A 2 10 Feeling 
guilty 
N - - 
Kühnen (2010) 1 J Biking instances; (C1) low 
accuracy + manip first, (C2) 
low accuracy + manip 
second, (C3) high accuracy 
+ manip first (C4) high 
accuracy + manip second 
B, A 5 15 Frequency 
of biking 
N C1: r = .57, N 
= 29 
C2: r = 
-.52 N 
=29, 
C3: r = 
-.35, N 
= 27, 
C4: r = 
-.30 N 
= 27 
Kühnen (2010) 2 J Assertiveness (C1) B, 
(C2) A 
2 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .18, N 
= 37.5 
C2: r = 
-.30, N 
= 29 
Kühnen (2010) 3 J Arguments in favor of 
surgery fee; (C1, C2) 
attribution absent, (C3, C4) 
attribution present 
(C1, 
C3) B, 
(C2, 
C4) A 
2 5 Attitude 
towards 
surgery fee 
C3/C4 C1: r = .46, N 
= 24 
C2: r = 
-.32, N 
= 24, 
C3: r = 
-.32 N 
= 23, 
C4: r = 
-.45, N 
= 23 
Kühnen (2010) 4 J Attributes on which men 
and women differ 
(C1) B, 
(C2) A 
2 12 Stereotyping 
(difference 
in 
N C1: r = .26, N 
= 45 
C2: r = 
-.30, N 
= 46 
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percentage 
of each sex 
had certain 
masculine or 
feminine 
traits) 
Kunstman et al. 
(2013) 
2 J Felt accepted by outgroup B 2 10 Florida State 
University 
connect 
score 
N r = .33, N = 
35 
- 
Kunstman et al. 
(2013) 
3 J Felt accepted by outgroup B 2 10 Internal 
motivation 
to respond 
without 
prejudice; 
feelings of 
acceptance 
by outgroup 
N r = .22, N = 
119 
- 
Laham (2013) 1 J Nonhuman animals they 
feel morally obligated to 
show concern for 
A 3 15 Proportion 
of world’s 
animals feel 
obliged to 
show moral 
concern for 
N r = .38, N = 
39  
- 
Laham (2013) 2 J Nonhuman animals they 
feel morally obligated to 
show concern for 
A 3 15 Proportion 
of world’s 
animals feel 
obliged to 
show moral 
concern for 
N r = .31, N = 
37  
- 
Lai & Kuo 
(2007) 
1 J Piracy-related behaviors B 1 5 Self-
positivity 
bias 
Reduction 
N C1: r = .52 N 
=30, C2: r = 
.17 N = 30 
- 
Lee (2005) 2 J Benefits or difficulties of 
work 
B 3 8 Work-life 
conflict 
N r = .28 N = 
68 
- 
Lemay, Clark, & 
Feeney (2007) 
3 J Things done to help 
relationship partner in past 7 
days 
A 2 8 Partner 
responsiven
ess 
N r = .17, N = 
151  
- 
Menon & 
Raghubir (2003) 
1 J Aspects to recall from 
Micron ad 
A 2 8 Recommend
ation 
likelihood 
N r = .34, N = 
133 
- 
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for personal 
computer 
brand 
Menon & 
Raghubir (2003) 
2 J Aspects to recall from 
Micron ad 
A 2 8 Purchase 
and 
recommenda
tion 
intention 
C2 C1: r = .13, N 
= 46 
C2: r = 
-.38, N 
= 46 
Menon & 
Raghubir (2003) 
3 J Aspects to recall from 
Micron ad; (C1) task 
difficult, feedback after; 
(C2) task easy, feedback 
after, (C3) task easy, 
feedback before (C4) task 
difficult, feedback before 
A 2 8 Purchase 
and 
recommenda
tion 
intention 
C1/C4 C1: r = .35 N 
= 26, C2: r = 
.45 N = 26, 
C3: r = .41 N 
= 26 
C4: r = 
-.59, N 
= 26 
Menon & 
Raghubir (2003) 
4 J Aspects to recall from 
Micron ad; (C1) load-
difficult, (C2) load-no info, 
(C3) no load-difficult 
A 4 12 Purchase 
and 
recommenda
tion 
intention 
C1/C3 C1: r = .35 N 
= 36, C2: r = 
.22, N = 36 
C3: r = 
-.45, N 
= 16 
Merckelbach et 
al. (2001) 
1 J Negative autobiographical 
events before age 10 
N 3 9 Agreement 
that have 
repressed 
many of 
their 
childhood 
memories 
N r = -.30, N = 
52 
- 
Nestler (2010) 1 J Counterfactual thoughts A 2 10 Belief 
perseveranc
e 
N r = .34, N = 
40  
- 
Nestler (2010) 2 J Counterfactual thoughts A 2 10 Belief 
perseveranc
e 
N r = .50, N = 
47  
- 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
2 J Reasons for picking a 
Microwave oven or digital 
camera 
B 2 10 Choice 
deferral 
N r = .14, N = 
289  
- 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
3 J Reasons for picking a 
camera 
B 2 10 Compromise 
Effect 
incidence 
N r = .27, N = 
180 
- 
Novemsky et al. 
(2007) 
4 J Reasons for picking a 
Microwave oven 
B 2 10 Compromise 
Effect 
incidence 
C2 C1: r = .25, N 
= 111 
C2: r = 
-.20, N 
= 111 
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O’Brien (2013) 2 J (C1) Happy/ (C2) Unhappy 
Experiences in Past, (C3) 
Happy/ (C4) Unhappy 
Experiences in Future 
B 3 12 Future 
happiness 
N C1: r = .37, N 
= 45, C2: r = 
.40 N = 45, 
C3: r = .37 N 
= 45 
C4: r = 
.01, N = 
45 
O’Brien (2012) 1 U Good aspects of (C1) 
material/ (C2) experiential 
good purchase 
A 2 10 Purchase 
satisfaction 
N C1: r = -.03 N 
= 69, C2: r = 
-.003 N = 59 
- 
Ofir (2000) 2 J Number of fault reasons; 
(C1) tree 1, (C2) tree 2, 
(C3) tree 3 
A 2 5, 6 Proportion 
of all other 
problems 
N - - 
Ofir (2000) 3 J Number of specific failure 
reasons; (C1) tree 1, drivers; 
(C2) tree 2, drivers; (C3) 
tree 1, mechanics, (C4) tree 
2, mechanics 
A 2 5 Proportion 
of all other 
problems 
N - - 
Ofir (2000) 4 J Number of specific causal 
reasons 
A 1 6 Proportion 
of all other 
problems 
N - - 
Ofir et al. (2008) 1a J Number of low-priced 
products sold at store 
A 2 5 Store 
expensivene
ss 
N r = .54, N = 
99  
- 
Ofir et al. (2008) pilo
t 
J Number of low-priced 
products sold at store 
A 2 9 Store 
expensivene
ss 
N r = .39, N = 
134 
- 
Ofir et al. (2008) 2 J Number of (C1) low-priced/ 
(C2) high-priced products 
sold at store 
A 2 5 Price 
perception 
N C1: r = .39 N 
= 76, C2: r = 
.27, N = 76 
- 
Ofir et al. (2008) 3 J Number of low-priced 
products sold at store  
A 2 5 Store-price 
judgment 
N r = .43, N = 
51  
 
r = -.41, 
N = 49  
Oyserman, 
Fryberg, & 
Yoder (2007) 
5 J Ways group and Whites are 
similar 
N 3 8 Self-rated 
Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .32, N = 
38.67 
- 
Oyserman, 
Fryberg, & 
Yoder (2007) 
6 J Ways group and Whites are 
similar 
N 3 8 Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .29, N = 
40  
- 
Oyserman, 
Fryberg, & 
Yoder (2007) 
7 J Ways group and Whites are 
similar 
N 3 8 Similarity to 
Whites 
N r = .29, N = 
68  
- 
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Pahl & Eiser 
(2007) 
1 J Behaviors (C1) you / (C2) a 
typical student does in a 
typical week that may be 
harmful to environment 
A 2 8 Comparative 
self-
positivity 
N C1: r = .06 N 
= 49.5, C2: r 
= .23 N = 
49.5 
 
- 
Park (2004) 1 D Reason for purchase (C1) 
compatible prevention (C2) 
compatible promotion (C3) 
incompatible prevention 
(C4) incompatible 
promotion 
A 1 10 Product 
Evaluation 
N C1: r = .40 N 
= 26.25, C2: r 
= .39 N = 
26.25 
C3: r = 
-.35 N 
= 26.25, 
C4: r = 
-.30 N 
= 26.25 
Park (2004) 2 D Reason for purchase (C1) 
compatible interdependent 
(C2) compatible  
independent (C3) 
incompatible interdependent 
(C4) incompatible 
independent 
A 1 10 Product 
Evaluation 
N C1: r = .18 N 
= 34.25, C2: r 
= .57 N = 
34.25 
C3: r = 
-.48 N 
= 34.25, 
C4: r = 
-.42 N 
= 34.25 
Petrocelli & 
Dowd (2009) 
3 J If-only statements A 4 10 Severity of 
punishment; 
deservingne
ss of 
punishment; 
causality 
N r = .27, N = 
49 
r = -.20, 
N = 49 
Pocheptsova, 
Labroo, & Dhar 
(2010) 
2 J Reasons to go to a (C1) 
causal or (C2) fancy 
restaurant 
A 1 5 Willingness-
to-pay 
N C1: r = .10 N 
= 102.5, C2: r 
= .33 N = 
102.5 
- 
Preston & Epley 
(2005) 
3 J Observations that (C1) God 
can explain, (C2) 
observations that can 
explain God’s behavior 
N 3 10 Perceived 
value of 
Belief in 
God 
N - C1: r = 
-.20 N 
= 28.5, 
C2: r = 
-.04 N 
= 28.5 
Raghubir & 
Menon (1998) 
2 J AIDS-related behaviors 
(Self) 
A 3 5 Risk of 
AIDS 
N r = .27, N = 
50  
 
- 
Raghubir & 
Menon (1998) 
3 J Ways in which HIV is 
transmitted 
A 1 3 Risk of 
AIDS 
N r = .30, N = 
61  
 
- 
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Raghubir & 
Menon (2005) 
1 J (C1) Positive/ (C2) 
Negative experiences eating 
out 
A 2 8 Satisfaction 
with eating-
out 
experiences; 
open-ended 
frequency, 
close-ended 
frequency, 
dollars spent 
eating out, 
attitude 
towards 
eating out, 
likelihood of 
initiating 
next eating 
out, 
likelihood of 
positive 
experience, 
likelihood of 
negative 
experience 
N C1: r = .23 N 
= 47, C2: r = 
.31 N = 47 
- 
Raghubir & 
Menon (2005) 
2 J (C1, C3) Positive/ (C2, C4) 
Negative experiences eating 
out (C1, C2) recently or 
(C3, C4) distant 
A 2 10 Satisfaction 
with eating-
out 
experiences; 
open-ended 
frequency, 
close-ended 
frequency, 
dollars spent 
eating out – 
sit-down, 
dollars spent 
eating out 
fast-food, 
attitude 
towards 
eating out, 
likelihood of 
initiating 
N C1: r = .39 N 
= 41.75, C2: r 
= .31 N = 
41.75 
C3: r = 
-.002 N 
= 41.75, 
C4: r = 
-.05 N 
= 41.75 
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next eating 
out, 
likelihood of 
sit-down, 
likelihood of 
fast-food 
Rai & Holyoak 
(2010) 
1 J Reasons for employee to 
take proposed Trolley 
action 
N 2 7 Agreement 
with taking 
proposed 
action 
N r = .19, N = 
124  
 
- 
Roese & 
Summerville 
(2005) 
3c J Examples of opportunities 
in (C1) Kindness and 
respect in friendships, (C2) 
meeting new friends, (C3) 
time spent with romantic 
partner, (C4) trust in 
romantic relationships 
A 2 8 Self-rated 
Regret 
N C1: r = .01 N 
= 60, C2: r = 
.21 N = 42, 
C3: r = -.22 N 
= 50, C4: r = 
.01 N = 46 
- 
Rothman & 
Hardin (1997) 
1 J Polite/impolite behaviors A 3 6 Self-rated 
Impolite 
ratings 
N r = .25, N = 
54  
r = -.24, 
N = 42 
Rothman & 
Hardin (1997) 
2 J Assertive/Unassertive A 3 6 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
C3/C4 C1: r = .11, N 
= 20.75; C2: r 
= .21, N = 
20.75 
C3: r = 
-.28, N 
= 42.50; 
C4: r = 
-.17, N 
= 42.50; 
C5: r = 
-.14, N 
= 20.75; 
C6: r = 
-.23, N 
= 20.75 
Rothman & 
Hardin (1997) 
3 J Assertive/Unassertive A 3 6 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .12, N = 
58; r = .13, N 
= 63 
r = -.17, 
N = 58; 
r = -.23, 
N = 63 
Rothman & 
Schwarz (1998) 
1 J Risk-increasing/decreasing 
factors for self/avg. man 
(C1) family history + avg 
man + decr (C2) family 
history + avg man + incr 
(C3) no family + self + decr 
A 3 8 Risk 
Perception 
N C1: r = .38 N 
= 18, C2: r = 
.59 N = 20, 
C3: r = .42 N 
= 19, C4: r = 
.28 N = 17 
C5: r = 
.10 N = 
21, C6: 
r = -.28 
N = 18, 
C7: r = 
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(C4) no family + self + incr 
(C5) no family + avg + decr 
(C6) no family + avg + incr 
(C7) family + self + decr 
(C8) family +self + incr 
-.55 N 
= 20, 
C8: r = 
-.22 N 
= 23 
Ruder & Bless 
(2003) 
1 J Arguments in favor of 
reduction in number of 
years of education 
B 2 6 Agreement 
with policy 
for change 
in education 
system 
N r = .61 N = 
24 
r = -.33 
N = 26 
Ruder & Bless 
(2003) 
3 J Reasons against highway 
toll; (C1) happy + 
diagnostic (C2) sad + 
nondiagnostic (C3) sad + 
diagnostic (C4) happy + 
nondiagnostic 
B 2 5 Agreement 
with policy 
for highway 
toll 
C2/C4 C1: r = .37 N 
= 27.5 
C2: r = 
-.49 N 
= 27.5, 
C3: r = 
-.51 N 
= 27.5, 
C4: r = 
-.46 N 
= 27.5 
Ruder & Bless 
(2003) 
4 J Arguments in favor of 
reduction in number of 
years of education 
B 2 5 Agreement 
with policy 
for highway 
toll 
N r = .41 N = 
31.5 
r = -.29 
N = 
31.5 
Ruder & Bless 
(2003) 
F J Arguments in favor of 
reduction in number of 
years of education 
B 2 6 Agreement 
with policy 
for change 
in education 
system 
N r = .43, N = 
24 
- 
Sackett (2006)* 6 D Advantages/disadvantages 
of optimistic or pessimistic 
prediction errors 
N 2 8 Preferences 
for 
predictions 
N - - 
Sanna, Chang, & 
Carter (2004) 
3 J Thoughts about (C1) 
outcome/ (C2) alternative 
B 2 10 outcome 
inevitability 
N C1: r = .48 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.58 N = 20 
- 
Sanna, Parks, 
Chang, & Carter 
(2005) 
3 J Reasons for (C1) 
successful/ (C2) 
unsuccessful task 
completion 
B 5 15 difference in 
completion 
time 
N C1: r = .50 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.55 N = 20 
- 
Sanna, Schwarz, 
& Small (2002) 
1 J Thoughts that would have 
helped side win; (C1) G 
win, (C2) British win 
A 2 10 Probability 
judgment 
N C1: r = .45 N 
= 28, C2: r = 
.57 N = 29 
- 
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Sanna, Schwarz, 
& Stocker 
(2002) 
1 J Thoughts of other outcomes N 2 10 Probability 
of other 
outcome 
N r = .51, N = 
34  
 
- 
Sanna, Schwarz, 
& Stocker 
(2002) 
2 J Thoughts of other outcomes A 2 10 Probability 
of other 
outcome 
N r = .49, N = 
40  
 
- 
Sanna & 
Schwarz (2003) 
1 J Thoughts about how 
homecoming game might 
have turned out differently 
B 4 12 Difference 
between 
actual and 
predicted 
C2 C1: r = .57, N 
= 25  
 
C2: r = 
-.21, N 
= 28 
 
Sanna & 
Schwarz (2004) 
1 J Things that might lead you 
to do well on exam 
B 3 12 Study 
Completion, 
Success 
Likelihood 
N -  - 
Scarnier (2007) 2 D Times controlled child’s 
behavior 
A 2 8 Control 
(over ability 
to influence 
child’s 
behavior, 
other 
individuals 
can control 
their 
children 
better) 
N r = .01, N = 
124 
- 
Shockley (2013) 7 D Times things went well 
when stuck with tradition or 
routine 
N 2 6 Resistance 
to Change 
Scale; 
feelings of 
sticking with 
tradition 
N r = .05, N = 
47 
- 
Schwarz et al. 
(1991) 
1 J (C1) Assertive 
(C2) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .35 N 
= 20,  
C2: r = .66, N 
= 20 
- 
Schwarz et al. 
(1991) 
2 J (C1) Assertive 
(C2) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .17 N 
= 79,  
C2: r = .21, N 
= 79 
- 
Schwarz et al. 
(1991) 
3 J (C1, C3) Assertive 
(C2, C4) Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
C3/C4 C1: r = .33 N 
= 19.5,  
C3: r = 
-.28 N 
= 19.5,  
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C2: r = .39, N 
= 19.5 
C4: r = 
-.33, N 
= 19.5 
Silvera et al. 
(2005) 
2 J Categories of potential 
causes of failure 
N 2 8 Likelihood 
of all other 
problems 
N r = .28, N = 
76  
 
r = -.19, 
N = 86  
 
Simonsohn, 
Simmons, & 
Nelson (2011) 
1 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
N 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = -.13 N 
= 24, C2: r = 
-.20 N = 22 
- 
Sinclair & 
Carlsson (2013) 
1 J Typical things done for 
boys/girls, things done 
where felt capable 
A 2 10 Occupationa
l preference 
N r = .13, N = 
85; r = -.28, 
N = 73; r = 
.06, N = 59; r 
= .004, N = 
54 
- 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
1 J Tourist spots in England A 1 7 Willingness-
to-pay for 
trip 
N r = .44, N = 
47.33 
r = -.32, 
N = 
47.33 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
2 J Company that makes digital 
cameras 
A 1 7 Purchase 
likelihood 
N r = .46, N = 
36; r = .50, N 
= 36 
r = -.11, 
N = 36; 
r = -.58, 
N = 36 
Sinha & 
Naykankuppam 
(2013) 
3 J Painters A 1 4 Willingness-
to-pay 
N r = .50, N = 
44.50; r = 
.50, N = 
44.50 
r = -.55, 
N = 
44.50; r 
= -.05, 
N = 
44.50 
Spielmann, 
MacDonald, & 
Wilson (2009) 
3 J People within their social 
networks with whom they 
could imagine developing a 
relationship 
B 2 10 Emotional 
attachment 
to ex-partner 
N r = .28 N = 
40.5 
r = -.21 
N = 
40.5 
Stephens (2007) 1 D Behaviors associated with  
(C1) AD (C2) HR 
N 3 12 Likelihood 
difference 
score 
N C1: r = .14 N 
= 59, C2: r = 
.02 N = 60 
- 
Stocker (2006) 3 D Positive (C1, C3) or 
Negative (C2, C4) Thoughts 
about my (C1, C2) or 
others’ (C3, C4) 
relationships 
B 5 25 Modified 
Investment 
Model Scale 
(IMS) 
N C1: r = -.02, 
N = 48.5; C2: 
r = .27, N = 
48.5; C3: r = 
.11, N = 48.5; 
C4: r = .08, N 
= 48.50 
- 
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Stone & 
Fernandez 
(2011) 
1 J Distinct times in last year 
when spent time in sun but 
did not wear sunscreen 
A 2 8 Sunscreen 
acquisition 
N r = .37 N = 
45 
r = -.31 
N = 45 
Thorisdottir & 
Jost 
1a J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 Threatened 
feeling 
N - 
 
r = -.22, 
N = 48 
Thorisdottir & 
Jost 
1b J Instances in which they felt 
threatened 
N 3 12 perceived 
threat 
N -  
 
r = -.26, 
N = 50 
Tormala, Petty, 
& Brinol (2002) 
1 J Reasons against 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 8 Attitude 
towards 
senior 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N r = .25, N = 
57 
r = -.26, 
N = 57 
Tormala, Petty, 
& Brinol (2002) 
2 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 8 Attitude 
towards 
senior 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N r = .25, N = 
60.5 
r = -.20, 
N = 
60.5 
Tormala, Petty, 
& Brinol 
(2002)* 
3 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
A 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
senior 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N - - 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
1 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N r = .44, N = 
28  
- 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
2 J Negative thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
comprehensi
ve exams 
N r = .34, N = 
38  
- 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
3 J Assertiveness A 2 10 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .23, N = 
74  
- 
Tormala, Falces, 
Brinol, & Petty 
4 J Positive thoughts about 
comprehensive exams 
N 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
comprehensi
ve exams; 
confidence 
N r = .34, N = 
43  
- 
Tsai & McGill 
(2011) 
1 J Reasons for preferring one 
camera over another for 
A 2 10 Choice 
confidence 
N C1: r = .42 N 
= 44.5, C2: r 
- 
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(C1) low or (C2) high 
construal 
= .25 N = 
44.5 
Tsai & McGill 
(2011) 
3 J Reasons for preferring one 
movie over another; (C1, 
C3) low or (C2, C4) high 
construal with (C1, C2) no 
attribution or (C3, C4) 
attribution 
A 2 8 Choice 
confidence 
C3/C4 C1: r = .34 N 
= 29.5, C2: r 
= .37 N = 
29.5 
C3: r = 
-.09 N 
= 32.5, 
C4: r = 
0 N = 
32.5 
Tsai & Thomas 
(2011) 
2 J Reasons for donating in 
support of polar bears; (C1) 
abstract or (C2) concrete 
A 2 8 Donation 
amount 
N   
Tybout et al. 
(2005) 
1 J Reasons to drive a 
Hyundai/BMW 
A 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N r = .32, N = 
49.5  
 
r = -.29, 
N = 
49.5  
 
Tybout et al. 
(2005) 
2 J Reasons to drive a (C3) 
Saab/(C1) Hyundai/ (C2) 
BMW 
A 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N C1: r = .30, N 
= 34.3  
C2: r = .40, N 
= 34.3  
 
 
C3: r = 
-.46, N 
= 34.3  
 
Tybout et al. 
(2005) 
4 J Reasons to drive a BMW N 1 10 Product 
evaluation 
N r = .15, N = 
20.5  
 
r = -.05, 
N = 
20.5 
 
Unkelbach & 
Plessner (2007) 
2 J Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) 
against sports-stadium 
A 2 6 Preference N C1: r = .19 N 
= 30, C2: r = 
.38 N = 27  
- 
Vastfjall, Peters, 
& Slovic (2008) 
2 J Major natural disasters that 
occurred in world in last 
100 years 
N 2 6 Risk 
perception 
N r = .45, N = 
89  
- 
Vaughn (1998) 1 D Assertive/Unassertive A 3 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .28, N = 
40; r = -.20, 
N = 40 
r = .35, 
N = 40; 
r = 0, N 
= 40 
Vaughn (1998) 2 D Positive things seen in 
Detroit 
A 3 7 Desire to 
live in 
Detroit 
N r = .06, N = 
55 
r = -.49, 
N = 50 
Vaughn (1998) 3 D Positive things seen in 
Detroit 
A 3 9 Evaluation 
of Detroit 
N r = -.36, N = 
29 
R = .24, 
N = 30 
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Vaughn (1999) 1 J Things that you doing to 
improve chances of getting 
good grades on finals: (C1) 
hard + start, (C2) hard + 
end, (C3) easy + end, (C4) 
easy + start 
A 3 8 Self-efficacy N C1: r = .25, N 
= 43.75 
C2: r = 
-.01, N 
= 43.75, 
C3: r = 
.08, N = 
43.75, 
C4: r = 
-.07, 
43.75 
Vaughn & 
Weary (2002) 
1 J Reasons event would 
happen to them, personally; 
(C1) no dysphoria or (C2) 
dysphoria 
A 2 5 Likelihood 
judgment 
N C1: r = .11 N 
= 45, C2: r = 
-.04 N = 50 
- 
Von Helversen 
et al. (2008) 
1 J Arguments in favor of 
public transit 
A 4 12 Attitude 
about public 
transport 
N r = .46, N = 
20  
- 
Von Helversen 
et al. (2008) 
2 J (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
A 4 11 Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .40 N 
= 24, C2: r = 
.28 N = 24 
- 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
1 J Friends who had personal 
characteristics that would 
make them likely to fit in at 
the school’s CS department 
A 2 8 Sense could 
fit in and 
succeed 
N - - 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
F J Skills in domain A 2 8 Sense could 
fit in and 
succeed 
N - - 
Walton & Cohen 
(2007)* 
P J Friends who had personal 
characteristics that would 
make them likely to fit in at 
the school’s CS department 
A 2 8 Sense could 
fit in and 
succeed 
N - - 
Wänke, Bless, & 
Biller (1996) 
1 J Reasons (C1) for/ (C2) 
against public transit 
A 3 7 Confidence; 
attitude 
towards 
using public 
transporatio
n 
N C1: r = .35 N 
= 35, C2: r = 
.12 N = 32  
- 
Wänke, Bohner, 
& Jurkowitsch 
(1997) 
1 J Reasons to (C1, C3) drive/ 
(C2, C4) not to drive BMW 
with (C1, C2) actual or (C3, 
C4) anticipated experience 
A, N 1 10 BMW 
Evaluation; 
Mercedes 
Evaluation; 
Direct 
preference 
N C1: r = .28 N 
= 38, C2: r = 
.47 N = 25, 
C3: r = .45 N 
= 42, C4: r = 
.44 N = 55 
- 
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Weaver, 
Vandello, & 
Bosson (2013) 
2 J Specific behaviors meeting 
cultural ideals for real man 
B 2 10 Masculinity; 
private (C1) 
versus 
public (C2) 
N C1: r = .34, N 
= 38 C2: r = 
.13, N = 35 
- 
           
Wehr (2010)* 1 J Autobiographical situations 
which were typical problem 
episodes or exceptions 
A 1 5 Social Skill N - - 
Wehr (2010) 2 J Autobiographical situations 
which were typical problem 
episodes or exceptions 
B 1 5 Coping 
confidence, 
serious 
N r = .18 N = 
46, r = .14 N 
= 46 
- 
Weick & 
Guinote (2008) 
1a J Arguments in favor of 
sending humans to Mars 
A 2 6 Attitude 
towards 
sending 
humans to 
Mars 
N r = .39, N = 
68 
r = .09, 
N = 68 
Weick & 
Guinote (2008) 
2 J Leisure events A 2 10 Leisure time 
satisfaction 
N r = .30, N = 
41.5 
r = -.28, 
N = 
41.5 
Weick & 
Guinote (2008) 
3 J Attributes on which men 
and women differ 
B 2 12 Stereotypica
lity; 
percentage 
estimate 
N r = .24, N = 
66 
r = -.21, 
N = 66 
Weick & 
Guinote (2008) 
4 J Arguments in favor of new 
identification card 
A 3 7 Attitude 
toward new 
identificatio
n card 
N r = .10, N = 
64 
r = -.10, 
N = 64 
Winkielman, 
Schwarz, & 
Belli (1998) 
1 J Events experienced when 5-
7 or 8-10 years old 
A 4 12 Judged 
childhood 
memory 
N r = .34, N = 
48  
- 
Winkielman & 
Schwarz (2001) 
1 J Events experienced when 5-
7 or 8-10 years old; (C1) 
pleasant childhood difficult 
to remember / (C2) 
unpleasant childhood 
difficult to remember 
N 4 12 Childhood 
pleasantness 
N (C1) r = .19 
N = 179, (C2) 
r = .03 N = 
179  
 
 
- 
Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
1 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .32, N = 
74 
- 
Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
2 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
C2 C1: r = .35, N 
= 44 
C2: r = 
-.19, N 
= 41 
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Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
3 J Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = .43, N = 
48 
r = .04, 
N = 47 
Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
4 J Assertive A 2 8 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .17, N = 
59 
r = -.19, 
N = 62 
Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
5 U Extraversion/lack of 
extraversion 
A 2 5 Self-rated 
Extroversion 
N r = .38, N = 
63 
r = -.04, 
N = 63 
Woltin, 
Corneille, & 
Yzerbyt (2014) 
6 U Creative A 2 6 Self-rated 
Creativity 
N r = -.09, N = 
75.5 
r = -.10, 
N = 
75.5 
Wood (2010) 5 J Big changes going on in life 
right now 
N 2 8 Choice of 
snack 
N r = .15, N = 
240 
 
- 
Yahalom & 
Schul (2013) 
1 J Assertive N 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .27, N = 
43.3 
r = -.29, 
N = 
43.3 
Yahalom & 
Schul (2013) 
2 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .40, N = 
40 
r = .02, 
N = 40 
Yahalom & 
Schul (2013) 
3 J Assertive A 4 10 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N r = .36, N = 
59 
r = -.17, 
N = 59 
Yeager & 
Krosnick (2002) 
1 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
A 6 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = -.016 
N = 674, C2: 
r = .07 N = 
623 
- 
Yeager & 
Krosnick (2010) 
2 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .03 N 
= 404, C2: r = 
.07 N = 373 
- 
Yeager & 
Krosnick (2012) 
3 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .04 N 
= 1532, C2: r 
= -.02 N = 
1579 
- 
Yeager & 
Krosnick (2012) 
4 U (C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, 
C4) Unassertive 
(C1, 
C2) B, 
(C3, 
C4) A 
3 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .003 
N = 517, C2: 
r = -.02 N = 
522, C3: r = 
.04 N = 526, 
C4: r = .04 N 
= 540 
- 
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Yeager & 
Krosnick (2013) 
5 U (C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2, 
C4) Unassertive 
(C1, 
C2) B, 
(C3, 
C4) A 
3 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = .06 N 
= 772, C2: r = 
-.05 N = 727, 
C3: r = .10 N 
= 817, C4: r = 
-.05 N = 776 
- 
Yeager & 
Krosnick (2013) 
6 U (C1) Assertive/ (C2) 
Unassertive 
A 3 12 Self-rated 
Assertivenes
s 
N C1: r = -.01 N 
= 108, C2: r = 
-.04 N = 110 
- 
Yoke (2009) 2 D Well-known successful 
same-sex role models 
A 6 12 Math 
interest 
N r = .19, N = 
79 
- 
Zhao, Hoeffler, 
& Dahl (2012) 
2 J Activities could do with X1-
100 
A 1 8 Product 
Evaluation 
N r = .32, N = 
43 
r = -.07, 
N = 41 
Zhao, Hoeffler, 
& Dahl (2012) 
3 J Activities could do with X1-
100 
A 1 8 Product 
Evaluation 
N r = .28, N = 
55 
- 
Zhao, Hoeffler, 
& Dahl (2012) 
4 J Activities could do with Z-
500 
A 1 8 product 
evaluation 
N r = .38, N = 
55 
r = -.01, 
N = 58 
             
Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a 
position yields less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects. 
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency. 
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished 
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None 
3 N = None 
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Table B2. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database – distal effect sizes.  
Paper Exp Sourc
e1 
Topic Retrieved Difficulty 
Question2 
Few  Man
y  
DV Misattribution3 XY Std 
          
Alter & 
Balcetis (2010) 
3 J Reasons NY (C1) vibrant 
and exciting/ (C2) dirty 
and dangerous 
N 2 10 Subjective 
Distance 
from 
Princeton to 
New York 
City 
N C1: r = .32, N 
= 30, C2: r = 
.41, N = 30 
Avnet (2005) 2 D Times correct in trusting 
feelings: (C1) pleasant or 
(C2) unpleasant 
N 2 10 Book 
Ratings 
N C1: r = .19 N 
= 26.5, C2: r 
= .56 N = 
26.5 
          
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
2 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings for (C1) pleasant 
or (C2) unpleasant 
A 2 10 Attitude 
towards 
reading 
N C1: r = .11 N 
= 26, C2: r = 
.48 N = 26 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
3 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
A 2 10 Ratio Bias N r = ., N = 97  
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
4 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Acceptance 
of 20% 
share of pie 
in 
Ultimatum 
Game 
N r = .18 N = 37 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
5 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings: (C1, C2) low 
relevant or (C3, C4) high 
relevance for (C1, C3) 
pleasant or (C2, C4) 
unpleasant 
A 2 10 Recommen
dation of 
whether 
friend 
should meet 
their target 
N C1: r = .31 N 
= 26, C2: r = 
.49 N = 31 
Avnet, Pham, & 
Stephen (2012) 
6 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings: (C1, C2) no load 
or (C3, C4) load for (C1, 
C3) pleasant or (C2, C4) 
unpleasant 
A 2 10 Evaluations 
of 
nonfiction 
book 
N C1: r = .36 N 
= 42, C2: r = 
.05 N = 49 
Bartels & 
Urminsky 
(2011) 
3 J Reasons identity would 
remain stable 
B 2 12 Discount 
factor 
N r = .32, N = 
97 
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Bartels & 
Urminsky 
(2011) 
4 J Reasons identity would 
remain stable 
B 2 12 Discount 
factor; 
impatience 
N r = .28, N = 
71  
Beck (2004) 3 D (C1) Successful/ (C2) 
unsuccessful metamemory 
judgments 
N 3 7 Predicted 
success 
N C1: r = .0 N = 
26, C2: r = 
.41 N = 26 
Beck (2004) 4 D Reasons would or would 
not be successful 
N 2 6 Valence of 
metamemor
y 
assessments 
N r = .11, N = 
51 
Carter & Sanna 
(2008) 
2 J (C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect 
self-presentation strategies 
B 3 12 Subjective 
Distance 
N C1: r = .48 N 
= 16, C2: r = 
.59 N = 16 
- 
Caruso et al. 
(2011) 
1 U Everyday purchases B 2 6 Satisfaction 
with 
personal 
finances 
N -  r = .09, 
N = 51  
Cheng (2005) 3 D Good things about being 
an Asian American 
N 3 12 Bicultural 
Identity 
Integration 
Scale-Pilot 
Version; 
Distance 
Scale; 
Conflict 
scale 
N r = .07, N = 
108  
- 
Crescioni 
(2012) 
1 D Stressors B 3 12 Combined 
persistence 
(attempts 
and time 
spent on 
puzzle) 
N r = .37, N = 
38 
- 
Cutright, 
Bettman, & 
Fitzsimons 
(2013) 
1 J Things in life over which 
have complete control 
N 2 10 Attitude 
favorability 
towards 
brand 
extension; 
perceived 
control 
N r = .35, N = 
59 
- 
Cutright, 
Bettman, & 
3 J Things in life over which 
have complete control 
N 2 10 Likelihood 
of 
N r = .53, N = 
46.5 
r = .11, 
N = 
46.5 
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Fitzsimons 
(2013) 
considering 
extension 
Ehrlinger 
(2004) 
9 D Reasons might lose money 
with investment 
B 3 12 Overconfide
nce 
N r = .33, N = 
33  
- 
Eibach, Libby, 
& Gilovich 
(2003) 
4 J Things about you changed 
since high school 
B 3 12 External 
world 
change 
N r = .25, N = 
80  
- 
Etkin & Ratner 
(2013) 
4 J (C1, C2) Similarities/ (C3, 
C4) Differences in protein 
bars for (C1, C3) 
temporally near or (C2, 
C4) temporally far 
N 2 10 Motivation 
to pursue 
fitness goal 
N C1: r = .16 N 
= 37.75, C2: 
r = .17 N = 
37.75, C3: r 
= .28 N = 
37.75, C4: r 
= .12 N = 
37.75 
- 
Fuller, 
McIntyre, & 
Oberleitner 
(2013) 
1 J Instances of (C1) success/ 
(C2) failure 
A 3 9 Performance 
on trivial 
pursuit; 
comparative 
ability 
assessment; 
performance 
perception 
N C1: r = .40 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.33 N = 21 
- 
Gawronski 
(2003) 
3 J Counterarguments to (C1, 
C2) pro/ (C3, C4) con for 
(C1, C3) having freedom 
or (C2, C4) not 
N 2 7 Attitude 
attribution 
N C1: r = .11 N 
= 19.75, C2: 
r = .35 N = 
19.75, r = 
.35 N = 
19.75, r = 
.34 N = 
19.75 
- 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen 
(2005) 
1 J (C1) Liked/ (C2) Disliked 
African Americans 
A 3 10 Implicit 
prejudice 
N C1: r = .32 N 
= 18, C2: r = 
.59 N = 17 
- 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen 
(2005) 
2 J Disliked African 
Americans (C1) response 
compatibility (C2) 
stimulus compatibility 
A 3 10 Implicit 
prejudice 
N C1: r = .51 N 
= 21 
C2: r = 
-.40 N 
= 22 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen 
(2005) 
3 J Women considered strong 
(C1) response 
compatibility (C2) 
stimulus compatibility 
A 3 10 Implicit 
stereotyping 
N C1: r = .34 N 
= 31 
C2: r = 
-.34 N 
= 32 
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Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen 
(wp) 
1 U African American 
individuals whom they 
particularly disliked 
B 5 12 Implicit 
Prejudice 
C2 C1: r = .39, 
N = 24 
C2: r = 
-.28, N 
= 24 
Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen 
(wp) 
2 U Strong women they 
particularly disliked 
B 5 12 Implicit 
Stereotyping 
C2 C1: r = .41, 
N = 22 
C2: r = 
-.19, N 
= 24 
Gershoff, 
Mukherjee, & 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2008) 
3 J Things liked about movie A 3 8 False 
Consensus 
N r = .34, N = 
103 
- 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011b) 
1 J Aspects of trust game 
seeming unfair as senders 
(C1) low uncertainty (C2) 
high uncertainty 
A 2 4 Trusting 
Behavior 
N C1: r = .29 N 
= 30 
C2: r = 
-.25, N 
= 30 
Greifeneder et 
al. (2011b) 
2 J Aspects of trust game 
seeming unfair as senders 
(C1) low uncertainty (C2) 
high uncertainty 
A 1 3 Trusting 
behavior 
N C1: r = .34 N 
= 27.5 
C2: r = 
-.13 N 
= 27.5 
Haddock 
(2004) 
2 J Reasons how (C2) 
personally made event 
happen/ (C1)other people 
and external factors made 
event happen 
A 1 6 Temporal 
bias 
N C2: r = .24, 
N = 43.5 
C1: r = 
-.29, N 
= 43.5 
IJzerman & 
Semin (2010) 
2 J Similarities A 3 10 Ambient 
temperature  
N - r = .28, 
N = 50  
IJzerman & 
Semin (2010) 
3 J Similarities N 3 10 Ambient 
temperature 
N - r = .25, 
N = 70  
IJzerman & 
Semin (2010) 
4 J Differences N 3 10 Ambient 
temperature 
N - r = .39, 
N = 36  
Janiszewski, 
Lichtenstein, & 
Belyavsky 
(2008) 
3 J Bike feature/place to use 
the bike; (C1) intermediate 
offer, (C2) premium offer, 
or (C3) standard offer 
A 1 3 Transaction 
commitment 
N C1: r = .17, 
N = 56 
C2: r = 
-.24 N 
= 63, 
C3: r = 
.03 N = 
55 
Keller & Bless 
(2005) 
1 J (C1) Stereotypic/(C2) 
non-stereotypic personal 
experiences 
B 2 5, 6 Emotional 
intelligence 
test 
performance 
N C1: r = .27 N 
= 43, C2: r = 
.18 N = 43 
- 
Kennedy 
(2008) 
1 D Reasons why academic 
event was 
B 3 12 Inevitability 
rating 
N C1: r = -.12 
N = 52 
C2: r = 
-.22 N 
= 52 
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positive/negative in (C1) 
first or (C2) 3rd person 
(Hindsight 
Judgment) 
Kennedy 
(2008) 
2 D Reasons about why 
performed in low 
percentile (C1) first or 
(C2) 3rd person 
B 3 12 Anticipated, 
Expected 
(Hindsight 
Judgments) 
N C1: r = .06 N 
= 26.5 
C2: r = 
-.10 N 
= 26.5 
Lee (2005) 1 J Benefits or difficulties of 
work 
A 2 6 Possible 
selves 
N r = .30 N = 
79.5 
- 
Lee, Amir, & 
Ariely (2009) 
3 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Number of 
transitivity 
violations 
N r = .20, N = 
101  
r = .03, 
N = 
101  
Ling (2009) 3 D Instances of optimistic 
thinking 
N 2 8 Purchase 
decision; 
motivation 
N r = .27, N = 
76.5 
r = -
.15, N 
= 76.5 
Ling (2009) 7 D Instances of optimistic 
thinking 
N 2 8 Exercise 
intention 
N r = .26, N = 
38.75; r = 
.43, N = 
38.75 
r = .18, 
N = 
38.75; r 
= -.17, 
N = 
38.75 
Ling (2009) 8 D Instances of optimistic 
thinking 
N 2 8 Willingness-
to-pay 
N r = .10, N = 
48.50; r = 
.33, N = 
48.50 
r = -
.29, N 
= 
48.50; r 
= .08, 
N = 
48.50 
Min & Arkes 
(2012) 
1 J Wedding planning steps A 2 5 Optimistic 
bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); 
accuracy 
N r = .19, N = 
103 
- 
Min & Arkes 
(2012) 
2 J Class assignment planning 
steps; (C1) pessimistic or 
(C2) optimistic 
A 2 5 Optimistic 
bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); 
accuracy 
N C1: r = .17 N 
= 36, C2: r = 
.39 N = 39 
- 
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Min & Arkes 
(2012) 
3 J Steps of planning; (C1) 
ease is bad or (C2) ease is 
good 
A 2 8 Optimistic 
bias 
(predicted 
minus actual 
completion 
times); 
accuracy 
N C1: r = .26 N 
= 60, C2: r = 
.16 N = 58 
- 
Müller et al. 
(2010) 
1 J Unfair aspects of 
negotiation procedure 
B 2 4 Cooperative 
Behavior 
N r = .29, N = 
51 
r = -
.31, N 
= 51 
Ofir et al. 
(2008) 
1b J Number of low-priced 
products sold at store 
A 2 5 Store 
favorability 
N r = .48, N = 
100 
- 
Park (2009) 1a D What another person 
would say during 
conversation 
A 4 15 Overall 
attitude 
towards 
group 
N r = -.03, N = 
104 
- 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
1 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .10, N = 
231 
- 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
2 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings, Times searching 
for info on Google 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .27, N = 
85.5 
r = -
.03, N 
= 85.5 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
4 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .19, N = 
134 
- 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
5 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .11, N = 
204 
- 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
6 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .23, N = 
52 
- 
Pham, Lee, & 
Stephen (2012) 
8 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Prediction 
accuracy 
N r = .37, N = 
116.67 
- 
Redden & 
Galak (2012) 
2 J Last times heard favorite 
song 
N 2 6 Choice of 
favorite 
song 
N r = .22, N = 
200.67  
 
- 
Sanna, Chang, 
& Carter (2004) 
3 J Thoughts about (C1) 
outcome/ (C2) alternative 
B 2 10 Subjective 
temporal 
distance 
N C1: r = .66 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.69 N = 20 
- 
Sanna, Parks, 
Chang, & 
Carter (2005) 
3 J Reasons for (C1) 
successful/ (C2) 
unsuccessful task 
completion 
B 5 15 Subjective 
temporal 
distance 
N C1: r = .51 N 
= 20, C2: r = 
.57 N = 20 
- 
Sharma et al. 
(2014) 
2 J Times worse off 
financially 
N 2 10 Dishonesty 
rate 
N r = .28, N = 
50  
- 
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Sharma et al. 
(2014) 
2pil
ot 
J Times worse off 
financially, Assertive 
A 2 10 Self-rated 
Financial 
well-being 
N r = .32, N = 
88.5  
r = .01, 
N = 
88.5 
Sharma et al. 
(2014) 
4 J Times worse off 
financially 
N 2 10 Mean 
sentence 
severity 
N r = 0, N = 96  - 
Sharma et al. 
(2014) 
4 f J Times worse off 
financially 
N 2 10 Fairness N r = .06, N = 
187  
- 
Stephen & 
Pham (2008) 
1 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Offers in 
Ultimatum 
Game 
N r = .31, N = 
60  
- 
Stephen & 
Pham (2008) 
2 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Initial offers 
in 
counteroffer 
game 
N r = .27, N = 
47  
 
- 
Stephen & 
Pham (2008) 
3 J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Offer size in 
Dictator 
Game 
N r = .36, N = 
58  
- 
Stephen & 
Pham (2008) 
pilo
t 
J Times correct in trusting 
feelings 
N 2 10 Self-rated 
Trust in 
feelings 
N r = .36, N = 
36 
 
- 
Sussman & 
Alter (2012) 
4b J Recently purchased items A 3 10 Willingness-
to-pay 
N r = .14, N = 
254  
- 
Thorisdottir & 
Jost 
1a J Instances in which they 
felt threatened 
N 3 12 Self-rated 
Closed-
mindedness 
(NFC scale) 
N - 
 
r = -
.04, N 
= 48 
Thorisdottir & 
Jost 
1b J Instances in which they 
felt threatened 
N 3 12 Self-rated 
Closed-
mindedness; 
perceived 
threat 
N -  
 
r = -
.33, N 
= 50 
Weaver, 
Vandello, & 
Bosson (2013) 
2 J Specific behaviors 
meeting cultural ideals for 
real man 
B 2 10 Imminent 
payoff 
choice 
N r = .32, N = 
35 
r = .03, 
N = 38 
Wood (2010) 5 J Big changes going on in 
life right now 
N 2 8 Choice of 
snack 
N r = .15, N = 
240 
 
- 
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Zauberman, 
Ratner, & Kim 
(2009) 
5 J (C1) Special/ (C2)non-
special experiences 
N 2 10 Willingness-
to-pay for 
Keychain 
N C1: r = .16 N 
= 112, r = 
.10 N = 112 
- 
Zhao, Hoeffler, 
& Dahl (2012) 
4 J Activities could do with 
Z-500 
A 1 8 Choice of 
product over 
Amazon gift 
certificate; 
product 
evaluation 
N r = .33, N = 
55 
r = -
.06, N 
= 58 
             
Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a 
position yields less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects. 
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency. 
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished 
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None 
3 N = None 
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APPENDIX C: STANDARD PARADIGM MEDIATION MODERATOR ANALYSES 
 
Table C.1. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal 
standard paradigm. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') 
Total Effect 
(c) 
  
      
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Regression 
Coefficient3 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
  
.015 (.012) 
 
.032 ^ -.024 (.015) 
 
-.030 
 
.003 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 31 .098 (.024) 
 
-.010 
 
.113 (.026) 
 
.006 
 
-.003 
 
 
After DV (-1) 112 .118 (.020) 
   
.102 (.021) 
     
Inference Moderators 
Representativeness Self (+1) 68 .069 (.024) * -.032 ^ .100 (.029)  .023  -.014  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 75 .144 (.022) 
   
.109 (.026) 
 
 
   
Relevance Self (+1) 95 .095 (.023)  -.010  .087 (.024)  -.036 ^ -.048 * 
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 48 .146 (.029) 
   
.137 (.032) 
 
 
   
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year 
  
.011 (.011) 
 
-.009 
 
-.016 (.013) 
 
.008 
 
-.004 
 
Country USA (+1) 78 .111 (.026)  -.005  .083 (.026)  -.002  -.006   
Non-USA (-1) 65 .118 (.029) 
   
.130 (.029) 
    
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 40 .085 (.042)  -.006  .002 (.039) ** -.061 ** -.070 **  
Published (-1) 103 .120 (.022) 
   
.130 (.021) 
     
Number of measures (M) 
 
.020 (.019) 
 
.017 
 
.015 (.019) 
 
-.019 
 
.0002 
 
Number of measures (Y) 
 
-.011 (.017) 
 
-.014 
 
.020 (.018) 
 
.025 
 
.012 
 
Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 
119 .100 (.022)  -.018  
.105 (.023)  -.002  -.021 
 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
24 .159 (.037) 
   
.104 (.041) 
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Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 
and the maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark 
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Table C.2. 
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal 
standard paradigm. 
Moderator Level N Indirect Effect (axb) Direct Effect (c') 
Total Effect 
(c) 
  
      
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Mean Effect 
Size (S.E.)1 
  
Regression 
Coefficient2 
  
Regression 
Coefficient3 
  
Salience Moderators 
Range 
  
.019 (.026) 
 
.024 
 
-.027 (.049) 
 
-.017 
 
.045 
 
Attention Before DV (+1) 15 .075 (.045) 
 
.119 
 
.169 (.096) 
 
-.092 
 
-.005 
 
 
After DV (-1) 16 .006 (.023) 
   
.221 (.106) 
     
Inference Moderators 
Representativeness Self (+1) 10 -.008 (.029) 
 
-.15  .228 (.114)  .134  -.005  
(retrieval target) Not-Self (-1) 21 .028 (.018) 
   
.170 (.091) 
 
 
   
Relevance Self (+1) 28 .018 (.014)  -.041  .221 (.026)  .102  .072  
(judgment task) Not-Self (-1) 3 .036 (.105) 
   
.042 (.105) 
 
 
  
Exploratory Methodological Moderators 
Year 
  
-.028 (.038) 
 
.038 
 
-.027 (.077) 
 
-.087 
 
-.094 
 
Country USA (+1) 26 .025 (.010)  -.018  .207 (.074)  .054  .055 ^  
Non-USA (-1) 5 -.028 (.030) 
   
.143 (.105) 
     
Publication Status Filedrawer (+1) 3 .030 (.107)  -.065  .063 (.108) 
 
.014  -.051   
Published (-1) 28 .018 (.013) 
   
.219 (.026) 
     
Number of measures (M) 
 
.014 (.039) 
 
-.053 
 
.035 (.062) 
 
.096 
 
.067 
 
Number of measures (Y) 
 
-.006 (.031) 
 
-.019 
 
.063 (.059) 
 
.077 
 
.074 
 
Type of dependent 
measure 
Attitude (+1) 
19 .068 (.042)  .113  
.155 (.089)  -.067  .014 
 
(attitude) Non-Attitude (-
1) 
12 .006 (.024) 
   
.254 (.114) 
    
             
Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.  
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1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated 
standard errors are reported.  Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels. 
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers.  All variables were standardized.  VIFs were all below 10 
and the maximum condition index was below 30.  
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark 
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Essay 2 
 
The Effects of Perceptual and Cognitive Salience on Product Valuations  
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ABSTRACT 
 Decades of research have proposed models of how individuals integrate 
information for product judgments. Many findings suggest consumers often do not use 
relevant information if it is not accessible (i.e., top of mind) and often use irrelevant 
information if it is accessible. Prior research explains these judgments by postulating that 
salience (i.e., the amount of attention paid to information) determines whether 
information is accessible or not. Yet, this research is silent about the possible effects of 
salience on the valuation of accessible information. In contrast, three experiments show 
that salience biases valuation, even when information is both accessible and relevant. 
These salience biases are shown to originate from both cognitive and perceptual sources. 
Further, the authors argue that the temporal dynamics of salience-based biases across 
repeated decisions have implications for what processes explain those biases. Cognitive 
salience biases were found to decrease with repeated decisions, which is consistent with 
self-correcting process explanations. However, perceptual salience biases did not decline 
(and directionally increased), which may result from persistent features of a stimulus 
display reinforcing these biases. 
 
  
Keywords: salience, valuation, accessibility, memory, attention  
  150 
 How do people integrate information when making decisions? Ideally, individuals 
should engage in analytical processing: they should focus on information that is relevant 
and important , and they should ignore irrelevant information (Chaiken, Liberman, and 
Eagly 1989; Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). However, 
research frequently shows that important information is often ignored while irrelevant, 
but more salient, information is given substantial weight (Klayman and Ha 1987; Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The result of this contamination 
is decisions that are biased (Evans 2008; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Payne et al. 
1993).  
 In the context of consumer decisions about products and services, information 
salience, the amount of attention devoted to an information input, per se, should not 
affect valuations, but there is evidence that it does (Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 
1994; Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Towal, Mormann, and Koch 2013). For example, 
Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto (1994) showed that irrelevant attributes affect 
consumer valuations, even when they are told that the attributes provide no meaningful 
benefits. Thus, "mere salience" can clearly affect valuation.  
 Salience contaminating valuation has an enormous role in consumer behavior as a 
piece of the advertising literature. Krugman's (1965) classic analysis of how low 
involvement advertising works postulated that advertising seldom overtly persuades 
people. Instead, advertising functions "…by shifting the relative salience of attributes 
suggested to us by advertising as we organize our perception of brands and products" 
(Krugman 1965, p. 353). From our perspective, Krugman's claim is these shifts in 
salience change the perceived importance of the attributes, and these changes affect 
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product valuation without explicitly persuading the consumer. As compared to the 
difficult task of explicit persuasion, building awareness is easy and can be accomplished 
by either creative executions or heavy repetition (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995; Erdem, 
Keane, and Sun 2008). Thus, money may not be able to buy love, but it almost certainly 
can buy salience. 
 This paper seeks to update our understanding of how salience effects operate. 
Most of the evidence supporting salience effects relies on a categorical model of the 
relationship between salience and valuation. Specifically, information is either accessible 
(at point b, high salience) or it is not (at point a, low salience), and the accessible 
information is either relevant or irrelevant (see Figure 1, panel A). However, this model 
is silent about the possible effects of salience on the valuation (v) of accessible 
information (see Figure 1, panel B). Instead, in this model there is a simple step function: 
inaccessible information at point a (panel B) is not incorporated into the response, 
whereas accessible information at point b (panel B) is. In this research, we examine the 
extent to which salience contaminates valuation when all information is relevant and 
equally accessible (see Figure 1, panels C and D). In Figure 1 panels C and D, both a and 
b represent accessible information with relatively less (a) or more (b) salience. These 
differences in salience translate into differences in valuation between v(a) and v(b). 
 This paper makes three contributions. First, we show that salience biases 
judgment, even when information is both accessible and relevant. Second, we show that 
the source of the salience bias can be either perceptual or cognitive. Perceptual salience 
is determined by stimulus-driven and goal-directed processes that direct the consumer's 
attention toward specific locations in the physical environment. Cognitive salience is 
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determined by the accessibility of information in memory and the mental elaborations of 
perceived and recalled information that occur during decision making. Third, we show 
that the temporal dynamics of these biases across repeated decisions have implications 
for possible explanations of the bias. We find that the cognitive salience bias decreases 
with repeated decisions. This decline is consistent with self-correcting process 
explanations, and inconsistent with explanations based on polarization or enduring 
changes in valuation (discussed in more detail below). Perceptual salience biases did not 
decline, and in fact increased slightly, with repeated decisions. Presumably, this is 
because the source of perceptual salience biases are characteristics of the stimulus 
display, which are always present during decision making.  
 
SALIENCE AND VALUATION 
 
 One framework for how salience and valuation interact is an expansion of the 
accessibility-diagnosticity model of Feldman and Lynch (1988). Their model postulates 
that consumer decision-making relies on two inter-related factors: the accessibility of 
informational inputs, and the perceived diagnosticity, or relevance given task goals, of 
those inputs. Accessibility is usually defined as the readiness with which an input can be 
applied in a task (Higgins 1989). Notably, what is accessible is only a small subset of 
what is available to individuals given their goals and the cues in the environment (Estes 
1955; McGeoch 1932; Tulving and Pearlstone 1966).  
 Feldman and Lynch (1988) propose that accessibility and diagnosticity operate in 
a memory-based, feed-forward manner. Individuals have some set of accessible 
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information based on recency, frequency, or other factors. This information is 
subsequently weighted based on its perceived diagnosticity for achieving task-specific 
goals. Importantly, all relevant information is not diagnostic because it might apply 
equally to all decision alternatives. In this framework, available and diagnostic 
information that is not accessible will not be used as an input to judgment unless some 
cue in the environment helps retrieve it from memory.  
 As an example of this feed-forward operation, consider a colleague, Bob, who 
stops by your office to ask you if you want him to buy you a candy bar from the café. If 
Snickers is not accessible, even if it is or is not diagnostic, you cannot ask Bob to buy a 
Snickers for you. If Snickers is accessible, then one of two outcomes may occur. If you 
subsequently decide Snickers is not healthy or delicious (not diagnostic), you may ask 
Bob to buy you something else or nothing. If you decide Snickers is delicious and 
desirable (diagnostic), then you may ask Bob to purchase a Snickers. 
 As noted earlier, accessibility is a categorical version of salience based on a low 
threshold separating sufficient and insufficient salience (see Figure 1A). This feed-
forward operation is a cornerstone of the hierarchy-of-effects model of consumer 
behavior often taught in introductory marketing courses (Figure 2, Barry 1987). 
According to this model, information proceeds from becoming salient during steps of 
product information acquisition to valuation steps including pre- and post-purchase 
evaluations. In this model, the Feldman and Lynch (1988) version of accessibility-
diagnosticity suggests information that is acquired in the salience steps (Awareness of 
Need, Identify Products, Get Information about Products) is passed along for evaluation 
in the valuation stages (Evaluate Products, Purchase Product, Post-Purchase Evaluation). 
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The present paper suggests instead that the process of information becoming salient can 
have an impact on product evaluation over and above the implications of the information. 
In the next section, we describe the construct of salience in greater detail and propose that 
there is an important difference between perceptual and cognitive salience. 
 
PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE SOURCES OF SALIENCE 
 
 We define salience psychologically and at a very general level as the amount of 
attention devoted to an information input. In doing so we adopt a "textbook" view of 
attention (e.g., D'Esposito and Postle 2015; Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 2013; Purves et 
al. 2012). 
Salience can emerge from two sources because informational inputs can originate 
in the immediate physical environment (i.e., perceptual sources) or in long-term memory 
(i.e., cognitive sources). Of the vast array of information that is available in the 
environment or in memory, attention filters out most and selects a relatively small 
amount for further processing. The information in working memory can, and usually is, 
manipulated in some way, including inference and integration. Thus, these manipulations 
of information (generally called "thinking and deciding") are also cognitive sources of 
information. The contents of working memory are also heavily influenced by goal-
directed attention processes, which are sometimes called endogenous or top-down. 
However, stimulus-driven attention processes, which are sometimes called exogenous or 
bottom-up, can sometimes capture or reorient attention (Carrasco 2011; Corbetta and 
Shulman 2002; Corbetta, Patel, and Shulman 2008; Egeth and Yantis 1997; Theeuwes 
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2010). We categorize these processes as perceptual salience because they are directing 
attention to locations in the physical environment.  
 As an example of this difference between perceptual and cognitive sources of 
salience, consider the car comparison tool from Consumer Reports (see Figure 3). This 
tool stacks several car profiles inclusive of attributes side by side for easier comparison. 
To illustrate perceptual salience, in Figure 3 the Overall Score row may be more 
perceptually salient because it appears at the top of the list, and it is processed first and 
longer. In contrast, Predicted Reliability might be less perceptually salient because it 
appears in the middle of the list and is processed later, for less time, and competes for 
attention with thoughts about the earlier attributes. To illustrate cognitive salience, 
imagine an individual has been thinking deeply about her valuation of Predicted 
Reliability because she sees that this is the main difference between the Subaru and the 
Toyota (and the Jeep has been ruled out based on Overall Score). In this case, although 
Predicted Reliability is low in perceptual salience, it would be very high in cognitive 
salience because of the internal deliberations devoted to assessing its value.  
 In our experimental paradigm, we manipulate the perceptual salience of product 
attributes by varying their location in a list of attributes. Attributes at the beginning and 
end of the list are often found to be more salient, while attributes in the middle of the list 
are less salient (e.g., Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011). We manipulate the cognitive salience 
of product attributes by making the tradeoffs between attribute levels easy for one 
attribute and hard for all others. Importantly, all attribute information is accessible and 
diagnostic, but some attribute information is more salient. The critical empirical question 
is the extent to which valuation is biased by differences in perceptual and cognitive 
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salience. We expect effects for both types because we believe that activation in working 
memory is the primary mechanism of the bias.  
 In the next section, we describe how different theories of decision biases make 
different predictions about the temporal aspects of salience-based biases. 
 
TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF SALIENCE-BASED BIASES 
 
We use a conjoint analysis paradigm in which salience is manipulated between 
subjects in an initial phase of product valuations (call the learning phase), and then all 
subjects continue making product valuations under identical circumstances (called the 
test phase). This allows us to measure salience biases in terms of part-worths (Green et al. 
2001; i.e., valuations of each attribute level) and to observe whether an initial salience 
bias increases, remains constant, or decreases as subjects repeatedly consider trade-offs 
among different attribute levels.  
The temporal dynamics of the salience bias has implications for possible 
explanations of the effect. Each different temporal dynamic suggests different 
psychological mechanisms. 
First, if the effect is bolstered over repeated decisions as people continue to make 
decisions, then there may be evidence of polarization (Lord et al. 1979). This would be 
one class of psychological explanations. That is, as individuals make more decisions, 
information made salient initially is maintained in working memory and becomes even 
more highly-weighted. Similar to Krugman’s (1965) account of low involvement 
advertising, information made salient early on may alter the structure of consumer 
  157 
perceptions and cause subsequent evaluations to serve as reinforcing repetitions of that 
structure, contributing to "overlearning." This type of carry-forward bias is akin to one 
explanation of pioneering advantage. That is, early entrants to a market have a large 
market share because they influence the reference point for ideal attribute combinations 
that future entrants must consider (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989).  
Second, it is possible that the salience effect persists over time, but does not 
strengthen, which would be a different class of psychological explanations. Persistence of 
a bias over time in the presence of potentially de-biasing information is the hallmark of 
what Arkes (1991; see also Brownstein 2003) called psychophysically based errors that 
"result from the nonlinear mapping of physical stimuli onto psychological responses." 
Arkes’ examples of such biases included the sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985), 
buyer-seller asymmetries (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990), and loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A more recent example of persistent biases is resource 
slack, which is a persistent belief that one will have greater freedom or availability of 
monetary or temporal resources in the future (Zauberman and Lynch 2005).  
Finally, the bias may "self-correct" as people continue to make decisions, which 
would be a third class of psychological explanations. For example, the endowment effect 
is attenuated as people continue to make trades or are given experience with trading over 
time (Engelmann and Hollard 2010; List 2003). Several different mechanisms may cause 
an attenuation. For example, information made salient may be more fluent than other 
information early on, and fluency can bias valuation (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). As 
people make more decisions, information that was originally not as salient is encountered 
and becomes just as fluent as the initially salient information, counteracting the bias. 
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Anchoring and adjustment may also explain attenuation (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
Individuals may develop attribute valuations by anchoring their initial valuations at zero 
for all attributes, then adjusting faster towards their true values for salient information. 
Essentially, salient attributes get a head start. As people make more decisions, they may 
finish adjusting valuations towards their true value for all attributes, which would 
eliminate the salience bias. Third, a self-inference story may account for salience’s 
impact declining over repeated decisions. People may infer that salient information is 
more important due to a naive theory (Schwarz 2004). However, if salience decays as 
people familiarize themselves with the task, then people may reassess how salient a given 
input is, in which case there will no longer be a bias.  
 Summarizing, the paradigm we use allows us to observe the dynamics of salience 
biases. An increasing bias favors polarization-based explanations, a constant bias favors 
persistence-based explanations, and a decreasing bias favors self-correcting processes as 
explanations. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
 We test our model using a conjoint analysis paradigm in which attribute salience 
is manipulated across conditions such that some attributes have greater salience. Conjoint 
analysis is particularly appropriate for testing our theory because (1) it is widely viewed 
and one of the most rigorous and valid methods for assessing valuation (Green et al. 
2001; Meissner, Musalem, and Huber 2016) and (2) prior work suggests that stimulus-
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based (bottom-up) factors do not predict choice, but instead, valuation and goal-directed 
(top-down) factors drive choice and fixations (Meissner et al. 2016).  
We employ a multi-phase paradigm consisting of a learning phase and one or 
more test phases. Each phase collects judgments based on a fractional factorial design 
that allows valuation estimates (i.e., part-worths) for each of four binary attributes. The 
full instructions for Study 1 are included in Appendix A, and a schematic diagram of the 
procedure and stimuli is depicted in Figure 4. 
 Prior to the learning phase, participants read a cover story instructing them to 
assume that they are in the market to buy a specific product and then stated willingness to 
pay for a series of specific products defined by attribute profiles. For example, one 
product category was cars. Participants were given information about four binary 
attributes for each car (e.g., MPG, sound system, safety rating, and warranty length). The 
attributes were chosen such that most or all participants would agree about which level 
was better (e.g., 33 MPG is better than 28 MPG). Participants were then informed about a 
general price range for the product (e.g., $16,000-$30,000, with an average of $23,000 
for cars). Similar stimuli were used for other products, such as monthly cell phone plans 
and Disney Vacation packages (see Table 1).  
 Hereafter we refer to attributes one, two, three, and four based on their position in 
the attribute list from top to bottom on the screen: first, second, third, and fourth, 
respectively. For each participant, the semantic identity of each attribute position (i.e., 
MPG, warranty, sound system, rating) was displayed in one of four orders based on a 4x4 
Latin square design (Rosenthal and Rosnow 2008). These four orders are a between-
subject factor. Based on prior research, we expect that the first attribute position would be 
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more perceptually salient than other positions because it is natural to start at the top 
(Anderson 1971; Mantonakis et al. 2009).  
 In the learning phase, participants were presented four pages with two specific 
products per page. Willingness-to-pay judgments were requested for each specific 
product. Cognitive salience is manipulated in this phase as a between-subjects factor, 
Page Structure (Biased vs. Control; see Figure 5). Within each page in the Biased 
condition, within each page only one attribute (the focal attribute) differed between the 
two products on the page. This attribute was in the fourth (bottom) position of each 
product description in Studies 1 and 2, and the third position in Study 3. The other three 
attributes differed across each of four pages in the learning phase, but not within a page. 
Even though the willingness-to-pay judgments were distinct, subjects were expected to 
realize that the difference between their two judgments on each page should reflect only 
their valuation of the focal attribute. Thus, the tradeoff between the levels of this attribute 
was very cognitively salient. The tradeoffs between levels of the other levels necessarily 
relied on memory (either short term memory for previous judgments or long term 
memory for general beliefs about attribute values). Thus, the three non-focal attributes 
were less cognitively salient. Consistent with our definition of cognitive salience, 
information about a focal attribute should be active in working memory while 
information about non-focal attributes should be less so.  
In the Control condition, more than one attribute differed on most or all pages, 
and the attribute that differed changed from page to page. Thus, cognitive salience should 
be more evenly distributed over attribute positions. In this experiment design, perceptual 
salience is a main effect of Attribute Position and cognitive salience is primarily an 
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interaction between Page Structure and Attribute Position in which the focal attribute is 
valued more in the Biased than in the Control condition, and vice versa for non-focal 
attributes (see Figure 4).  
 Importantly, the Page Structure manipulation was achieved using the same eight 
product versions, but altering which pairs occurred on the same page in the Biased and 
Control conditions. This controls for any effects of product versions (including possible 
configural effects of attribute valuations), and the Latin Square design for semantic 
identity (i.e., Order) controls for the effects of attribute valuation. Importantly, if there are 
no effects of perceptual or cognitive salience, then there should be no effects of Attribute 
Position, Page Structure, or their interaction when averaging across Orders. The exact 
design of products and orders in the learning phase are shown in Table 2A and 2B.  
 In the test phases (see Figure 6), participants saw eight pages with one product 
version per page, and all participants complete the same tasks. The test phases allow us to 
examine the temporal dynamics of the salience manipulations. One to three attributes 
differed from page to page (see Table 2C). Participants in both Page Structure conditions 
saw the same product versions in the same order; thus, any effects of Attribute Position, 
Page Structure, or their interaction are due to the enduring effects of perceptual or 
cognitive salience in the learning phase. 
 
STUDY 1: EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE ON PART-
WORTHS 
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In Study 1, we use three different product replicates. Across cars, cell phone 
plans, and Disney vacation packages, we predict that calling more attention to the fourth 
attribute position, both by perceptual and cognitive salience, will lead that attribute to 
have a relatively greater part-worth. However, differences between the Biased and 
Control conditions will be due to cognitive salience alone. 
If part-worths are unaffected by salience, we should observe the pattern of means 
shown in Figure 7A. In this figure, there are no differences among conditions, and each 
attribute position has a roughly similar part-worth. Remember, our design 
counterbalances the identity of the attributes across orders, so these differences average 
out in the marginal means. If cognitive salience influences part-worths, then we should 
observe an effect of our manipulation on the Biased condition’s fourth attribute part-
worth (Figure 7B). However, we should also not see increases in the part-worths of 
attribute positions one, two, and three in the Biased condition because attention is not 
devoted to those; if anything, attention is directed away from them. Thus, attribute 
positions one, two, and three should not have larger part-worths in the Biased condition 
and might have smaller part-worths if salience effects are symmetric (i.e., increased 
salience increases valuation, and decreased salience decreases valuation).  
Further, if perceptual salience influences part-worths, then we should observe 
position effects such that the prominent attributes at the top and bottom of the list receive 
higher part-worths than attributes in the middle of the list (Figure 7C).  
We counterbalance the position of all semantic identities of attributes in our 
studies, so if individuals’ ratings reflect their underlying beliefs and preferences, we 
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should observe the pattern of results seen in Figure 7A on average. Therefore, the effects 
in Figures 7B and 7C are indeed biases. 
Method 
 Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 774) were randomly assigned to 
one cell in a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 3 (Product: Cars, Cell Phone 
Plans, or Disney) between-subject design. Attribute Position (First, Second, Third, 
Fourth) was a within-subjects factor. 
 Participants completed the basic setup as described in the Experimental Paradigm 
section with the design matrix from Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Participants saw one of cars, 
cell phone plans, or Disney vacation packages. A summary of the attributes for each 
product category can be seen in Table 1.  
 As described in the experimental paradigm section, participants randomly saw 
one of four orders of attribute names across the four attribute positions based on a 4x4 
Latin square design (Rosenthal and Rosnow 2008).  
 In Study 1 (only), Biased condition participants also were instructed to be mindful 
of how much they valued whatever attribute that would subsequently appear in the fourth 
position (referred to by name of the attribute, not position). This "enhanced" 
manipulation of salience was removed in Studies 2 and 3. Note that these instructions 
directed top-down attention toward the focal attribute and is therefore a manipulation of 
cognitive, not perceptual salience. In the Control condition, the instructions merely asked 
participants to be mindful of tradeoffs across attributes. Full instructions can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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 Participants completed sixteen willingness-to-pay judgments: eight in learning 
phase with two per page on four pages, and eight in the test phase with one per page on 
eight pages. Each judgment was recorded via numerical keyboard entry.  
Results 
Across both learning and test phases, we predicted that increasing the cognitive 
salience of the fourth attribute should a) bolster its part-worth, and b) reduce (or at least 
not increase) the relative part-worths of the other attribute positions. To have a 
meaningful unit of measure across three product categories, we analyze the combined 
data across product categories and across attribute identities in which each product’s part-
worth is divided by the stated average price in the study (e.g., $23,000 for Cars, $80 for 
Cell Phone Plans, and $850 for Disney Vacation Packages; see Table 1) then multiplied 
by 100 (i.e., a percent of stated average price scale). In all analyses, we include Order to 
control for the valuation differences across the specific identities of the attributes. 
The Effect of Cognitive and Perceptual Salience on Valuation. We find evidence 
in support of our predictions, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 8. Consistent with our 
predicted effect of cognitive salience, the attribute in the fourth position in the learning 
and test phases was higher in the Biased condition compared to the Control condition. 
Further, this result was not the case for attributes in the first, second, or third positions. 
These attributes had directionally smaller part-worths in the Biased condition compared 
to the Control condition. As discussed earlier, this pattern is consistent with an effect of 
cognitive salience (e.g., compare Figure 7B to Figures 8A and 8B). 
Further, the pattern of means reveals a position effect in the average attribute part-
worths: the first part-worth is larger than the second and the fourth is larger than the third. 
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This effect is present in both learning and test phases. As discussed earlier, this pattern is 
consistent with an effect of perceptual salience (e.g., compare Figure 7C to Figures 8A 
and 8B, especially the Control condition). 
 Statistical Tests of Effect of Cognitive Salience on Valuation in Learning Phase. 
Consistent with our theory, in the learning phase a 4 (Attribute Position) x 2 (Condition: 
Biased or Control) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) mixed ANOVA revealed that attribute (one, 
two, three, or four) interacted with condition (F(3, 750) = 17.88, p < .001).  
First, in support of our theory, we found a boost in the attribute four part-worths 
in the Biased (M = 6.61) versus Control (M = 3.94; F(1, 750) = 51.54, p < .001) 
conditions. However, also consistent with our predictions, this relationship was not the 
case for attribute one (MBiased = 5.43, MControl = 5.98, F(1, 750) = 1.86, p = .17), two 
(MBiased = 4.50, MControl = 4.81, F(1, 750) = .81, p = .37), or three (MBiased = 3.59, MControl 
= 4.00, F(1, 750) = 1.26, p = .26). This pattern of results is consistent with Figure 7C in 
which cognitive salience biases valuation. 
Statistical Tests of Effect of Cognitive Salience on Valuation in Test Phase. The 
same analysis (a 4 (Attribute Position) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 3 (Product) x 
4 (Order) mixed ANOVA) on the test phase yielded another interaction of condition and 
attribute (F(3, 750) = 8.17, p < .001; see Figure 8B). 
First, in line with our predictions, we found a significant contrast between the 
attribute four part-worths in the Biased (M = 5.57) compared to Control (M = 3.88; F(1, 
750) = 18.03, p < .001) conditions. However, consistent with our theory, this relationship 
was not the case for attribute one (MBiased = 4.46, MControl = 4.65, F(1, 750) = .28, p = 
.59), two (MBiased = 3.82, MControl = 4.18, F(1, 750) = 1.10, p = .29), or three (MBiased = 
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2.37, MControl = 2.75, F(1, 750) = 1.29, p = .26). The predicted interaction between 
attributes 1-3 versus 4 and condition was significant (F(1, 750) = 24.48, p < .001). 
Alternative Quantification of Cognitive Salience Results. A different way to 
codify the cognitive salience effect (CSE) in the results is to compare the part-worth of 
attribute four against the mean of all other attribute part-worths. Because attribute four 
(the focal attribute) should be boosted in the Biased but not Control condition, and no 
other attributes should see said increase due to the manipulation in the learning phase, the 
comparison of attribute four against the other attributes should represent the size of the 
effect. We call this index the relative value of the focal attribute, hereafter RVF. Indeed, a 
2 (Phase) x 2 (Condition) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) ANOVA reveals said index is larger 
in the Learning and Test phases for the Biased condition (Learning: F(1, 750) = 53.17, p 
< .001; Test: F(1, 750) = 24.48, p < .001; see Figure 8C). In studies 2 and 3 we represent 
the cognitive salience effect on this index to simplify the interpretation of the results.  
 Statistical Tests of Effect of Perceptual Salience on Valuation in Learning Phase. 
We also observed an effect of attribute position on our results in the learning phase (F(3, 
750) = 23.98, p < .001) that was consistent with perceptual salience effects from being 
located in the top and bottom of the attribute list. That is, part-worths were higher for 
attributes in the first (M = 5.70) and fourth (M = 5.28) positions compared to the second 
(M = 4.65) and third (M = 3.79) positions (F(1, 750) = 56.80, p < .001). We observed 
further evidence consistent with the top position bump: the attribute in the first position 
had a significant boost over the second attribute (F(1, 750) = 18.18, p < .001), and 
attribute four had a bump over attribute three (F(1, 750) = 37.21, p < .001). 
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Statistical Tests of Effect of Perceptual Salience on Valuation in Test Phase. 
Consistent with perceptual salience’s effects, there were attribute position effects in the 
test phase (F(3, 750) = 29.23, p < .001) that supported top and bottom effects. The 
contrast pitting the first (M = 4.55) and fourth (M = 4.73) positions against the second (M 
= 4.00) and third (M = 2.56) positions was significant (F(1, 750) = 59.95, p < .001). 
Further contrasts supported a boost to attribute one over attribute two (F(1, 750) = 5.59, p 
= .018) and attribute four over attribute three (F(1, 750) = 72.59, p < .001).  
Alternative Quantification of Perceptual Salience Results. Similarly, it is also 
possible to codify the perceptual salience results on indices (PSE). The first index, PST, 
represents the lift to the top attribute (attribute one) compared to the next attribute 
(attribute two). This index is then not confounded with the manipulation of cognitive 
salience on attribute four. A 2 (Phase) x 2 (Condition) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) ANOVA 
reveals this index is positive in both the learning (M = 1.16, SE = .36, t = 3.21, p = .001) 
and test phases (M = .47, SE = .34, t = 1.36, p = .17) in the Control condition, and overall 
(Learning: M = 1.05, t = 4.26, p < .001; Test: M = .55, t = 2.36, p = .018). We compute a 
similar index for the bottom attribute (attribute four) compared to the attribute above it 
(attribute 3), hereafter PSB. We also find a positive effect for an alternative index in the 
test phase contrasting attributes three and four in the Control condition (M = 1.13, t = 
3.03, p = .003). We mainly test this index in the Control condition to ensure the 
perceptual salience effects are not confounded by the cognitive salience manipulation.  
Discussion 
 Study 1 demonstrates that increasing the cognitive salience of particular tradeoffs 
across attributes in learning phase had a carryover effect on valuation in test phase: part-
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worths for the fourth attribute were higher for the Biased condition relative to the Control 
condition. This effect held across various attributes for several products (cars, cell phone 
plans, vacation packages), which serves as evidence of the effect’s generalizability.  
 Further, consistent with perceptual salience influencing valuation, attributes in 
positions one (first) and four (last) had increased part-worths compared to the middle 
attributes. Attribute one also had a boost over a middle attribute in the Control condition, 
showing the effect was not confounded with cognitive salience (i.e., attribute four). We 
return to estimating perceptual salience without confounds later in this paper. 
 However, an argument may be levied against Study 1’s results concerning 
whether the instructions were too heavy-handed. The instructions asking participants to 
attend to the attribute of interest might have led to demand effects. In Studies 2 and 3 we 
remove the heavy-handed instructions to demonstrate the results persist without them. 
We also add two more test phases to investigate the temporal dynamics of these salience 
effects. 
 
STUDY 2: REPEATED DECISIONS ELIMINATES IMPACT OF COGNITIVE 
SALIENCE 
 
 In Study 2, we address whether people can overcome the effect of cognitive 
salience on valuation by becoming acclimated to the decision environment through 
repeated decisions. Given repeated decisions after a focal attribute has been made salient, 
there are three possible outcomes. First, people may persist in exhibiting a bias from 
salience no matter how many decisions they make (bias constant). Second, people may 
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show a stronger bias as more and more decisions are made, which would be consistent 
with polarization (i.e., thinking more about attribute four bolsters its part-worth; Lord et 
al. 1979). Third, the bias may be self-correcting and decline over time. This decline might 
be due to an anchoring and adjustment process, information salience becoming more 
even over time (because no new biases are introduced), or self-inference (see the earlier 
section on Temporal Aspects of Salience-Based Biases).  
To test the temporal dynamics of the effect over repeated decisions, we repeated 
the first 16 judgments of the study in a second set of 16 judgments in two additional test 
phases. Note that for four binary attributes, there are 16 possible product versions. 
Similar to the initial 16 judgments, the second 16 were divided into two sets of eight, 
each of which was a fractional factorial of the full set that provided estimates of attribute 
part-worths. These two set are referred to as test phases II and III, with test phase I being 
the set of eight judgments immediately following the learning phase (i.e., the test phase in 
Study 1). As in Study 1, the test phases were the same for participants in the Biased and 
Control conditions.  
 We also handle a potential confound from the previous studies. In those studies, 
the learning and test phases always had the same eight products. In this study, we 
developed a new set of designs for a Biased and Control condition using the products 
from the test phase, and a new test phase using the products from the learning phase. This 
counterbalancing ensures our results are not particular to what products individuals see in 
the learning phase (of the 16 possible combinations of four attributes). This new design 
can be found in Appendix B. 
Method 
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 Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 823) were randomly assigned to 
one cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 2 (Learning Stimuli: Original 
or New) between-subject design.  
 Study 2 (along with Study 3) uses the layout shown in Figures 2B and 3B. 
Further, in this study (and in Study 3), unlike Study 1, participants used a slider scale to 
indicate their responses. This change enables a test that the effect is not restricted to any 
particular response modality.  
 Participants randomly received either the same design matrix as Study 1 
(Learning Stimuli: Original condition), or a different design matrix in which the Biased 
and Control conditions were constructed using the products from the Study 1 test phase 
(Learning Stimuli: New condition). This counterbalancing of what products were used in 
learning and test phase reduces the likelihood that our results are influenced by a 
confound with product versions.  
 Participants, in addition to making the initial set of 16 judgments from the 
previous studies, also completed two test phases: test phase II, which repeated the 
product versions from the learning phase in a different order, and test phase III, which 
repeated the product versions from the test phase I in a different order. These phases had 
one judgment per page for eight pages each for the eight products.  
Results 
 Tests of Impact of Cognitive Salience. For simplicity, we compute one dependent 
measure to illustrate the size of the effect for each phase (learning, test I, test II, and test 
III) of the study. As in Study 1, this dependent measure (RVF) examines the percentage-
size of each attribute valuation and subtracts the mean of attributes one, two, and three 
  171 
from attribute four (i.e., the focal attribute). The estimate of the cognitive salience effect 
should be larger in the Biased condition than in the Control condition. 
 As shown in Figure 9A, consistent with self-correcting process explanation 
described earlier, the size of the cognitive salience effect declines monotonically from the 
learning phase to test phase III. In the learning phase, the effect is much stronger in the 
Biased condition compared to the Control condition. This effect (i.e., the difference 
between the Biased and Control conditions) declines for test phase I and test phase II, and 
is almost completely attenuated by test phase III. Additionally, the difference between the 
size of the effect in Biased and Control appears larger in the learning phase compared to 
when the same eight products appear in test phase II. The same pattern holds true for test 
phase I and test phase III. 
A 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Phase) ANOVA yielded 
the critical phase (learning, test I, test II, or test III) by condition (Biased or Control) 
interaction of interest (F(3, 807) = 12.99, p < .001), in addition to a main effect of 
condition (MBiased = 1.36, MControl = .44; F(1, 807) = 18.44, p < .001). However, this effect 
of condition was only significant in Learning (F(1, 807) = 49.09, p < .001), the first test 
phase (F(1, 807) = 10.84, p = .001), and the second test phase (F(1, 807) = 8.87, p = 
.003), but not the third test phase (F(1, 807) = .63, p = .43). Importantly as well, the 
Biased and Control conditions differ in relative magnitude between the learning phase 
and its duplication, test phase II (F(1, 807) = 11.53, p < .001), and between test phase I 
and its duplication, test phase III (F(1, 807) = 8.70, p = .003). Therefore, we find 
evidence that additional judgments in this task are associated with overcoming the nature 
of the cognitive salience manipulation. 
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 Further, the nature of which products were used in the learning or test phase I 
(i.e., Original vs. New) did not meaningfully interact with condition (F(1, 807) = .01, p = 
.91), and did not exert a main effect either (F(1, 807) = .00, p = .98). We therefore do not 
find evidence for any confounds from the specific products used in our design matrix for 
the learning phase. 
 Tests of Impact of Perceptual Salience. A 4 (Phase) x 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x 
2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Attribute Position) ANOVA revealed similar perceptual 
salience effects (PSE) on the index computed from Study 1 (PST, Attribute 1– 2). The 
means for each attribute, phase, and condition are in Table 3. Overall, this effect was 
directional in learning (M = .25, t = 1.64, p = .10) but was directionally growing across 
test phase I (M = .34, t = 2.47, p = .014), test phase II (M = .97, t = 6.18, p < .001), and 
test phase III (M = 1.07, t = 7.00, p < .001). In the Control condition, this effect held in 
learning (directionally; M = .06, t = .26, p = .79), test I (M = .45, t = 2.28, p = .023, test II 
(M = 1.06, t = 4.69, p < .001, and test III (M = 1.18, t = 5.38, p < .001). We also observe 
this effect for the comparison between bottom (attribute four) and middle (attribute 3). In 
the Control condition, we observed larger part-worths for attribute four compared to three 
(PSB) in learning (M = 1.61, t = 7.20, p < .001), test I (M = .61, t = 2.85, p = .005, test II 
(M = .78, t = 3.73, p < .001), and test III (M = .83, t = 3.95, p < .001). Therefore, 
although the effects of cognitive salience dissipated by the end of the study, we observe 
position effects that demonstrate perceptual salience does not totally fade. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 demonstrates that over the course of repeated decisions, the effect of 
cognitive salience on valuation declines. In two additional test phases, participants 
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exhibited smaller effects of cognitive salience compared to the earlier learning phase and 
test phase. Therefore, experience with the stimulus-based environment can help 
overcome the impact of the Biased versus Control manipulation. This result is consistent 
with self-correction types of explanations. On the other hand, the impact of perceptual 
salience from position effects was consistently large throughout the phases, which is 
more in line with persistence-based explanations.  
 However, one criticism may still be levied against Studies 1 and 2: they only 
make the fourth attribute salient in the Biased condition. It is possible that the effect may 
be limited to that position. We rule out this possibility in Study 3. 
 
STUDY 3: CONCEPTUAL REPLICATION WITH ANOTHER ATTRIBUTE POSITION 
 
 We replicate Study 2 in a context in which we switch the design matrix for the 
third and fourth attribute positions in the learning phase for the Biased condition, making 
the third attribute position focal. That is, in this study, we increase the cognitive salience 
of the third attribute by making it the only one to change within a page in the Biased 
condition’s learning phase. This switch rule out the alternative explanation that the 
cognitive salience effect is an artifact of the attribute of interest being the bottom 
attribute.  
Method 
 Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 630) were randomized into one 
cell of a 4 (Order) x 3 (Condition: Biased, Control, or Control*) x 2 (Learning Stimuli: 
Original or New) between-subject design. 
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 The study was the same as Study 2 with for two changes. First, in the learning 
phase, we modified the design matrices such that only the third attribute differed between 
the two products in the Biased condition. This modification was achieved by flipping the 
design matrix (both in the original learning stimuli and modified stimuli) for attributes 3 
and 4, and attributes 1 and 2. Participants completed three test phases after the initial 
learning phase manipulation just as they had in Study 2.  
 The second change was that we used a second control condition, Control*, to 
address a possible confound in the design matrix in the Control condition that introduced 
differences among attribute positions in the number of times they differed on the same 
page. These differences might create differences in cognitive salience across attributes. 
Comparing CSEs on RVF for each attribute position in the Control and Control* 
conditions allows us to examine this possibility. In the Control condition in Study 3, it is 
possible that attribute positions 2 and 4 were also less cognitively salient because they 
had identical levels (i.e., 28 MPG for each of the two products) on two of the four 
learning phase pages, compared to attribute positions 1 and 3, which differed on all four 
pages. To rectify this possibility, we constructed a new design matrix using the same 
products in which each attribute is constant on exactly two of the four pages. Thus, the 
Control* condition provides measures of perceptual salience that are not potentially 
confounded with cognitive salience. The set of design matrices used in the learning 
phases in Study 3 can be found in Appendix C. 
Results 
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Tests of Impact of Cognitive Salience. We compute the size of the effect of 
cognitive salience on valuation by subtracting the mean (percentage-adjusted) valuation 
from attributes one, two, and four from attribute three.  
Consistent with Study 2, we found a decline in the size of the cognitive salience 
bias (CSE) on RVF when moving from learning phase through test phase III. The two 
control conditions had a smaller bias (at least through test phase II) in favor of attribute 
three compared to the Biased condition, which had a learning phase that made the third 
attribute more cognitively salient.  
 A 4 (Order) x 3 (Condition) x 4 (Phase) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) ANOVA 
confirmed this replication: the size of the effect between Biased and the two Control 
conditions declines from learning phase through test phase III (Figure 9B). We drew 
contrasts between the Biased and two control conditions in both phases. This result 
emerges through an omnibus main effect of condition (MBiased = 1.06; MControl = .383; 
MControl* = -.055; F(2, 606) = 7.45, p < .01) that is qualified by the key phase (learning, 
test I, test II, test III) x condition interaction (F(6, 606) = 5.17, p < .001). In Study 3, the 
contrast between the Biased condition and the two control conditions is significant in the 
learning (M = 3.46; F(1, 606) = 26.25, p < .001), first test phase (M = 1.86; F(1, 606) = 
8.69, p = .003), and second test phase (M = 1.30; F(1, 606) = 4.11, p = .043), but not in 
the third test phase (M = .54; F(1, 606) = .76, p = .384). These results demonstrate the 
robustness of our effect and manipulations across attribute positions. 
 Further, consistent with Study 2, we did not observe any meaningful impact of the 
learning stimuli set on our results. It did not significantly interact with the conditions 
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(F(2, 606) = 1.08, p = .34), and it did not have a significant main effect (F(1, 606) = .97, 
p = .33).  
Tests of Impact of Perceptual Salience. We find an effect of perceptual salience 
that slightly declines over the learning and test phases in Study 3. This effect can be 
codified as an advantage to attributes in more salient positions. Table 3 reports the results 
by attribute position within each phase and condition (see also Figures 7B and 7C). This 
pattern of means generally support a position-based advantage to the top attribute in a 3 
(Condition) x 4 (Order) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Phase) ANOVA. This metric was 
directionally positive (favoring a boost to the perceptually salient, top attribute) over 
attribute two (PST index) in the Control* condition (learning: M = .66, t = 2.07, p = .039; 
test I: M = .71, t = 2.64, p = .009; test II: M = .13, t = .41, p = .68; test III: M = .50, t = 
1.64, p = .10) and in the Control condition (learning: M = 1.20, t = 3.52, p < .001; test I: 
M = 1.06, t = 3.74, p < .001; test II: M = .35, t = 1.07, p = .29; test III: M = .14, t = .42, p 
= .68). However, the index for attribute four’s advantage over attribute three (PSB) was 
not consistently positive in the Control* condition (see Table 3). 
Discussion 
 Study 3 provides a replication of our results when the attribute made cognitively 
salient the third, not the fourth, position. This result rules out a methodological artifact 
that potentially could have been present in Studies 1 and 2, for which we increased the 
cognitive salience of the fourth attribute. However, we should note that because the 
fourth attribute already receives a boost from perceptual salience, it should be more 
difficult to observe an effect on it between the Biased and Control conditions. Therefore, 
studies 1 and 2 were more conservative in their testing of cognitive salience.  
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SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF PERCEPTUAL AND 
COGNITIVE SALIENCE 
 
 To better address possible overlapping effects of cognitive and perceptual salience 
on attribute valuation, we pool the two conditions (Biased, Control) in Study 2 and the 
three conditions (Biased, Control, Control*) in Study 3 to test cognitive and perceptual 
salience in the same statistical model. This approach serves as an internal meta-analysis 
of our studies. We include five conceptual predictors of each individual’s part-worths for 
the 4 attribute positions: two for cognitive salience and three for perceptual salience. 
These predictors represent the possible causal factors underlying our experimental 
manipulations.  
For perceptual salience, we include three predictors representing whether an 
attribute was in a top, salient position (attribute position one), a bottom-salient position 
(attribute position four), or in a middle position (attribute position three). We use attribute 
position two as the reference level.  
For cognitive salience, we include two predictors indicating two aspects of 
manipulations in the Learning Phase. First, “Same Page Variation” represents the number 
of pages on which an attribute had varied within the two options in the learning phase. In 
the Biased condition, attributes 4 (Study 2) and 3 (Study 3) varied between the two 
options on the page for all four pages, and the other three attribute positions did not vary 
on the same page. This created two levels of variation in the Biased condition. In the 
Control condition for Study 2, attribute positions 2 and 4 varied on all pages and attribute 
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positions 1 and 3 varied only on two of four pages. In the Control condition for Study 3, 
attribute positions 1 and 3 varied on all pages and attribute positions 2 and 4 varied only 
on two of four pages. The Control* condition in Study 3, all four attribute positions 
varied on 2 of 4 pages. Second, “Context” represents the extent to which the experimental 
manipulation (Biased vs. Control) favored the target attribute over and above the effect of 
Same Page Variation. These two variables provide a more refined representation of 
cognitive salience. Recall that our initial description of the Biased condition centered 
around the large difference between the focal and non-focal attribute positions in that 
condition in same page variation. However, we did not discuss the smaller differences in 
same page variation that existed in the Control conditions. Thus, these two variables 
capture the direct effects of same page variation in all conditions plus context dependent 
effects of the Bias manipulation (i.e., same page variation of one attribute position 
relative to other positions). 
The whole set of contrast codes for the salience variables can be found in 
Appendix D. These contrast codes were standardized with a mean of zero and variance of 
one to make the estimated regression coefficients more interpretable, and to allow 
interactions to be represented by simple products of variables (Irwin and McClelland 
2001).  
Pooling over each phase we regressed the five aforementioned covariates, a set of 
variables representing the attribute identities compared to a reference attribute (here, 
MPG), and the interactions of phase with the five covariates. That is, we coded each 
phase (-1.5 = Learning, -.5 = Test I, .5 = Test II, 1.5 = Test III), standardized it (mean 
zero and variance one), and interacted it with the five main predictors. Attribute position 
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was treated as a repeated measure for sixteen measures per person (four part-worths for 
each phase for each of four phases). We did not find evidence for collinearity concerns 
(maximum VIF under 10, maximum condition index under 30).  
 The results of the regression pooled across phases is shown in Table 4. Both 
cognitive salience variables exhibit large, reliable effects in the early phases and decline 
dramatically in the later phases (i.e., negative coefficients on the interaction with phase). 
In contrast, the perceptual salience effect for attribute position 1 is positive, large, reliable 
and relatively constant across phases (only directionally positive interaction with phase). 
Attribute position 4 does not exhibit strong perceptual salience effects (or interactions 
across phase, despite being positive), while being in attribute position 3 has a negative 
impact (and a directionally positive interaction with phase). These results reinforce the 
effects from our studies: cognitive salience increases valuation, but this effect recedes 
over repeated decisions, whereas perceptual salience boosts top valuations of attributes in 
top positions while hurting those in middle positions. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Prior research on the relationship between salience and valuation has assumed 
that salience is categorical (i.e., information is accessible or it is not) and that salience has 
no effect on valuation once information is sufficiently salient to be used as an input to 
valuation (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Meissner, Musalem, and Huber 2016). We 
contribute to the literature by advancing a relationship between salience and valuation in 
which salience affects valuation in a graded fashion. Information is not merely salient or 
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not. The contamination of salience into valuation can even occur in settings in which 
salience varies among accessible decision inputs.  
The three studies reported here provide evidence of how salience affects valuation 
in a stimulus-based environment. Specifically, we employ a conjoint paradigm to test 
how salience may affect valuation. Attributes with greater salience subsequently had 
larger part-worths, even when accessibility and relevance were held constant at high 
levels. 
Further, we demonstrated that salience effects can take two forms: perceptual or 
cognitive, both of which affect valuation. Perceptual salience reflects stimulus-based 
processes based on the physical environment, which were manipulated in our studies by 
attribute position (top, middle, bottom). Cognitive salience refers to which information is 
activated in working memory. Cognitive salience was manipulated in our studies during 
an initial learning phase by making the comparison of attribute levels easy for some 
attributes and difficult for others. 
Finally, these studies demonstrate impact of cognitive salience was not 
permanent. After repeated decisions, cognitive salience biases declined and were 
eventually eliminated. By examining the temporal dynamics of the salience effects over 
repeated decisions, we rule out several possible explanations of the effects based on 
explanations inconsistent with these results. The observed reduction in the cognitive 
salience bias support explanations based on self-correcting mechanisms.  
On the other hand, perceptual salience effects were weakly positive over repeated 
decisions. However, the psychological interpretation of this result is complicated because 
each attribute remained in the same position (e.g., top) throughout the study. Unlike the 
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cognitive salience manipulation, the stimulus display reinforced position effects beyond 
the learning phase and is necessarily present.  
Prior research in the conjoint analysis literature found that the estimated part-
worths were stable and unaffected by perceptual salience (Meissner et al. 2016). To the 
contrary, we demonstrate that manipulations of cognitive and perceptual salience can 
exert strong influences on part-worths. In our paradigm, the effects of cognitive salience 
decrease over time, but biases due to perceptual salience were more persistent. From a 
marketing research perspective, the biases due to cognitive salience could be mitigated by 
having people make many judgments and the biases due to perceptual salience could be 
mitigated by counterbalancing attribute position for each person across trials. However, 
from a consumer behavior perspective, these mitigating factors are seldom present in 
real-world situations for which a small number of trade-offs are likely to be considered 
and the presentation of attribute information is fixed.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 Two limitations suggest fruitful areas for future research. First, while we pinpoint 
a possible set of mechanisms (e.g., anchoring and adjustment, Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) that may explain the decline of the cognitive salience effects over repeated 
decisions, we do not explicitly favor a lone mechanism. Instead, there is a class of 
possible “self-correcting” explanations. Further research may combine analyses of 
repeated decisions with other manipulations to isolate specific mechanisms. However, 
these results are still useful in ruling out competing explanations (e.g., polarization; Lord 
et al. 1979) that have opposing predictions (i.e., increases in salience’s impact over 
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repeated decisions). The results also provide a call for other biases to examine their 
temporal impact to examine if they are self-correcting or may grow. 
 Second, while this paper addresses analogs of salience and valuation, it does not 
explicitly comment on the debate regarding constructed preferences (Bettman et al. 1998; 
Feldman and Lynch 1988). The original Feldman and Lynch (1988) paper commented 
more deeply on this topic in contrast with older models of decision-making (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975). While the present results suggest that temporarily salient information can 
affect preferences, which supports the constructionist view, we do not expand as deeply 
on that point as other pieces of the framework. However, we find that these temporary 
influences subside after repetition. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Ultimately, we demonstrate how salience can affect valuation in a continuous 
fashion: information is not merely salient or not. Further, this research proposes two 
distinct forms of salience, perceptual and cognitive, that may have distinct effects on 
valuation. Finally, we examine the stability of these effects that exist in several realms of 
decisions including advertising and marketing research.  
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Table 1 
ATTRIBUTES USED FOR EACH PRODUCT IN STUDY 1 
Product Attribute Low Level High Level 
    
Cars MPG 28 33 
Cars Sound System 
Basic – 3 speakers, 1 
subwoofer 
Advanced – 9 
speakers, 2 
subwoofers 
Cars Safety Rating 3.5 Stars 4.5 Stars 
Cars Warranty 1 year 4 years 
Cell Phone Plans Monthly Data 1 GB 3 GB 
Cell Phone Plans Texts 100 Unlimited 
Cell Phone Plans Minutes 150 Unlimited 
Cell Phone Plans 3-way calling Unavailable Available 
Disney Vacations Visit Length 3 days 5 days 
Disney Vacations 
Number of 
Disney 
Dinners 
0 2 
Disney Vacations Hotel quality 2.5 stars 4 stars 
Disney Vacations 
Number of 
lines skipped 
per day 
2 3 
 Average Price Low Price High Price 
    
Cars $23,000 $16,000 $30,000 
Cell Phone Plans $80 $30 $130 
Disney Vacations $850 $600 $1100 
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Table 2A 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION 
Page Product Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
      
1 1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
1 2 -1 -1 +1 -1 
2 3 -1 +1 -1 -1 
2 4 -1 -1 +1 +1 
3 5 +1 -1 -1 -1 
3 6 -1 +1 -1 +1 
4 7 +1 -1 -1 +1 
4 8 +1 +1 +1 -1 
      
  
Table 2B 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION 
Page Product Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
      
1 4 -1 -1 +1 +1 
1 2 -1 -1 +1 -1 
2 3 -1 +1 -1 -1 
2 6 -1 +1 -1 +1 
3 5 +1 -1 -1 -1 
3 7 +1 -1 -1 +1 
4 1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
4 8 +1 +1 +1 -1 
      
 
Table 2C 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR TEST PHASE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS 
Page Product Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
      
1 9 +1 -1 +1 -1 
2 10 -1 +1 +1 +1 
3 11 +1 +1 -1 -1 
4 12 +1 +1 -1 +1 
5 13 -1 -1 -1 -1 
6 14 +1 -1 +1 +1 
7 15 -1 -1 -1 +1 
8 16 -1 +1 +1 -1 
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Table 3 
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3 FOR PART-
WORTHS 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Attr Biased Control Biased Control Biased Control Control* 
   Learning Phase    
1 5.4 (.3) 6.0 (.3) 1.69 (.2) 2.5 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 2.8 (.3) 2.5 (.3) 
2 4.5 (.2) 4.8 (.3) 1.3 (.1) 2.4 (.1) 1.7 (.2) 1.6 (.3) 1.9 (.2) 
3 3.6 (.2) 4.0 (.3) .2 (.2) 1.1 (.2) 3.4 (.2) 2.8 (.3) 1.7 (.2) 
4 6.6 (.3) 3.9 (.3) 3.5 (.2) 2.7 (.2) .8 (.2) 1.2 (.3) 2.2 (.2) 
RVF1 2.1 (.3) -1.0 (.3) 2.5 (.2) .7 (.2) 1.9 (.3) .9 (.3) -.6 (.3) 
PST2 .9 (.3) 1.16 (.4) .4 (.2) .1 (.2) .1 (.3) 1.2 (.3) .7 (.3) 
PSB3 3.0 (.3) -.06 (.4) 3.3 (.2) 1.6 (.2) -2.6 (.3) -1.6 (.4) .6 (.3) 
   Test I    
1 4.5 (.2) 4.65 (.3) 1.9 (.2) 2.4 (.2) 2.1 (.2) 2.8 (.2) 2.3 (.2) 
2 3.8 (.2) 4.18 (.3) 1.7 (.2) 2.0 (.2) 1.5 (.2) 1.8 (.2) 1.6 (.2) 
3 2.4 (.2) 2.75 (.3) 1.2 (.1) 1.8 (.1) 2.9 (.2) 2.7 (.3) 2.2 (.2) 
4 5.6 (.3) 3.88 (.3) 2.9 (.2) 2.4 (.2) 1.3 (.2) 2.1 (.2) 2.1 (.2) 
RVF 2.0 (.3) .03 (.3) 1.3 (.2) .4 (.2) 1.3 (.3) .5 (.3) .3 (.3) 
PST .6 (.3) .47 (.3) .2 (.2) .5 (.2) .6 (.3) 1.1 (.3) .7 (.3) 
PSB 3.2 (.4) 1.13 (.4) 1.7 (.2) .6 (.2) -1.6 (.3) -.6 (.4) -.1 (.3) 
   Test II    
1 -- -- 2.3 (.2) 3.0 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 2.5 (.3) 2.1 (.2) 
2 -- -- 1.4 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 1.6 (.2) 2.1 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 
3 -- -- 1.1 (.1) 1.7 (.1) 2.5 (.2) 2.4 (.3) 2.0 (.3) 
4 -- -- 2.7 (.2) 2.5 (.2) 1.8 (.2) 2.2 (.2) 2.0 (.2) 
RVF -- -- 1.1 (.2) .3 (.2) .7 (.3) .2 (.3) -.0 (.3) 
PST -- -- .9 (.2) 1.1 (.2) .4 (.3) .4 (.3) .1 (.3) 
PSB -- -- 1.6 (.2) .8 (.2) -.7 (.3) -.3 (.3) .0 (.3) 
   Test III    
1 -- -- 2.5 (.2) 2.8 (.2) 2.4 (.2) 2.4 (.3) 2.3 (.3) 
2 -- -- 1.6 (.2) 1.6 (.2) 1.6 (.2) 2.3 (.2) 1.8 (.2) 
3 -- -- 1.2 (.1) 1.6 (.1) 2.2 (.2) 2.2 (.3) 2.1 (.2) 
4 -- -- 2.4 (.2) 2.4 (.2) 1.6 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 1.9 (.2) 
RVF -- -- .6 (.2) .4 (.2) .3 (.3) .0 (.3) .1 (.3) 
PST -- -- 1.0 (.2) 1.2 (.2) .8 (.3) .1 (.3) .5 (.3) 
PSB -- -- 1.2 (.2) .8 (.2) -.6 (.3) -.3 (.3) -.2 (.3) 
        
Notes: 1 Relative value of focal attribute (in study 1 and 2: attribute 4 partworth – mean(attribute 1, 2, 3 partworths; in 
study 3: attribute 3 partworth – mean (attribute 1, 2, 4 partworths). 2 Perceptual salience top (attribute one partworth – 
attribute two partworth). 3 Perceptual salience bottom (attribute four partworth – attribute three partworth).  
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Table 4 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR IMPACT OF 
COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE POOLED OVER PHASES FOR 
STUDIES 2 AND 3 
   
Effect Regr Coeff S.E. t 
 
    
Same Page Variation .35 .04 8.86*** 
Context .18 .04 4.62*** 
Attribute Position 1 vs. 2 .37 .04 9.04*** 
Attribute Position 3 vs. 2 -.22 .04 -5.07*** 
Attribute Position 4 vs. 2 -.04 .04 -.99 
Phase .02 .02 1.01 
Phase*Same Page Variation -.13 .02 -6.91*** 
Phase*Context -.10 .02 -5.50*** 
Phase*Attribute Position 1 .03 .02 1.19 
Phase*Attribute Position 3 .02 .02 .79 
Phase*Attribute Position 4 .02 .02 1.00 
Warranty vs. MPG .11 .04 3.03** 
Sound System vs. MPG -.16 .04 -4.34*** 
Safety Rating vs. MPG .31 .04 8.43*** 
    
Note: ^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figure 1 
OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
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Figure 2 
CLASSIC MODEL OF CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING 
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Figure 3 
CAR COMPARISON TOOL FROM CONSUMER REPORTS 
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Figure 4 
OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
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Figure 5 
EXAMPLE FIRST PAGES OF LEARNING PHASE  
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Figure 6 
FIRST PAGE OF TEST PHASE IN STUDY 1 AND 2  
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Figure 7 
HYPOTHETICAL RESULTS WHEN THE FOCAL ATTRIBUTE IS IN THE 4TH 
POSITION: NO SALIENCE EFFECTS (7A), AND EFFECT OF COGNITIVE 
SALIENCE (7B) AND AN EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE (7C) 
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Figure 8 
LARGER PART-WORTH (%) WEIGHTS ON ATTRIBUTE FOUR IN 
LEARNING (8A) AND TEST (8B) PHASES IN STUDY 1; SIZE OF COGNITIVE 
SALIENCE EFFECT IN BOTH PHASES (8C) 
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Figure 9 
COGNITIVE SALIENCE EFFECT ACROSS PHASES WHEN THE FOCAL 
ATTRIBUTE WAS THE FOURTH POSITION (9A, STUDY 2) OR THE THIRD 
POSITION (9B, STUDY 3) 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY INSTRUCTIONS  
STUDY 1 (CARS) 
Car Study 
 
Imagine that you are in the market to buy a new car. You will see descriptions of 16 cars 
with varying attributes and will be asked to declare how much you would be willing to 
pay (in $) for a car with those attributes. 
 
The attributes (low level, high level) you will see today are: 
Warranty (1 year, 4 years), 
Sound System (Basic – 3 speakers, 1 subwoofer; or Advanced – 9 speakers, 2 
subwoofers), 
Safety Rating (3.5 Stars, 4.5 Stars), and 
MPG (28, 33). 
 
All of the cars shown today are midsize sedans with market sale retail price (MSRP) of 
$16,000 to $30,000, with an average MSRP of $23,000. 
 
Please take your time and be sure to think carefully about each judgment you make in this 
task and to list valid willingness to pay (WTP) numbers. Note that, obtaining more than a 
10% discount off the MSRP is very rare and, in addition to buying a car for yourself, you 
might be willing to buy a car you do not like and then sell it. Thus, your WTP amount 
should reflect the MAXIMUM amount you would be willing to pay for the car, and 
you might either keep it for yourself or sell it for profit. 
 
[Multiple Condition: We are especially interested in how people determine their 
valuations across attributes. While providing willingness to pay numbers, please be 
mindful of the tradeoffs across all of the attributes. Sometimes multiple attributes will 
change within or across pages, and it is important for you to figure out how much you 
value the improvements from low to high levels for each attribute.] 
 
[Single Condition, MPG: We are especially interested in how people determine their 
valuation of MPG. While providing willingness to pay numbers, please be mindful of the 
values for MPG. Sometimes the value of MPG will change within or across pages, and it 
is important to figure out how much you value the improvement from 28 MPG to 33 
MPG for MPG.] 
 
Please click “Next” to begin. 
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STUDY 2 INSTRUCTIONS (CARS) 
Car Study 
 
Imagine that you are in the market to buy a new car. You will see descriptions of 16 cars 
with varying attributes and will be asked to declare how much you would be willing to 
pay (in $) for a car with each of those attributes. 
 
The attributes (low level, high level) you will see today are: 
Warranty (1 year, 4 years), 
Sound System (Basic – 3 speakers, 1 subwoofer; or Advanced – 9 speakers, 2 
subwoofers), 
Safety Rating (3.5 Stars, 4.5 Stars), and 
MPG (28, 33). 
 
Please click “Next” to continue. 
==Next page== 
You will be indicating your willingness to pay (WTP) for each of these products on the 
scale below. That is, you will be rating the maximum price you would pay. For example, 
suppose you wanted to buy a laptop with 15” display and a light weight, and the 
maximum price you would pay is $1,000. In this task, you would indicate $1,000 as your 
willingness to pay. 
 
On each page you will be asked to indicate your willingness to pay (WTP) for two products. 
 
Please click “Next” to continue.  
 
==Next page== 
An example set of judgments is shown below for two laptops. Please indicate your 
willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the below laptops. 
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==Next page== 
All of the cars shown today are midsize sedans with market sale retail price (MSRP) of 
$16,000 to $30,000, with an average MSRP of $23,000.  
 
Note that, obtaining more than a 10% discount off the MSRP is very rare and, in addition 
to buying a car for yourself, you might be willing to buy a car you do not like and then sell 
it. Thus, your WTP amount should reflect the MAXIMUM amount you would be 
willing to pay for the car, and you might either keep it for yourself or sell it for profit.  
 
Please click “Next” to begin. 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 NEW LEARNING AND TEST PHASE DESIGN MATRICES 
Table B1 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
1 +1 +1 -1 +1 
2 +1 -1 +1 +1 
2 +1 +1 -1 -1 
3 -1 +1 +1 +1 
3 +1 -1 +1 -1 
4 -1 +1 +1 -1 
4 -1 -1 -1 +1 
     
 
Table B2 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 +1 -1 +1 -1 
1 +1 -1 +1 +1 
2 -1 +1 +1 +1 
2 -1 +1 +1 -1 
3 +1 +1 -1 +1 
3 +1 +1 -1 -1 
4 -1 -1 -1 -1 
4 -1 -1 -1 +1 
     
 
Table B3 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW TEST PHASE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 +1 -1 -1 +1 
2 -1 +1 -1 -1 
3 +1 -1 -1 -1 
4 -1 +1 -1 +1 
5 +1 +1 +1 -1 
6 -1 -1 +1 +1 
7 -1 -1 +1 -1 
8 +1 +1 +1 +1 
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APPENDIX C: STUDY 3 LEARNING PHASE DESIGN MATRICES 
Table C1 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION, 
ORIGINAL 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
1 -1 -1 -1 +1 
2 +1 -1 -1 -1 
2 -1 -1 +1 +1 
3 -1 +1 -1 -1 
3 +1 -1 +1 -1 
4 -1 +1 +1 -1 
4 +1 +1 -1 +1 
     
  
Table C2 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION, 
ORIGINAL 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 -1 +1 +1 
1 -1 -1 -1 +1 
2 +1 -1 -1 -1 
2 +1 -1 +1 -1 
3 -1 +1 -1 -1 
3 -1 +1 +1 -1 
4 +1 +1 +1 +1 
4 +1 +1 -1 +1 
     
 
Table C3 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL* CONDITION, 
ORIGINAL 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 -1 +1 +1 
1 -1 +1 -1 -1 
2 -1 -1 -1 +1 
2 +1 -1 -1 -1 
3 -1 +1 +1 -1 
3 +1 -1 +1 -1 
4 +1 +1 -1 +1 
4 +1 +1 +1 +1 
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Table C4 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION, NEW 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
1 +1 +1 +1 -1 
2 -1 +1 +1 +1 
2 +1 +1 -1 -1 
3 +1 -1 +1 +1 
3 -1 +1 -1 +1 
4 +1 -1 -1 +1 
4 -1 -1 +1 -1 
     
  
Table C5 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION, NEW 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 +1 -1 +1 
1 -1 +1 +1 +1 
2 +1 -1 +1 +1 
2 +1 -1 -1 +1 
3 +1 +1 +1 -1 
3 +1 +1 -1 -1 
4 -1 -1 -1 -1 
4 -1 -1 +1 -1 
     
 
Table C6 
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL* CONDITION, 
NEW 
Page Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
     
1 -1 -1 +1 -1 
1 +1 -1 -1 +1 
2 -1 -1 -1 -1 
2 -1 +1 -1 +1 
3 -1 +1 +1 +1 
3 +1 -1 +1 +1 
4 +1 +1 -1 -1 
4 +1 +1 +1 -1 
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APPENDIX D: REGRESSION CONTRASTS FOR STUDY 2 AND 3 ANALYSES 
Table D1 
REGRESSION CONTRASTS FOR ANALYSES OF STUDY 2 AND 3 FOR EACH 
PHASE 
     
Condition 
(Attr) 
Same Page 
Variation 
Context Perceptual 
Salience – 
Attr1 
Perceptual 
Salience – 
Attr3 
Perceptual 
Salience – 
Attr4 
    
Study 2 
Control (1) 
0 -1/9 1 0 0 
Study 2 
Control (2) 
2 -1/9 -1 -1 -1 
Study 2 
Control (3) 
0 -1/9 0 1 0 
Study 2 
Control (4) 
2 -1/9 0 0 1 
Study 3 
Control (1) 
2 -1/9 1 0 0 
Study 3 
Control (2) 
0 -1/9 -1 -1 -1 
Study 3 
Control (3) 
2 -1/9 0 1 0 
Study 3 
Control (4) 
0 -1/9 0 0 1 
Study 3 
Control* (1) 
0 -1/9 1 0 0 
Study 3 
Control* (2) 
0 -1/9 -1 -1 -1 
Study 3 
Control* (3) 
0 -1/9 0 1 0 
Study 3 
Control* (4) 
0 -1/9 0 0 1 
Study 2 
Biased (1) 
-2 .-1/9 1 0 0 
Study 2 
Biased (2) 
-2 -1/9 -1 -1 -1 
Study 2 
Biased (3) 
2 1 0 1 0 
Study 2 
Biased (4) 
-2 -1/9 0 0 1 
Study 3 
Biased (1) 
-2 -1/9 1 0 0 
Study 3 
Biased (2) 
-2 -1/9 -1 -1 -1 
Study 3 
Biased (3) 
-2 -1/9 0 1 0 
Study 3 
Biased (4) 
2 1 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX E: EYE-TRACKING EXPERIMENT 
 
 We piloted an eye-tracking study to examine how attention to informational 
inputs changed based on our manipulations of perceptual and cognitive salience 
(Chandon et al. 2009; Rayner 2009). This study replicates Study 2 to track participants 
from learning phase to test phase III. Our definition of salience suggests that our 
manipulations should affect how attention is allocated to the attribute information based 
on its position (perceptual salience) and how often it changes within-page in the learning 
phase (cognitive salience). We operationalize attention in terms of fixation duration and 
fixation count.  
 Specifically, in the learning phase, we expect more attention (i.e., longer and 
more frequent fixations) to be allocated to the top and bottom attributes compared to the 
middle attributes (perceptual salience). Further, we predict there will be more attention 
paid to the bottom attribute in the Biased condition compared to the Control condition 
(cognitive salience) because it is the only attribute that varies within each of the four 
pages in the learning phase. 
However, the test phases do not have as clear predictions. One possibility is that 
the same patterns from the learning phase will persist in the test phase due to carryover: 
participants will attend more to top and bottom attributes, and to the bottom attribute in 
the Biased condition compared to the Control condition. This result would support an 
explanation in which more attention translates into greater valuation. A different result 
would be one in which the top and bottom attributes, and the Biased condition’s bottom 
attribute, would have fewer fixations in the test phase because the participants determined 
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those attribute valuations in the learning phase and can therefore more rapidly make a 
product valuation without lingering on those attributes. It is also possible that across 
multiple test phases these patterns may differ as participants familiarize themselves with 
the study environment. Specifically, participants may have more fixations for longer 
durations in test phase I (or shorter) but not in test phase III.  
Methods 
 67 Participants from a behavioral laboratory at a private east-coast laboratory 
were randomly assigned to one cell of a 3 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) 
between-subject design. This study replicated Study 2 with two exceptions: first, there 
was no manipulation of the learning phase stimuli.  
Second, participants were calibrated to an eye-tracking machine running iMotions 
before participating in the study. However, due to software issues, we were unable to use 
the eye-tracking data. 
Results 
Unfortunately, we were not able to replicate our results in a 2 (Condition) x 3 
(Order) x 4 (Phase) mixed ANOVA; there was no main effect of condition (p > .6) or 
interaction of phase and condition (p > .10). Although we found directional support for 
our theory in the learning phase (MBiased = 2.45, SE = .60; MControl = .68, SE = .61), this 
pattern was reversed in test phase I (MBiased = 1.04, SE = .54; MControl = 1.42, SE = .55), 
test phase II (MBiased = 1.19, SE = .54; MControl = .95, SE = .55), and test phase III (MBiased 
= .68, SE = .49; MControl = 1.20, SE = .50).  
Discussion 
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 Unfortunately, due to a combination of software issues and moderation by sample 
(i.e., the students did not reflect the Mechanical Turk results), we were unable to test the 
process for how our perceptual and cognitive salience effects operate. While the studies 
on mTurk yielded the predicted pattern of results, we did not find similar patterns in a 
small laboratory sample. One possibility is that, much like the low-involvement 
consumers watching advertising (Krugman 1965), mTurkers were influenced by salience, 
while laboratory participants were more engaged. Alternatively, laboratory participants, 
who were mostly comprised of students in college, may have not provided reliable 
responses due to less experience with purchasing cars. We therefore focus instead on the 
temporal effects of our salience manipulations to rule in and out classes of psychological 
explanations for these results. 
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APPENDIX F: STUDY F 
STUDY F: RULING OUT MERE TIME 
 
An alternative interpretation of Studies 2 and 3 is that the decline in the effect 
does not come from having made repeated decisions, but instead the passage of time 
leads to a drop in the effect strength. Because repeated decisions take time to complete, 
having time elapse in the task may also reduce the effect’s strength. Such a decline over 
time would be consistent with effects in other literatures (e.g., Higgins et al. 1985).  
 We rule out this possibility in Study F. We institute a delay task between the 
learning phase and test phase for some participants but not others. If time’s passage by 
itself (“mere time”) accounts for the patters in Studies 2 and 3, then participants who 
experience a delay between the learning phase and test phase should not exhibit the bias 
from the previous few studies. If time’s passage is not sufficient to lower the effect of 
cognitive salience on valuation, then we should not observe an attenuation based on a 
delay between the learning and test phases.  
 
Method 
 Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 409) were randomly assigned 
into one cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x 2 (Delay: Yes or No) between-subject 
design that was identical to Study 2, inclusive of the Biased condition only having the 
fourth attribute differ on all pages of the learning phase. Participants only saw the cars 
product category. 
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 Participants either received the delay task between the learning and test phases 
(Delay: Yes) or at the end of the study as a separate task (Delay: No). The delay task was 
a two- to three-minute reading task in which participants read an article about dolphins. 
Participants then also responded to five questions about the article (e.g., How informative 
was the article; How interesting was this article; How difficult to understand was this 
article; How well do you think this article was written; How much did the article change 
your understanding of dolphins) on seven-point Likert scales. This delay task was 
intended to not induce memory load or be overly onerous so as to elicit negative affect.  
  
Results 
 Key to the results of this study is to investigate whether there is an interaction 
between the condition (Biased or Control) and delay (Yes or No) factors in the test phase 
on the CSE index of attribute four minus the mean of attributes 1, 2, and 3. 
 Contrary to a delay between learning and test phase attenuating the effect, A 2 
(Condition) x 2 (Delay) x 4 (Order) ANOVA did not reveal the an interaction of Delay 
and Condition (F(1, 393) = .33, p = .57). Both when the Delay was absent (F(1, 393) = 
2.19, p = .14) and present (F(1, 393) = 5.44, p = .02), the Biased condition had a 
directionally larger cognitive salience bias (CSE) than the Control condition (see Figure 
F1). Therefore, instead of the predicted interaction consistent with a “mere time” 
explanation of the results of Studies 2 and 3, we observed a main effect of condition such 
that the size of the bias was larger in the Biased (M = 1.66) compared to Control (M = 
.68) condition (F(1, 393) = 7.23, p = .008).  
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Discussion 
 Study F rules out an alternative interpretation of the pattern of results from 
Studies 2 and 3: that the passage of time (“mere time”), and not having made more 
decisions, underlies the effects: there was no attenuation observed due to an enforced 
delay.  
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Table F1 
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY F FOR SIZE OF EFFECT IN 
TEST PHASE 
  
Condition Biased Control 
  
Delay Absent 1.56 (0.37) 0.79 (0.37) 
Delay Present 1.77 (0.36) 0.57 (0.37) 
   
 
  213 
Figure F1 
MERE TIME DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR EFFECT (STUDY F1) 
 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Delay Absent Delay Present
Biased
Control
  214 
APPENDIX G: STUDY G 
STUDY G: ATTRIBUTION 
 
 In Study G, we manipulate the diagnosticity of the salient attribute based on 
calling into question the nature of order effects to subjects (Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham 
2011; Schwarz et al. 1991). Participants either proceeded through the same task for cars 
as in Study 1 or were interrupted before the learning phase to be warned about being sure 
they were thinking of stable part-worths that weren’t influenced by the order in which 
they read the attributes. If questioning the diagnosticity behind what is made more 
salience conforms to standard attribution manipulations, then we should see salience 
affect valuation (part-worths) when the attribution is absent but not when it is present.  
 
Method 
 Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 369) were randomized into one 
cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 2 (Attribution: Present or Absent) 
between-subject design.  
 The study was akin to Study 1 with one major exception: participants in the 
Attribution Present condition also saw a screen before the learning phase that asked them 
to think carefully about their long-run valuation of attributes, and warned them that their 
immediate reactions would be. Specifically, this text said: 
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“When determining your willingness to pay values, please think of how 
you value each attribute level in the long run—how might you value each 
attribute beyond the confines of this study? 
 
Do not be mislead by your immediate reactions, as these may sometimes 
be influenced by unimportant aspects of the task, such as which attributes 
are first or last. After reading about each attribute level for each car, please 
take a moment to pause before stating your willingness to pay.” 
 
Results 
 Statistical Tests of Impact of Attribution on Cognitive Salience. We again codify 
the effects in terms of the index for the size of the bias: attribute four’s part-worth minus 
the mean of attributes one, two, and three. 
 Contrary to predictions in which the attribution instructions would lead to an 
attenuation of the bias, a 2 (Condition) x 2 (Attribution) x 4 (Order) ANOVA did not 
reveal the predicted interaction of Attribution and Condition (F(1, 353) = .11, p = .74). 
However, there was a main effect of condition such that the Biased condition (M = 1.05, 
SE = .26) had a larger bias than did the Control condition (M = .15, SE = .28; F(1, 353) = 
5.51, p = .019). The Biased condition had a directionally larger effect than in the Control 
condition both when the attribution instructions were absent (F(1, 353) = 3.18, p = .075) 
and when they were present (F(1, 353) = 2.33, p = .13; see Figure G1).  
Statistical Tests of Perceptual Salience. A 2 (Condition) x 2 (Attribution) x 4 
(Order) x 4 (Attribute) ANOVA in both learning and test phases revealed the same 
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position effects from Study 1. The top and bottom attributes, attributes one and four, had 
higher part-worths compared to the middle attributes (two and three) in both learning 
phase (F(1, 353) = 39.34, p < .001) and test phase (F(1, 353) = 16.57, p < .001).  
 
Discussion 
 Study G demonstrates (albeit weak) preliminary evidence that a combination of 
encouraging increased processing depth and attribution of reactions to the order of 
attributes on the page somewhat reduces the effect of increased cognitive salience. By 
questioning the diagnosticity created by salience, we find directional but nonsignificant 
evidence of attenuation by which attributes with greater salience no longer receive as 
much of a boost through salience.  
 However, given that there was still a boost in the attribute part-worth when 
salience was increased, it is possible that people have a difficult time overcoming the 
bias. There were still attribute position effects in the attribution conditions despite 
explicit warning to be cognizant of attribute position, which suggests people may under-
adjust bias.  
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Table G1 
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY G 
  
Attribute Attribution Absent Attribution Present 
 Learning Phase 
Attribute 1 3.28 (0.31) 3.80 (0.27) 
Attribute 2 2.93 (0.29) 2.94 (0.26) 
Attribute 3 1.73 (0.29) 1.51 (0.25) 
Attribute 4 3.45 (0.25) 3.26 (0.22) 
 Test Phase 
Attribute 1 2.33 (0.25) 2.82 (0.22) 
Attribute 2 2.37 (0.28) 2.41 (0.24) 
Attribute 3 1.57 (0.26) 1.46 (0.23) 
Attribute 4 2.88 (0.25) 2.64 (0.22) 
   
 
  
  218 
Table G2 
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY G FOR SIZE OF EFFECT IN 
TEST PHASE 
  
Condition Biased Control 
  
Attribution Absent 1.30 (0.38) 0.27 (0.44) 
Attribution Present 0.80 (0.36) 0.03 (0.35) 
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Figure G1 
ATTRIBUTION OF EFFECT TO POSITION DOES NOT IMPACT BIAS 
(STUDY G) 
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